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Summary
In this thesis we investigate the effects of real exchange rate (RER) uncertainty on out-
put in the context of Southern Cone economies. The first chapter provides a framework
to analyze the output effects of RER uncertainty when firms contract dollar-debt and no
hedging instruments are available, by focusing on the channel uncertainty-output operating
through the firms financial strategy. An increase in uncertainty increases the probability
of bankruptcy, raising expected marginal bankruptcy costs, and reducing optimal out-
put of a risk-neutral firm. We find the output response to uncertainty shocks to depend
on firms’ liquidity balances, trade orientation and perceptions about government assist-
ance if large exchange rate movements occur. The second chapter examines empirically
RER uncertainty effects on sectoral output for 28 manufacturing sectors in the Southern
Cone over 1970-2002. We use alternative uncertainty measures allowing different degrees
of sophistication in agents’ expectation mechanisms to estimate a supply function. We
use instrumental variable techniques to address potential simultaneity problems. Results
suggest a negative non-negligible effect of uncertainty on output, threshold effects, and
sectoral heterogeneity, explained by trade orientation, the intensity with which sectors
trade within Mercosur and by sectoral productivity. The fourth chapter investigates the
importance of past exchange rate behaviour when forming expectations and tests for the
uncovered interest parity (UIP) hypothesis in Uruguay. Using interest rate differentials
over 1980-2010 we identify a strong extrapolative component in expectations, following
an inverted-U pattern over time. Agents internalise announcements and shocks that may
affect fundamentals. Deviations from UIP are low for high-inflation periods, and high
for low-inflation periods and freely floating regimes. As long as what it takes to predict
well is simple (look backwards, follow announcements), interest rate differentials perform
well. Once exchange rate determination becomes intricate, agents fail at predicting. This
finding remains unchanged when survey data are used for the period 2005-2010.
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1Introduction
This thesis analyses exchange rate expectations and the impact of real exchange rate uncer-
tainty on manufacturing output in Southern Cone countries. It begins from the premise
that because production takes time, output decisions are in effect risky investment de-
cisions. Firstly, it investigates the channels through which uncertainty affects optimal
output. It then empirically explores the effect of changes in real exchange rate uncer-
tainty on sectoral output, over the period 1970-2002, paying close attention to sectoral
characteristics that may drive heterogeneous responses. With a generalized perception
about the central role played by real exchange rate variations on firm profitability and
thus output decisions, this thesis provides evidence from the Southern Cone economies
supporting the hypothesis that uncertainty has sizable effects on production, that the
effects are non-linear and sector-specific.
This is followed by an examination of exchange rate expectations and the extent to
which these are determined by past trends of the exchange rate, by changes in the economic
environment that may affect fundamentals, or by other mechanisms, as well as exploring
whether they have been accurate and unbiased.
The two issues are strongly related. Identifying the output effects of exchange rate
uncertainty requires measuring uncertainty in the first place. For these purposes we need
firstly, a model of how the expectations themselves are being formed. This model will
provide us with forecasts. On the basis of this, expectation errors will be used to con-
2struct a measure of uncertainty. Understanding the model behind expectation formation
mechanisms allows us to assess the validity of imposing a particular one on the represent-
ative agent.
The choice of countries and that of the source of uncertainty to be analysed is jointly
determined. The thesis draws on the case of Southern Cone countries over the period 1970-
2002 and focuses on exchange rate uncertainty. Southern Cone countries have exhibited
a particularly high record of exchange rate volatility over the period, and in addition,
have become more integrated through trade, a phenomenon which has further increased
their exposure to uncertainty. In these economies, the expected value of the exchange
rate and the uncertainty surrounding that expectation are constantly on the agenda of
manufacturer lobbies, and in the speeches of policy makers. The words of Enrique Iglesias
illustrate this point:1
“During my first years as a civil servant, as a researcher, as the Secretary of the
Commission for Investment and Economic Development, but especially, as the
President of the Central Bank, I perceived the extent to which the value of the
exchange rate was a key element both in the distributive struggle among groups
of agents, and in the economic dynamics in general. It is for these reasons that
on several occasions I have expressed my conviction that the history of the
political economy, and to a large extent, the political history of the country
could be reconstructed around the debates and viscissitudes of exchange rate
policy.”
There are several reasons why agents attach so much importance to exchange rates in
1Iglesias (2003). Enrique Iglesias has been President of the Central Bank of Uruguay, Secretary-General
of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and twice President of the
Inter-American Development Bank. His words refer to the Uruguayan case, but as argued by Frieden and
Stein (1999) the extreme importance attached to the exchange rate evolution among manufacturers and
policymakers is not restricted to Uruguay, but includes also Brazil and Argentina.
3these economies. First, because these are, to different extents, relatively open economies,
and so exchange rates affect the price of tradable goods sold by manufacturers. Second,
because during much of the 1980s and 1990s a large portion of firms contracted dollar
debt to finance their production plans irrespective of their trade orientation, introducing
important mismatches in their balance sheets and making them vulnerable to exchange
rate movements. Third, because hedging instruments to cover against exchange rate risk
have been largely unavailable in these economies until recent years. In fact, a pilot sur-
vey we conducted on Uruguayan firms at the beginning of the research confirmed that
the evolution and predictability of the exchange rate were among the top concerns of
manufacturers.
The research presented in this thesis is organised in two parts. Part I focuses on the
impact of exchange rate uncertainty on output and comprises two chapters. Part II is
fundamentally about exchange rate expectations and consists of three chapters.
Chapter 1 presents a conceptual framework to analyze the impact of exchange rate
uncertainty on the supply of output of manufactured goods. In the first part of the chapter
we review the textbook approach to analysing firms’ output decisions under uncertainty.
Typically, assumptions are made on either the probability distribution of the source of
randomness or on the preferences of the decision-makers, and the effects of changes in
uncertainty on optimal output will depend on the attitude towards risk displayed by the
firm’s managers. In the second part of the chapter we discuss the limitations of the
standard approach given the context under which firms in the Southern Cone operate.
First, we challenge the pertinence of the assumptions made by the textbook approach on
the probability distribution of the real exchange rate — this variable has been subject to
extreme jumps in several occasions during the period of analysis. Then, we discuss the
importance of incorporating the financial strategy of the firm into the analysis. The fact
that firms in the Southern Cone contract dollar debt introduces an additional channel
4through which real exchange rate uncertainty affects output decisions. In light of this
discussion, we adapt Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) to the case in which uncertainty arises
from exchange rate randomness, and introduce three extensions. A simple production
model with bankruptcy costs allows us to investigate the output response to a rise in the
degree of exchange rate uncertainty faced by competitive firms. The main result of the
model is that when firms exhibit currency mismatches, obtaining revenue in pesos and
repaying dollar debt, an increase in exchange rate uncertainty reduces optimal output,
as the marginal bankruptcy costs increase. These are part of total marginal costs, to be
equated to expected prices. The first extension of the model shows that when risk-neutral
firms do not exhibit currency mismatches, say, because they produce tradable goods whose
prices move in line with exchange rate and international price changes, optimal output will
be unaffected by an increase in uncertainty. The second extension considers firms facing
soft budget constraints, and shows that if firms are aware of the possibility of generalized
government financial assistance in the event of drastic exchange rate movements, the
output effect of an increase in uncertainty on output is ambiguous. The third extension
provides an informal discussion, and contends that in spite of the analytical ambiguity,
in the event of high uncertainty, firms will not take government financial assistance for
granted and will act cautiously, most probably disengaging from risky activities.
In Chapter 2 we empirically explore the impact of real effective exchange rate (REER)
uncertainty on the output of the manufacturing sectors in Southern Cone countries (Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Uruguay). Alternative measures of REER uncertainty are constructed,
allowing for different degrees in sophistication of the forecast model assumed for the rep-
resentative agent. Our contribution in this paper is threefold. First, we identify the
average effect of REER on output in the manufacturing sectors of Southern Cone coun-
tries. We estimate an output supply function using data from 28 manufacturing sectors
in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay over the period 1970-2002, tackling the output-price
5simultaneity problem with instrumental-variable techniques, and using alternative sets of
instruments to check the robustness of our results. We also allow for heterogeneous effects
across countries. Second, we test for the presence of threshold effects on the relation-
ship between REER uncertainty and output. Third, we test for sectoral heterogeneity in
the output response to REER uncertainty and try to identify whether trade orientation,
the intensity with which the sector trades within Mercosur, and labour productivity are
drivers of that heterogeneity. We present new evidence suggesting that REER uncertainty
has on average negatively affected the level of output produced in the manufacturing sec-
tors in Southern Cone countries over the period 1970-2002. This finding is robust to the
choice of the uncertainty measure. Further to this, we find that the average effect masks
significant specificities in the relationship. Although the effect seems to be stable when
allowing for country heterogeneity in the response, there seems to be a threshold above
which uncertainty affects output negatively, but below which the effect may even be pos-
itive. Moreover, those sectors that exhibit a higher exposure to export markets tend to
be less responsive to REER uncertainty, although the opposite is true for those that trade
intensively with Mercosur member countries. In addition, those sectors displaying a higher
degree of labour productivity are less sensitive to REER uncertainty. Last but not least,
we find that output is not only responsive to the first two moments of the distribution of
REER (mean and variance), but also to higher moments such as skewness and kurtosis.
The choice of the uncertainty measures we use in Chapter 2 is driven by data con-
straints. These measures impose a backward looking expectation formation mechanism in
which the representative agent uses an autoregressive forecast model. The question that
arises is how reasonable is this assumption? For these reasons, in Part II we focus on
exchange rate expectations.
Chapter 3 is intended to bridge Parts I and II. We review the literature on uncertainty
measures and classify them into two groups: those that impose assumptions on the agents’
6expectation formation mechanisms (like that of Chapter 2), and those that do not impose
any assumptions on these mechanisms. We find that the choice of which measure to
use tends to be driven by data availability and, generally, lacks conceptual or empirical
justification.
In an attempt to understand how reasonable it is to impose an autoregressive forecast
model for the representative agent, the following two chapters investigate key elements of
exchange rate expectations.
In Chapter 4 we examine expectation formation mechanisms, and their evolution over
time and test for unbiasedness of expectations, using data on Uruguayan interest rate
differentials over the period 1980-2010. The shift of focus from the real exchange rate
to the nominal exchange rate is motivated by data constraints. Although there is no
guarantee that agents use the same mechanisms to forecast nominal and real exchange rates
it seems likely that some lessons could be learned. Uruguay provides an interesting and
representative case. Since it is a small, open and highly dollarized economy in which agents
are proficient users of financial instruments denominated in both domestic and foreign
currency, it serves as a good approximation to the required assumption of perfect capital
mobility. During this period it went from high to low inflation levels, as well as different
exchange rate regimes: a period of short-lived and non-credible stabilization plans with
the exchange rate as a nominal anchor (Pre-TZ), a period of credible target zones for the
exchange rate (TZ), and a subsequent period in which the Central Bank had no target for
the exchange rate, and this was largely determined by market forces (Post-TZ). This raises
the question of how expectation formation mechanisms have responded to the changes in
the environment. Two regularities in the literature motivate this chapter. First, most of
the tests done on the deviations from the interest parity and on expectation formation
mechanisms have been applied to major currencies and developed economies. Second, that
most of the tests done on expectation generating mechanisms implicitly assume that the
7mechanisms are stable over time. Our contribution in this chapter is twofold. First, we
test and identify a time-variant exchange rate expectations formation mechanism in the
context of Uruguay over the period 1980-2010, and second, we test the Uncovered Interest
Parity (UIP) across different exchange rate regimes. New evidence is presented suggesting
that, on average, the autoregressive (or extrapolative) component in expectations has been
substantial. The importance attached to the past exchange rate behaviour explains why
agents tend to under predict in the event of large depreciations, but after these occur,
they tend to over predict new changes in the exchange rate. We also find the importance
attached to the past evolution of the exchange rate to have changed over time, following
an inverted-U shape pattern. Given that for about two thirds of the period considered, the
Central Bank announced some sort of target for the exchange rate, that identified evolution
is likely to be related to the credibility of the Central Bank’s announcements. Furthermore,
we find that apart from an autoregressive component, agents also display adaptive and
regressive components in expectation formation and also internalise the potential effects
of policy announcements on the path of exchange rates. In addition, we present evidence
of deviations from UIP, although these are relatively small compared to those typically
reported in the literature. The size of the deviations from the UIP is larger when looking
at sub-periods than when looking at the whole period, pointing to the importance of the
‘peso problem’ in our data. Across sub-periods, the largest deviations are found during
the last period of freely floating exchange rates, in which the economy experienced low
inflation.
In Chapter 5 we use unexploited survey data on foreign exchange rate expectations for
the Uruguayan Peso/US dollar rate available for the last five years of the post target zone
period (Post TZ). We examine firstly, expectation formation mechanisms, and secondly,
how much of the “puzzle” found in the previous chapter can be explained by expectational
failures. These survey data are useful in providing direct information on expectations,
8and allowing us to understand the extent to which the strong rejection of unbiasedness
found when using interest rate differentials is attributable to expectational failures. The
motivation for this chapter is twofold. Firstly, as mentioned, using interest rate differentials
for the Uruguayan case, we have rejected the hypothesis of unbiasedness more strongly
when looking at the Post TZ period that goes from 2003 until 2010. This period is
atypical since the Central Bank abandoned the policy of announcing a target for the
exchange rate (de jure, the regime is claimed to be one of floating), and because CPI
inflation records were low by historical standards. If one looks back at the past fifty
years, the period considered in this chapter is where the foreign exchange market most
resembles that of a small open, developed economy. To the best of our knowledge, the
survey data on the Uruguayan Peso/Dollar exchange rate expectations made available by
the Central Bank of Uruguay since June 2005 have been unexploited to date. Secondly, in
a recent contribution to the literature Frankel and Poonawala (2010) show that the bias
in expectations is lower for developing countries’ currencies than for major currencies.
The authors conjecture that relatively high inflation in developing countries may make it
easier for agents to predict the evolution of the exchange rate. We argue that, besides the
point made by Frankel and Poonawala (2010), Central Bank intervention in the foreign
exchange market, pervasive in emerging economies, is another factor that may explain
the differences in the biases. When Central Bank intervention is substantial and has a
clear and known rationale — e.g.: keeping a “competitive” exchange rate — the forecast
exercise is simplified. In order to shed light on this issue and given that Argentina and
Brazil have been undergoing a similar adaptation process to a new foreign exchange regime
(also the Argentinean Peso and the Brazilian Real were also floated around the beginning
of the 2000s, although to different extents), and that the three countries have exhibited
relatively low levels of inflation since then, we use available survey data on expectations
for the evolution of the Argentinean Peso and the Brazilian Real. We incorporate these
9markets in the analysis and test for expectational failures in the three markets. We
construct indicators of Central Bank intervention a` la Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and
examine if patterns can be extracted in the relationship between expectational failures
and intervention. When the focus is placed on the Uruguayan survey data we test for
extrapolative, adaptive and hybrid expectation formation mechanisms, with inconclusive
results. Although there is some evidence of extrapolative and adaptive mechanisms when
investigated in isolation, this vanishes when a hybrid mechanism is allowed. We present
new evidence suggesting expectational failures. In fact, unbiasedness of exchange rate
forecasts is rejected at the three time horizons considered (one, six and twelve months),
although forecasts perform well at predicting the direction of the exchange rate movement
over a one-month horizon. When looking at the three Southern Cone countries, we find
that unbiasedness of expectations cannot be rejected only for the Argentinean Peso/Dollar
market. One explanation for this result is that systematic Central Bank interventions —
as they occur in Argentina — make the forecast exercise simpler.
In light of the findings of the last two chapters, both on the drivers of expectations
mechanisms and on the tests of unbiasedness of expectations, we can claim that as long
as what it takes to predict well is rather simple — i.e. look backwards, follow policy
announcements, agents predict well. However, once the exchange rate determination model
becomes intricate, or at least unfamiliar — regimes in which the Central Bank does not
pre-announce a target for the exchange rate have not been frequent in the Southern Cone
— agents fail in their attempt to accurately predict exchange rate depreciations. The
“puzzle” often reported in the literature about the biases in expectations does not seem
so puzzling in this case.
Finally, in the concluding chapter, we summarise the findings of the earlier chapters,
present lessons learnt from the research carried out for this thesis and identify avenues for
future research.
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Part I
Uncertainty and Output
11
Chapter 1
A Framework to Analyze
Production Decisions Under
Uncertainty
1.1 Introduction
Imagine a situation of permanent long-run static equilibrium. Agents trade at equilibrium
prices, which become known by experience. There would be no uncertainty in such a
world. Producers would know how much they would get for their produce, how much they
would pay for their inputs, in which conditions they would obtain credit, and consumers
would know how much they would have to pay.
Economic decisions, however, almost invariably carry an important component of un-
certainty. Decisions taken by agents in the present will have an unknown impact in the
future. Therefore, the optimization processes through which these decisions are taken
must incorporate the fact that some of the relevant variables are not deterministic but
random. In this thesis we are concerned with a particular source of uncertainty, that with
respect to the real exchange rate, in the effect that it has had on determining sectoral
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output supply levels in Mercosur countries, over the period 1970-2002.
This chapter presents a conceptual framework through which we will analyze the im-
pact of uncertainty with respect to the real exchange rate on the supply of output of
manufactured goods, and is structured in two parts.
In the first part, we present and discuss the literature on firm behaviour under un-
certainty. For these purposes, we first need to identify the channels through which real
exchange rates are relevant for the supply of output. Output of manufactured, tradable
goods will be affected by real exchange rates because the latter variable will affect profits
obtained by producers, via effects on the price they receive, the cost of inputs they pay,
and the cost and availability of credit to finance working capital that they face. These
effects on profits will in turn affect investment decisions made by producers, determining
the production capacity of the firm. In addition, for a given production capacity, these
will affect optimal output to be produced.
Then, we define what we understand for “uncertainty”. Broadly speaking, uncertainty
exists when there is randomness associated with an outcome. If a random process governs
how much the producer will receive for its produce, or how much it will have to pay for
inputs, or credit, then, profits will also be random.
To construct our framework, we need to capture the notion of uncertainty in a partic-
ular measure. We analyze how randomness governing profits affects utility and how that
randomness can be picked up analytically. It is known that under certain restrictions im-
posed on a) preferences or b) the distribution of the random variable, the variance proves
to be a good way of capturing the notion of uncertainty.
We present the main known results of the textbook approach on the behaviour of the
firm under uncertainty — which assumes that a) or b) above are valid, and which uses the
usual taxonomy of attitudes toward risk. These are: first, that if the firm is risk-averse,
optimal output in the presence of price uncertainty will be lower than it would be the
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case in a context of certainty, and second, that under certain plausible conditions on the
type of risk-aversion faced by the firm, an increase in the degree of perceived uncertainty
reduces optimal output.
In the second part of the chapter we look at the particular context of the economies
considered in this thesis, and discuss critically the limitations of the standard approach.
On one hand, we discuss the pertinence of assumptions a) and b) in the particular con-
text of Southern Cone economies during the period analysed in this thesis. On the other,
we discuss the limitations of the standard theory of the firm. In light of this discussion,
we introduce a simple production model, adapting Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993). We
investigate the output response to a rise in the degree of exchange rate uncertainty faced
by competitive firms, and consider as separate cases firms producing non-tradable and
firms producing tradable goods. We focus on the effects of increases in uncertainty that
increase the probability of extreme exchange rate outcomes. Most of the literature on
the link between uncertainty and economic activity overlooks the effects of the financial
strategy of the firm, relies on exogenously determined attitudes to risk and on distribu-
tional assumptions that mainly reduce uncertainty to the variance of the random variable.
This model focuses on the channel linking uncertainty and output that operates through
the financial strategy of the firm. In our model, firms rely on credit markets to finance
working capital, and contract dollar-debt. The firm faces bankruptcy in the event of an
exchange rate outcome that raises debt repayment above output proceeds. Therefore, it
internalizes the expected bankruptcy costs when making the optimal output decision, thus
showing aversion to bankruptcy risk. To identify the pure-risk effect on output we focus
on changes in perceptions that lead to a higher probability of extreme exchange rates,
keeping a constant mean. Our analysis does not rely on distributional assumptions on the
exchange rate.
Our main results are the following. First, when firms exhibit currency mismatches, ob-
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taining revenue in pesos and repaying dollar-debt, an increase in exchange rate uncertainty
reduces optimal output, as the marginal bankruptcy costs increase. The anticipation of
generalized government financial assistance in the event of drastic exchange rate move-
ments exerts the opposite effect on output. However, our contention is that in the event
of high uncertainty, firms will not take government financial assistance for granted and
will act cautiously, hoarding liquidity and disengaging from risky activities. Second, firms’
liquidity balances matter for the choice of output: firms with high liquidity balances will
face low bankruptcy risks, which leads them to produce more than the average firm. This
introduces persistence in the output effects of shocks to profits because any shock to
profits, such as a reduction in output prices, or a depreciated exchange rate, will decrease
firm’s next period liquidity balances, and so, next period’s output.
Although this model draws heavily from Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), it contributes
to the literature by adapting it to the case in which uncertainty arises from exchange
rate randomness, and by presenting three extensions, namely, a) the case in which firms
exhibit currency-matched balance sheets, b) the case in which firms perceive the possibility
of government financial assistance in the event of drastic exchange rate movements, and
c) the case of firms facing high uncertainty.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the chan-
nels through which real exchange rates affect output decisions. Section 1.3 presents the
situations in which uncertainty arises in a production process and discusses the distinction
between risk and uncertainty. Section 1.4 reviews the literature on the effects of uncer-
tainty on output, firstly by looking at the effects on investment, and secondly, by looking
at the effects on optimal output, for a given production capacity. Section 1.5 focuses on
the limitations of the standard approach to the analysis of production under uncertainty.
Section 1.6 introduces a simple production model to analyse firm behaviour under uncer-
tainty that overcomes some of the shortcomings of the standard approach. In Section 1.7
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we present some extensions of that model, and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Real Exchange Rates and Output
We argue that uncertainty with respect to the real exchange rate affects output of man-
ufacturing sectors in Southern Cone countries. For that to be true, the level of the real
exchange rate (RER) itself must have an effect on output in the first place. Here we define
RER = EP ∗/P , where E is the nominal exchange rate expressed as domestic currency
(pesos) per unit of foreign currency (dollar), P ∗ and P are the foreign and domestic prices
respectively.
What are the channels through which real exchange rates affect output supply under
competition?1
1. Price channel: If manufactured goods are tradable, then the price faced by the
producer will move with international prices and nominal exchange rates. Increases
in international prices or domestic currency (peso) depreciations (i.e. increases in
the RER) will increase supply.
2. Costs of Inputs channel: the cost of intermediate imported inputs, or wages that
are indexed to foreign inflation or exchange rates will increase with a depreciation
of the peso or with an increase in international prices (i.e. increases in the RER).
This will reduce supply. The net effect of channels 1+2 should be to increase supply
as long as value added is positive.
3. Availability (and therefore cost) of Credit channel: firms use credit markets
to obtain working capital. Depreciations will affect credit supply both for trad-
able and non tradable firms. This is particularly relevant when considering drastic
1Note that the focus here is put on the channels through which real exchange rates affect the aggregate
supply of output. In addition to these supply channels, output will be affected by demand factors that
will not be considered here.
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depreciations as Southern Cone economies exhibit two characteristics: a) Capital
markets are imperfect, and so, firms face an external finance premium, defined as
the gap between the opportunity cost of using own funds and recurring to external
funds, and dependent on borrowers’ net worth. b) Firms typically exhibit a currency
mismatch in their balance sheets. Dollar liabilities exceed dollar assets. Therefore,
depreciations of real exchange rate lower firms’ real net worth, raising the external
finance premium and so the cost of credit, and thereby reducing supply. However,
this effect depends on the composition of the firm’s net worth. For firms producing
in the tradable sector, a real depreciation increases the expected present value of
profits after a real depreciation at the same time that increases the burden of the
dollar debt. These firms will be less affected in their ability to obtain credit (if at
all) than those producing in the non-tradable sector.2
1.3 Uncertainty and Risk: Definitions and Measures
Uncertainty arises when the consequence of a decision is not a single sure outcome, but
a number of possible outcomes. Figure 1.1 shows three production timing scenarios to
visualise the sources of uncertainty associated with production decisions.
(Sc1) Certainty: The firm produces in period one, when inputs are transformed into
output instantaneously, with known output and input prices. The proceeds of the
output are used to pay inputs. Everything is known with certainty.
(Sc2) Two Periods, No Working Capital Needs: In period one the firm makes a
commitment to produce and fixes input prices. In period two, inputs are transformed
into output instantaneously. Output prices are revealed, output is sold and the
proceeds are used to pay for the inputs. Firms do not need working capital. When
2For a full discussion of the credit channel, see Bernanke and Gertler (1995)
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making the production decision they only face uncertainty with respect to output
prices.
(Sc3) Two Periods, Working Capital Needs: Here, production takes time. The
production process starts in period one, when inputs are purchased, but it is only in
period two when output can be sold. Working capital needs arise. Firms contract
dollar debt in period one at the risk-free interest rate (we assume no default risk).
In period two, output prices and exchange rates are revealed. When making the
production decision firms face uncertainty with respect to output prices and the
peso cost of the dollar debt. Under these conditions, output decisions are risky
investment decisions.
Figure 1.1: Timing of the Production Decision
Sc2 and Sc3 seem to better describe reality than Sc1. Forward contracts are a way
to reduce exposure to real exchange rate risk. However, these have not been available for
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most of the period of analysis, and when they have, their costs have been prohibitive.3
We make three assumptions in the analysis that follows:
(1) All agents have in mind the same set of states of the world.
(2) When the future arrives, they all recognize and agree on the state of the world that
prevailed.
(3) Agents are able to assign probabilities to the states of the world occurring in the
future, and these probabilities satisfy probability laws.
Thus agents are, in Knight’s sense, exposed to risk rather than uncertainty (Knight
(1921)). Knightian ‘risk’ refers to situations in which mathematical probabilities can be
assigned to the random variable that is faced. Knightian ‘uncertainty’ refers to situations
in which the agent can’t assign probabilities. This was later expressed by Keynes:
“By uncertain knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to dis-
tinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of
roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty...The sense in which I am
using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain,
or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence...About these
matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability
whatever. We simply do not know.” (Keynes, 1937, pp.213-214)
This distinction has been disputed. It could be argued that there is not much difference
between uncertainty and risk if we believe probabilities are only subjectively defined. In
3This assertion is based on an informal discussion with the Secretariat of the Uruguayan Union of
Exporters. In addition, as argued in Borensztein et al. (2008) this seems to apply to Argentina as well.
In Brazil, only large firms use forward contracts, and still it is a recent trend. It is argued that because
these countries have had fixed or predetermined exchange rate regimes for long periods, firms frequently
have not internalized exchange rate risk as an additional cost, given that the Central Bank was implicitly
offering an insurance against variations. That could help explaining absence of a better developed forward
market for the exchange rate.
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any case, and as Keynes argues later in the same text, the necessity for action and for
decision compels us to do our best to overlook the impossibility of assigning objective
probabilities to the occurrence of an array of possible states of the world. This necessity, he
claims, makes us behave as if we could. For these reasons, in what follows, uncertainty and
risk will be considered as interchangeable. These terms will be used to describe a situation
in which there are multiple possible outcomes, and we will proceed as if probabilities of
occurrence could be assigned.
Having defined what it is understood here by uncertainty, it is necessary to choose
how to capture that concept in one measure before turning to the analysis of optimal
output choice. The measure of uncertainty most commonly found in the literature is the
variance. This measure considers all the possible outcomes of a given random event and its
associated probabilities. To explore in the context of uncertain profits, if the variance fully
captures the notion of uncertainty we follow the exposition of Gravelle and Rees (1992).
Take a firm with profits (pis) that have a deterministic (p¯i) plus a stochastic component
(), where  is the deviation of profits about its mean, and E() = 0. The utility function
of this firm, U , could be written as a Taylor’s series expansion around p¯i, as follows:
U(pis) =
U(p¯i)
0!
+
U ′(p¯i)
1!
+
U ′′(p¯i)
2!
2 +
U ′′′(p¯i)
3!
3 + ...+
Un(p¯i)
n!
n (1.1)
And if we take expectations:
E[U(pis)] = U(p¯i) + U ′(p¯i)E[] +
U ′′(p¯i)
2!
E[2] +
U ′′′(p¯i)
3!
E[3] + ...+
Un(p¯i)
n!
E[n] (1.2)
Equation 1.2 shows that expected utility depends on the mean of the distribution of
profits, and on all other higher moments about the mean, which characterize the distri-
bution: variance, skewness, kurtosis, and so on. This suggests that in general, all of the
moments of the distribution matter for the decision-maker when she faces uncertainty.
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However, focusing only on the mean and variance is appropriate when we place restric-
tions on preferences (utility function) or the distribution of the random variable. These
are:
(A1) On Preferences: The utility function is such that the n-th order derivatives are
zero (n ≥ 3).
(A2) On the Distribution: The probability distributions of the random variable, differ
only by parameters of scale and location, with parameters of shape that are constant
or a function of those of location and scale.4
To prove that A1 would reduce the expected utility analysis to a scrutiny of mean and
variance, take a quadratic utility function. As the higher order derivatives are zero, the
last terms in equation (1.2) are zero. Thus, expected utility would only depend on the
mean and the variance of the distribution.
A2 will hold for any family of distributions (however complex these are) that could be
fully characterized by measures of location and scale, which implies that its shape is either
constant or a definite function of location and scale. Gravelle shows that A2 would also
reduce the expected utility analysis to an examination of mean and variance (Gravelle and
Rees, 1992, pp. 577-9). Take a probability distribution pi0 and another one, pii. If these
belong to a set that only differ by location and scale, with constant shape parameters,
then:
pii ∼ αi + βipi0 (1.3)
4A location parameter shifts a distribution without changing standard deviation or shape. A scale
parameter is a multiple of the standard deviation. A shape parameter is neither a location nor a scale
parameter, that affects the shape of a distribution (determining for example, skewness and kurtosis of a
distribution, see Everitt (2002)).
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For equation 1.3 to hold, then,
F (pii) = Pr[pii ≤ pi] = Pr[αi + βipi0 ≤ pi] = Pr[pi0 ≤ (pi − αi)
βi
] = F0(
pi0 − αi
βi
) (1.4)
If µi and σi are the mean and standard deviation of the i − th member of the set of
probability distributions, then z, a standardized variable could be constructed from pi0:
z˜ =
pi0 − µ0
σ0
(1.5)
which has the distribution function:
G(z) = Pr[z˜ ≤ z] = Pr[pi
0 − µ0
σ0
≤ z] = Pr[pi0 ≤ µ0 + σ0z] = F0(µ0 + σ0z) (1.6)
with probability density g(z), zero mean and unit variance. If we use equation (1.5) to
substitute for pi0 = µ0 + σ0z we can rewrite equation (1.3) as:
pii ∼ αi + βiµ0 + βiσ0z = µi + σiz (1.7)
since µi = αi + βiµ0 and σi = βiσ0.
Then, the expected utility of the agent can be written, using equation 1.7 as:
∫
U(pii)fi(pii)dpii =
∫
U(µi + σiz)g(z)dz = u(µi, σi) (1.8)
The ordering of prospects of the decision-maker, which differ only in location and scale
parameters, depends only on their mean and standard deviation.
A1 and A2 impose restrictions on the domain of applicability of the variance as an
appropriate measure for capturing the notion of uncertainty. It is, however, a convenient
measure, and therefore, widely used in the literature. We discuss the implications and
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the soundness of these assumptions in Section 1.5.1, and now proceed taking A1 or A2
as acceptable. The analysis of expected utility of profits is thus reduced to the analysis
of mean and variance of profits. How do changes in mean and variance of profits affect
utility?
Increases in the mean of pii will increase expected utility, as can be seen in (1.9), while
the effect on expected utility of an increase in its standard deviation will depend on the
sign of Cov[U ′(µi + σiz), z], as can be seen in (1.10).
∂u
∂µi
=
∫
U ′(µi + σiz)g(z)dz = E[U ′(µi + σiz)] > 0 (1.9)
∂u
∂σi
=
∫
U ′(µi + σiz)zg(z)dz = E[U ′(µi + σiz)× z] (1.10)
= E[U ′(µi + σiz)]× E[z] + Cov[U ′(µi + σiz), z]
= Cov[U ′(µi + σiz), z]
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the standard deviation leaves the risk-averse agent
worse-off, the risk-lover better-off, and keeps the utility of the risk-neutral unchanged.5
1.4 Uncertainty and Output
The effects of real exchange rate uncertainty on output take place through two channels.
Uncertainty affects investment decisions, thus potential output in the economy. Then, for
a given production capacity, uncertainty will affect output decisions. There is extensive
literature on the first link both at a theoretical and empirical level in which the irrevers-
5This is because E(z) = 0, as implied by equation 1.5 and Cov[U ′(µi + σiz), z] < 0 for the risk-averse,
Cov[U ′(µi + σiz), z] > 0 for the risk-lover, and Cov[U ′(µi + σiz), z] = 0 for the risk-neutral.
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ibility of investment plays a key role. We review that literature in section 1.4.1 and in
section 1.4.2 we focus on the effects of real exchange rate uncertainty on output, for a
given production capacity.
1.4.1 The Effects of Uncertainty on Production Capacity
Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983) pioneered this literature and argue that increased uncer-
tainty could affect investment positively. The authors showed that the combination of a
perfectly competitive environment, constant returns to scale and symmetric capital adjust-
ment costs implied a convex relationship between the expected profitability of capital and
prices. This convexity implies that a mean-preserving increase in price uncertainty will
raise expected profitability of capital (applying Jensen’s inequality, E(Π(P )) ≥ Π(E(P ))),
thus increasing the optimal capital stock, which stimulates investment. (Hartman, 1972,
pp.: 262-263)
These conclusions have been challenged by a number of authors who emphasize the role
asymmetric capital adjustment costs play in the links between uncertainty and investment.
Dixit and Pindyck (1994), for example, argue that downward adjustment is costlier than
upward adjustment due to irreversibilities in the investment process. Irreversibility may
arise because of the “lemons problem”6, because of the specificity of capital7, or because
of industry-wide shocks.8 In this context, and if it is possible to postpone the investment
decision, price uncertainty will bring about an asset for the firm, a call option originated
by the chance the firm has to postpone carrying out the investment plan awaiting for
more information on output prices. That call option is valuable because in a context of
6If there is asymmetry of information on the quality of the second-hand machinery being sold, incentives
will exist for the seller to try to sell a good of low quality as one of higher quality. Aware of this incentive,
the buyer will take the quality of the good to be average. As a consequence, high-quality goods will not
be traded in this market.
7If there are not many firms in a particular sector, and the machinery is specific, the chances of re-selling
it decrease.
8If a sector is affected by a negative shock, then, the chances of finding a buyer for the a specific unit
of capital at a price close to its replacement value decreases.
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uncertainty, waiting to invest may give a better picture of the market conditions. This
implies that for an investment project to be carried out, it is not enough for the expected
discounted profit flow to exceed the initial investment, it should now exceed the sum of
the initial investment plus the opportunity cost of exercising the option (i.e.: the value of
the option). This depresses investment at a given point in time.9
Further contributions to the literature have built upon the irreversibility argument,
adding the possibility of costly upward adjustment of the capital stock. One example is
the work done by Abel et al. (1996). These authors consider investment to be reversible,
but attach a cost to that reversibility. The resale price of capital may be less than its
current acquisition price. In addition, they consider expandability to be costly as well.
The firm can continue to invest later, but the price of capital may be higher than its
current acquisition price. If uncertainty on returns (due to say, output price uncertainty)
is incorporated, two options arise: a call option that is generated by the possibility of
expandability the firm faces, and a put option, which lies in the chance the firm has of a
future sale of the machinery. An increase in uncertainty will have ambiguous effects on
investment. This is because it increases the benefits of waiting for further information in
order to invest, i.e.: it increases the value of the call option, thus reducing the current
incentive to invest. At the same time, it also increases the benefits of waiting for further
information in order to disinvest, i.e.: it increases the value of the put option, thus increas-
ing the current incentive to invest. The net effect, according to the authors, will depend
on the values of these two options.
The apparent ambiguity in the theoretical literature has encouraged significant empir-
ical research on the links between uncertainty and investment. The work by Pindyck and
Solimano (1993) , that of Aizenman and Marion (1999) and Serven (2003) is of particular
9It is worth mentioning that these effects could be economically significant. For example, McDonald
and Siegel (1986) show, in a model of irreversible investment, that moderate uncertainty could significantly
increase the required rate of return for investments to be carried out.
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interest, as it focuses on developing countries. Pindyck and Solimano (1993) explore the
empirical relevance of irreversibility and uncertainty for aggregate investment behaviour
on a sample of 29 developed and developing countries, performing a comparison between
this relevance between the former and the latter group. The authors found a negative
relationship between uncertainty and investment, of a moderate size, and “of greater mag-
nitude for developing countries” (Pindyck and Solimano, 1993, p33). They also related
the volatility of the marginal profitability of capital to indices of economic and political
stability. They found that inflation was the only robust explanatory variable of the mar-
ginal profitability of capital.10 Then, Aizenman and Marion (1999) work on a sample
of forty African, Asian and Latin American developing countries. These authors found
a significant negative correlation between several measures of uncertainty and aggregate
private investment, while they found that some evidence of public investment spending
being positively correlated with uncertainty.11 They explore the role of market imperfec-
tions in the link between uncertainty and private investment. In particular, they argue
that investment expansions in good times are restricted by the existence of credit ceil-
ings, while the drops in bad times are not, which contributes to a negative relationship
between uncertainty and investment. These authors use volatility and uncertainty as inter-
changeable concepts. However, for their result to be explained by market imperfections as
they claim, investors would need to perceive whether what is approaching are good times,
and in that case invest - and be potentially constrained by credit ceilings, or bad times,
and then disinvest with no restriction. In that case, the distinction between uncertainty
and foreseen fluctuations would seem necessary. Serven (2003) assesses the effect of real
10As indices of economic stability they considered inflation, the volatility of inflation, the volatility of
the real exchange rate, and the volatility of the real interest rate. As indices of political stability they
considered an estimate of the probability of a change in government within one year, the average number
of assassinations, government crises, strikes, riots, revolutions, and constitutional changes per year.
11They considered uncertainty over government expenditure, money growth, real exchange rates, and an
index of the previous three variables.
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exchange rate uncertainty on private investment in a sample of sixty-one countries over
twenty-four years. The author finds a strong negative effect of uncertainty on aggregate
private investment. In addition, he finds evidence of threshold effects in the link between
uncertainty and investment. Higher levels of uncertainty exert larger effects on investment
than lower levels of uncertainty - which showed to have no significant effects.12
1.4.2 Uncertainty, Risk Aversion, and Output Decisions, Given Produc-
tion Capacity
Sandmo (1971) has shown that firms behave differently under certainty than under un-
certainty. Then Hawawini (1978) has used a geometric approach to show firm’s behaviour
under uncertainty relying on a mean-variance framework, first introduced by Markowitz
(1952) and extended by Tobin (1958). Here we follow Hawawini (1978)’s exposition. Op-
timal output levels of a firm operating in Sc1 (of certainty) are compared with those of
one operating in Sc2 (of output price uncertainty).13 Second, the output effects of changes
in uncertainty, starting with positive uncertainty are presented.
When the firm operates in Sc1, the producer will choose output to maximise a profit
function as in (1.11), where p is deterministic.
Π = pq − c(q) (1.11)
dΠ
dq
= p− c′(q) = 0 (1.12)
12“Higher” and “lower” are arbitrarily defined by the author: countries are ranked according to their
uncertainty score. Those above the median of the distribution are considered high-uncertainty countries.
Those below are considered low-uncertainty countries.
13The analysis of the firm operating in Sc3 is presented in Section 1.6.
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d2Π
dq2
= −c′′(q) < 0 if c′′ > 0 (1.13)
The standard result is obtained, in which the firm maximises profits when q∗ is chosen
such that p = c′(q).
Let us now move to a situation in which there is risk.
1.4.2.1 The locus of opportunity for risk and expected profits
When we move to Sc2, we introduce price uncertainty. The choice of output entails risk in
terms of profits. Here, the locus of opportunity for risk and expected profits when agents
face output price uncertainty is identified. This locus shows the terms under which the
producer can obtain greater expected profits at the expense of greater risk.
Consider a profit function as in equation (1.11). Prices are randomly distributed. Its
distribution is assumed to be fully characterized by two parameters: µp and σp, which
implies that A2 holds. Thus, the mean-variance approach to be introduced in what fol-
lows is fully compatible with utility maximization, regardless of producer preferences, as
discussed in Section 1.3.14
Expected profits can be expressed as:
µΠ = µpq − c(q) (1.14)
The risk associated to profits, Π, is measured by its standard deviation, σΠ. Take
the standard deviation of equation (1.11). The standard deviation of Π depends on the
14Hawawini (1978) assumes prices being normally distributed. We believe that is an unnecessary restric-
tion as any distribution that can be fully characterized by location and scale parameters (the normal is
one case) would make a mean-variance analysis fully compatible with utility maximization, regardless of
producer preferences.
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standard deviation of p and on the quantity produced, q in the following manner:
σΠ = qσp (1.15)
The quantity of output produced, q, determines both the expected return µΠ, and the
risk σΠ. As output increases, so does the standard deviation of profits, for a given σp15.
Line OB in the bottom part of Figure (1.2) shows the relation between output and σΠ.
The slope of that line is given by 1/σp.
Figure 1.2: Locus of Opportunity for Expected Profits and Risk
The curve OP in the upper part of Figure (1.2) shows the terms under which the
producer can obtain greater expected profits at the expense of assuming more risk. This
is presented analytically in equation (1.16), which is obtained by substituting (1.15) into
15We are assuming firms being price-takers. Their output decisions affect neither µp, nor σp
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(1.14). To explore the shape of this locus, we differentiate equation (1.16) with respect
to σΠ. If c′′(q) > 0, µpi is a concave function of σpi as indicated in Figure 1.2, with a
maximum consistent with µp = c′(q) (see equations 1.16 and 1.17).
µΠ = µp
σΠ
σp
− c(σΠ
σp
) (1.16)
dµΠ
dσΠ
=
µp
σp
− c′(σΠ
σp
)(
1
σp
) (1.17)
dµΠ
dσΠ
= 0 if c′ = µp (1.18)
d2µΠ
dσ2Π
= 0− 1
σp
c′′(
σΠ
σp
)
1
σp
= − 1
σ2p
c′′(
σΠ
σp
) < 0 if c′′ > 0 (1.19)
1.4.2.2 The loci of indifference between combinations of risk and expected
profits
To identify the effect of uncertainty on the quantity of output produced, the preferences
of the producer need to be considered, which reflect her attitude toward risk.
The producer is assumed to have preferences between expected profits, µΠ and its
standard deviation, σΠ. Because A2 holds, these preferences can be represented by a
map of indifference curves in the µΠ − σΠ plane as illustrated in Figure (1.3). The usual
taxonomy with respect to attitude to risk is considered: risk-neutral, risk-averse and risk-
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loving producers.
The first are those who only care about expected profits, and do not attach any weight
to the amount of risk. For these producers, the indifference curves will be horizontal.
Higher expected profits are preferred over lower, irrespective of the risk associated with
profits. So, I3 is preferred to I2, which in turn is preferred to I1.
The risk-averters will not accept more risk unless they can also expect greater profits.
They trade off expected profits with profit-risk. Their indifference curves will be positively
sloped and convex (we provide a proof in Appendix A, not available in Hawawini (1978)).
Figure 1.3: Indifferences Curves between µΠ and σΠ and Attitude to Risk
The risk-lovers, instead, are willing to accept lower expected profits in order to have the
chance of unusually high profits, afforded by high values of σΠ. Their indifference curves
will be negatively sloped and concave (we provide a proof in Appendix A, not available in
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Hawawini (1978)).
From this framework, the first result is derived:
Proposition 1. Comparing with a certainty environment, the introduction of a mean-
preserving increase in uncertainty leads the risk-neutral agent to produce the same amount
of output, the risk-averter to produce a lower amount and the risk-lover to produce a larger
amount. (Conclusion i in Hawawini (1978))
Combine the locus of opportunities with the preferences of the agents. This can be
seen in Figure (1.4). Panel A shows the case of the risk neutral producer. The producer
will decide the combination of expected profits and risk so as to reach the highest indiffer-
ence curve permitted by the opportunity locus. This indifference curve is tangent to the
opportunity locus in its maximum. That maximum point is consistent with µp = c′(q),
as can be seen in equation (1.18). By projecting the maximum of the opportunity locus
OP into the output-risk line OB, we can see the level of output produced, q∗RN . Thus,
a mean-preserving increase in uncertainty (i.e.: one which leaves the expected price equal
to the price in the absence of uncertainty), starting from a situation of zero risk, will not
affect the output decision of this risk-neutral agent, as the producer will choose output
such that µp = c′(q) and µp = p.
The case of the risk-averter is shown in Panel B of Figure 1.4. Assume that she is
willing to trade off higher risk for higher expected profits in the terms given by the map of
indifference curves “I”. Again, this producer decides the amount to produce so as to reach
the highest indifference curve permitted by her opportunity locus. The tangency point
implies a level of output q∗RA. This level of output is found by projecting the tangency
point into the output-risk line OB, in the lower half of the graph. Output here is lower
than that produced by the agent in a context of certainty (p = c′(q)).
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Figure 1.4: Output and Uncertainty
Finally, the case of the risk-loving type is illustrated in Panel C of figure 1.4.16 This
producer will trade off the prospect of unusually high profits that are afforded by higher
levels of σΠ for lower expected profits, and will maximise her utility subject to the con-
straint given by the opportunity locus OP by choosing the indifference curve that is
tangent to OP . The tangency point is located in the downward sloping section of OP .
The corresponding level of output produced, q∗RL, is found by projecting the tangency
point into the output-risk line OB, in the lower half of the graph. Output is higher than
that produced in a context of certainty.17
16This is not presented in Hawawini (1978).
17Note that given the slope and curvature of the indifference curves of the risk-lover type, multiple
equilibria may arise. Slopes and curvatures of the indifference curves are derived in Appendix A.
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1.4.2.3 Effects of Increases in Risk, starting from Positive Risk
“Conclusion vi” of Hawawini (1978) expresses that the firm with decreasing absolute risk
aversion will decrease its level of output when risk is revised upwards. We extend slightly
that conclusion and provide a geometric proof for it in what follows.
Proposition 2. An increase in perceived risk will lead to a decrease in output produced by
the agent exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion or decreasing absolute risk aversion.
The effect on output for the agent exhibiting increasing absolute risk aversion is ambiguous.
To prove this proposition, Hawawini (1978) uses the concepts of decreasing, constant
and increasing absolute risk aversion defined by Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965). An agent
is said to display increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) if her aversion increases with
increasing profit. This means that given the trade off between expected profits and risk,
an increase in profits makes this agent less willing to accept more risk for the same extra
expected profits than before the increase (Panel (A) of Figure 1.5). Constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) is displayed if risk aversion remains constant as profits increase, whereas
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) is displayed when her degree of risk aversion
decreases with increasing profits (Panels (B) and (C) of Figure 1.5).18
If there is an increase in the perceived risk, σp, then the profit-opportunity locus will
shift to the right, from OP to OP ′. This is shown in Figure 1.6. This locus, OP ′ has the
same shape and same maximum while being more spread out than OP .
We examine what happens to the slope of the locus after an increase in price-risk, for
a fixed level of output. Notice that if q is constant, then µΠ = µp × q − c(q) is constant,
but σΠ = qσp will have risen, after the increase in σp. So, the question can be rephrased
as: what happens to the slope of the locus at a given value of µΠ. This is presented in
18The type of aversion to risk reflects the form of concavity of the utility function. Algebraically, these
measures of risk aversion considered here are defined as r(pi) = −u′′(pi)/u′(pi). If IARA, then r′ > 0. If
DARA, , then r′ < 0, If CARA, then r′ = 0. See Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) for a detailed discussion
on this subject.
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Figure 1.5: Types of Risk Aversion
equation 1.20
Remember that:
dµΠ
dσΠ
=
µp
σp
− c′(σΠ
σp
)(
1
σp
) and
dσΠ
dσp
= q
So,
d
dσp
(dµΠ
dσΠ
)∣∣∣
dq=0
= −µp
σ2p
+ c′
1
σ2p
− c
′′
σp
[
− σΠ
σ2p
+
1
σp
σΠ
σp
]
(1.20)
The term in brackets of (1.20) is zero because d(σΠ/σp) = 0 if dq = 0. Thus, for q
constant, an increase in risk leads to a decrease in the slope of the locus, if the agent is
risk averse (as (c′ − µp) < 0). Now, compare points A and A’ in Figure (1.6). The (’)
optimum has to lie to the left of A’ if the intersection at A’ is as drawn. That can only
not be true if the indifference curve that passes through A’ (I’(A’)) is flatter than that one
passing through I(A). From the geometry, that implies IARA. Agents displaying CARA
or DARA will produce less after an increase in perceived risk.
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The intuition behind these results can be understood by trying to decompose the
change in output into what can be called an income and substitution effect. For all risk
averse agents, an increase in risk increases the risk-cost of any level of output, and then,
they will decrease it, to decrease their exposure to risk. This is the substitution effect.
The income effect, however, works in different directions depending on the type of
risk-aversion displayed. For an agent with CARA an increase in risk makes her worse off,
but that does not change her degree of risk aversion. The income effect will be zero in this
case. So, the effect of an increase in risk on output is negative. For the agent displaying
DARA, the increase in risk leaves her worse-off, and the worse-off she is, the more risk
averse she becomes. Therefore, she will now reduce output to reduce her exposure to risk.
Both income and substitution effects lead to a reduction in output after an increase in
risk. For the agent displaying IARA being worse-off makes her become less risk-averse,
and so, she’ll be prone to increase her risk exposure. The income effect here leads her
to produce more, but the substitution to produce less. The final effect for this agent is
ambiguous.
1.4.3 Do Agents Display DARA, CARA or IARA?
Is it reasonable to assume that absolute risk aversion is non-increasing? Arrow (1974), for
example, argues that the assumption of risk aversion can be defended both from personal
introspection and from its success in explaining economic phenomena, and in particular,
that wealth moderates an individual’s risk aversion. After this hypothesis, a significant
portion of the empirical literature on signs and magnitudes of measures of attitudes to
risk has focused on testing the effect of wealth on an individual’s risk aversion.19
19Arrow’s hypothesis was that agents display DARA and increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). While
the measure of absolute risk aversion is pertinent when describing situations in which total wealth has a
stochastic fixed portion (income), and a variable non-stochastic portion (wealth), the measure of relative
risk aversion is appropriate when both stochastic and non stochastic parts are changing proportionally.
Our focus here is on absolute risk aversion, as that’s what determines the direction of the change in output
after an increase in perceived risk, in our conceptual framework.
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Figure 1.6: Effects of an Increase in Risk
In general, the literature follows a two-stage procedure, first measuring attitudes to
risk, then, exploring their determinants. For the first stage, the available evidence can be
divided into those that follow an experimental approach, generally based on simulations
in which individuals answer questionnaires or face gambles with real or hypothetical gains
or losses, and those that follow an econometric approach, generally assuming expected
utility maximization (with an assumption on the functional form), obtaining estimable
parameters of risk-aversion with data on past actual economic decisions on the subject
of analysis. None of the approaches is without criticism. Assuming external validity of
lab-based experiments is heroic. Econometrics, on the other hand, generates identification
problems when probabilities individuals face need to be estimated with variables that also
affect attitudes to risk. In addition, in the presence of imperfections, this approach is
likely to confound risk behaviour with other factors, such as resource constraints that may
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affect behaviour in a similar way as attitudes to risk (Eswaran and Kotwal (1990), Lybbert
and Just (2007)). Still, there seems to be significant evidence produced using either of
the approaches, suggesting that agents’ risk aversion decreases with wealth. A thorough
discussion on this literature is out of the scope of this thesis. For this reason, we focus on
four key contributions.20
A seminal contribution in this field is that of Binswanger (1980). The author’s exper-
iment consists of eight gambles that a set of Indian farmers are confronted with, whose
outcome is determined by a coin toss. These gambles ranged from a certain amount of
money obtained regardless of the result of the coin toss, to a large gain with 50% prob-
ability, and a zero gain with 50% probability.21 Individuals then played the gambles at
different payoff levels. Given budget restrictions, some of the gambles were hypothetical,
and some offered real payoffs for the individual. Their choices allowed the researcher to
assign a particular measure of risk aversion. In a second stage, these measures were re-
gressed on a set of demographic characteristics for each payoff level. The author finds that
at high payoff levels, almost all individuals are moderately risk-averse, with little variation
associated to personal characteristics. He finds some evidence in favour of DARA, but only
at low payoff levels. A recent contribution using a similar approach is that of Wik et al.
(2004). The authors analyze risk attitude patterns among households carrying out farm-
ing activities in Northern Zambia using repeated gambling experiments, thus generating
a panel dataset. Gains-only and gains-and-losses gambling experiments with real payoffs
are used here. In the second stage, exploiting the panel structure of the data by using
random-effects interval regression, the authors found evidence of DARA. Two often-cited
papers that use econometrics are those of Chavas and Holt (1996) and Bar-Shira et al.
20Although most of the empirical work on this subject deals with farming decisions, and they refer to
non Latin American contexts, it can still offer us some useful insights.
21None of the gambles involves losses to the farmers. The maximum gains were close to a farmer’s daily
wage.
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(1997). The former uses simultaneous equations’ techniques in order to estimate jointly
the parameters of a risk preference function and those of a production function, in the
context of corn-soybean acreage decisions in the U.S. The authors find evidence of DARA.
The latter focuses on farming decisions in Israel, and uses a Taylor-series approximation
of an expected utility function around the mean wealth level, which produces estimable
risk aversion coefficients. Their results suggest that absolute risk aversion decreases with
wealth, thus supporting Arrow’s hypothesis.
1.5 The Limitations of the Standard Approach
Here we discuss the limitations of the approach we have just outlined. In Section 1.5.1
we focus on the validity of a mean-variance analysis, and in Section 1.5.2 on the implicit
assumptions the standard theory of the firm makes on the capital structure.
1.5.1 Is the Variance a Good indicator of Uncertainty?
The analysis of the impact of uncertainty on output that was presented above reduced the
concept of uncertainty to the variance of the random variable. That implies that either
A1 or A2 holds. Here we discuss how reasonable these restrictions are.
“In economics, the relevant probability distributions are not nearly Gaussian,
and quadratic utility in the large leads to well-known absurdities”. Samuelson
(1970)
To illustrate the problems associated with A1 take a quadratic utility as in equation
(1.21):
U(pi) = a+ bpi + cpi2 (1.21)
(where a > 0, b > 0, c < 0).
(1) Agents display negative marginal utility of profits when these exceed −b/2c.
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(2) Agents display IARA. Pratt (1964) defines absolute risk aversion (ARA) as r(pi) =
−u′′(pi)/u′(pi). If r′(pi) > 0, agents display IARA. For a function as in (1.21), r(pi) =
−2c/b+ 2cpi, and r′(pi) = 4c2(b+ 2cx)−2 > 0.
Instead, what seems to be widely accepted is that agents typically display DARA. Pratt
(1964), for example, suggests that “people might generally pay less for insurance against
a given risk the greater their assets” [pp. 122-3], implying DARA. The common findings
in the empirical literature support the hypothesis of DARA, as discussed in Section 1.4.3.
Let us turn the attention to the implications of A2. Distributions that differ only
by location or scale will have shape parameters that are functions of location and scale
(or constants). An example is the Normal, in which the parameters of location (µ) and
scale (σ) fully characterize the distribution, and measures of shape, such as skewness and
kurtosis are constants (= 0 and = 3 respectively). In the context of financial studies, it is
generally claimed that probability distributions of asset returns cannot be fully paramet-
erized by measures of location and scale. These distributions may also exhibit differences
in measures of shape, implying that A2 does not hold.22
An example helps to illustrate why reducing the analysis of uncertainty to that of mean
and variance of the random variable is inadequate if distributions also differ in shape.
Figure 1.7 shows the behaviour of two series: “Fixed” and “Flexible”. Fixed exhibits
an extreme episode in periods t = 23 and t = 24, and it takes a constant value equal to
one for the rest of the period. Flexible shows permanent and mild variation. Would agents
22In fact, an unpublished manuscript of Samuelson suggests “Full-Scale Optimization” (FSO), a method-
ology in which return distributions are used in their entirety (Hagstromer et al. (2007)). The computational
burden of this method is significant, and will not be considered here. For more on FSO, see Cremers et al.
(2005). Another advocate against the assumption of distributions that only differ by location or scale
in the context of economic analysis is Taleb (2007), and in fact, focuses his criticism on the extensive
use of gaussian distributional assumptions in economics. The author argues against the validity of these
assumptions, as economic data seems to be subject to what he calls “wild randomness”. The author gives
the example of the German Mark, which has seen its value change from four per dollar to four trillion per
dollar in a period of a few years during 1920, suggesting that the bell curve is not well-suited to describe
the randomness associated with, for example, currency fluctuations. Anecdotically, the 10-German-Mark
note of the 1989 series shows a photo of Gauss and the bell curve in the obverse. (Taleb, 2007, p. 230)
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Figure 1.7: Volatility that “breaks” versus volatility that “bends”
perceive the same degree of uncertainty with respect to the value that “Fixed” will take
tomorrow and with respect to the value that “Flexible” will take tomorrow? Probably
not. Assume now that “Fixed” and “Flexible” are prices of two goods. The behaviour of
Fixed has more scope for large effects on, say, accumulated profits than that of Flexible.
The producer facing Flexible faces mild or “bounded randomness” whereas that facing
Fixed faces “substantial randomness”. Uncertainty associated with the former is somehow
controllable by averaging while that associated with the latter is less so. Using a M-V
approach, we would consider both series as equivalent (E[u(Fixed)] = E[u(Flexible)]), as
“Flexible” has been constructed by drawing random numbers from a normally distributed
population, such that the obtained series follows a normal distribution and E(Flexible) =
E(Fixed), and V (Flexible) = V (Fixed) (µ = 1.005 and σ = 0.08). It is possible to have a
change in which location and scale do not alter, but shape does (kurtosis in our example).
41
Then, a M-V analysis will give the wrong answer. When distributions differ by location,
scale and shape, the decision maker will not only look at mean and variance, but also at
higher moments of the distribution. (In this case, for example, the kurtosis of “Fixed” is
66, while that of “Flexible” is 2.6.)
Take two countries, with different real exchange rate generating processes. In one, the
process is consistent with low-probability extreme events (such as the series “Fixed” in
figure 1.7), in the other, is consistent with a low, constant variance (such as the series
“Flexible” in the same figure). If uncertainty affects the behaviour of producers, then it is
reasonable to expect a larger effect, and therefore a more cautious behaviour of producers
in the former country than in the latter, even if during a particular time period, the series
shows to be stable.23
We cast doubt on the validity of A2 for the random variable being the RER in Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Uruguay, as these countries have had fixed nominal exchange rate
regimes, with mild variations in RER, and then, collapses of these regimes with extreme
RER movements in several occasions during the period of analysis. In Table 1.1 we present
the first four central sample moments of the distribution of the growth rate of the RER
over four different time periods.24 The variation in the estimates of the parameters of
shape (skewness and kurtosis) are evident. For illustrative purposes, we take two sub-
periods for Uruguay (last three rows of Table 1.1) in which mean and variance of RER
growth are similar, but skewness and kurtosis change significantly, suggesting that these
23Daniel Heymann has coined a distinction between the volatility that “breaks” and the volatility that
“bends”. This distinction came up in the context of an informal discussion on exchange rate uncertainty
generated by fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes in Southern Cone countries, where currency crises
are relatively frequent. Then, Heymann claimed that, frequently, fixed exchange rate regimes experience
“underlying volatility”. This is unobservable until it is so large that “breaks” the regime and generates an
extreme episode. Underlying volatility in the context of flexible exchange rate regimes, on the other hand,
manifests immediately, no matter how large it is, through movements in the exchange rate. Thus, it is less
likely to accumulate and generate an extreme episode.
24We have arbitrarily chosen the time periods to illustrate the likely inadequacy of A2.
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Country Period Mean Variance Skeweness Kurtosis
Argentina 1970m1-1978m12 0.006 0.021 4.428 25.334
1979m1-1991m12 0.013 0.048 7.230 68.257
1992m1-1998m12 -0.001 0.000 -0.743 3.646
1999m1-2004m12 0.012 0.005 3.866 19.327
Brazil 1970m1-1978m12 0.001 0.000 -0.895 5.346
1979m1-1991m12 0.003 0.002 1.315 7.152
1992m1-1998m12 -0.001 0.000 0.335 5.845
1999m1-2004m12 0.007 0.003 1.616 8.200
Uruguay 1970m1-1978m12 0.003 0.009 7.791 74.843
1979m1-1991m12 0.002 0.007 7.475 78.328
1992m1-1998m12 -0.004 0.000 0.949 7.816
1999m1-2004m12 0.005 0.001 2.012 14.909
1996m1-2002m12 0.003 0.001 2.998 23.099
2003m1-2004m12 0.003 0.001 -0.596 4.881
Ho:Same µ, σ p-value 0.4413 0.3196
Table 1.1: Sample moments for the Growth Rate of the REER
distributions do exhibit changing patterns in their shape.25 Thus, the M-V approach
seems inappropriate to deal with the randomness of the RER. To capture uncertainty, we
will need to take into account higher moments of the distribution of the relevant random
variable, besides the analysis of mean and variance.
1.5.2 Are the firm’s financing decisions innocuous?
All references to the capital structure of the firm were ignored in our initial exposition
of the effects of real exchange rate uncertainty on output, which relied on tools of the
standard theory of the firm. When the firm operates in Sc3, in which there is a lag
between the moment in which the production decision is taken and inputs are purchased,
and the moment in which the revenue from the sale of output is obtained, working capital
needs will arise. The financial strategy of the firm may add extra uncertainty, and will
not be innocuous for optimal output, as we will show in Section 1.6. Here we discuss
some of the options the firm may face in terms of its capital structure, and some of their
implications.
Firms could finance working capital needs in excess of the available internally generated
25We test equality in means, and equality in variances and report the p-values in the last row of the
table.
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funds by issuing equity, or borrowing. When they choose the first alternative, the firm
diversifies risk. However, as argued by Myers and Majluf (1984), firms generally do not
issue equity to finance working capital needs. The authors find that the announcement of
equity offerings reduces stock prices in a significant manner. They argue that informational
imperfections are a plausible explanation for this finding. The manager of a firm has inside
information about the value of the firm. For this reason, if the manager decides to issue
stock at a given market price, the investors are only going to be willing to buy it at a lower
price, exerting downward pressure on stock prices. That reduction in firm value would be
a substantial “cost to false signalling”, to be avoided if firms can rely on debt-financing —
neglecting default risk.26 In this case, creditors will not interfere with managerial decisions,
but risk will not be diversified, and if the firm cannot meet its financial obligations due to
adverse market conditions or poor management, debt will be unforgiving, and the firm will
face bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is to be avoided by managers. This is because if it happens,
they will suffer a stigma as it is difficult to distinguish whether the financial distress is due
to poor management or due to adverse market conditions. This is why, as Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1993) argue, managers are averse to bankruptcies and will internalize its expected
costs when making the production decision.
Now, if firms tend to use debt as a source of financing, the currency structure of that
debt needs to be considered, for in the countries under analysis and over a large portion
of the period considered, liability dollarization has been a common phenomenon, largely
independent of the trade orientation of the firm.27 The existence of liability dollarization
brings us to Scenario 3 presented in Section (1.3), in which there is another channel through
which real exchange rate uncertainty will affect production decisions.
26Another explanation for the reduction in stock prices after equity issues is that there is a downward
sloping demand for a firm’s shares. (See Myers and Majluf (1984))
27For example, Galiani et al. (2003) argue that in Argentina, debt dollarization was “the rule rather
than the exception”, and found no relationship between the production mix, or the probability of a sudden
nominal devaluation and the degree of debt dollarization.
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The reasons behind liability dollarization are debatable. In general, banking lending
rate differentials between domestic and foreign currency were significantly above devalu-
ation expectations - at least those devaluation expectations that explained the banking
borrowing rates’ differentials (Licandro and Licandro (2003)). A myopic financial man-
ager would then choose to borrow in foreign currency, as it is the apparent cheaper option.
However, even if the agent is forward looking and foresees a large exchange rate depre-
ciation, he may be tempted to borrow in foreign currency. This is because if all other
agents are doing the same (and he’s aware of that), a large depreciation would generate
chained bankruptcies, and a collapse in the payment system of the economy. Because
the social costs of that outcome are socially undesirable, then a debtor bailout could be
ex-post optimal for the government. This induces firms not to internalize the exchange
rate risk, and instead, rely on an implicit “free insurance” provided by a lender of last
resort (the government) (see Burnside et al. (2001)).28 Another view argues that dollar-
ization was deliberately fostered by the governments in these countries in order to show
a commitment to the fixed exchange rate regimes. By making the costs of a devaluation
extremely high, the government tried to gain credibility (for a review of the literature on
dollarization determinants, see Levy-Yeyati (2006)). Whatever the reasons behind this,
the existing data reveals that it was a widespread phenomenon in Argentina and Uruguay,
and though less prevalent, still significant in Brazil. Kamil (2004) offers some indicators
in this respect. His database provides unique information on the currency and maturity
structure of firms’ liabilities for 10 Latin American countries.29 The debt-dollarization
ratio, calculated as dollar-linked debt as a percentage of total liabilities, is for Argentina
during the 1990s, well above 50%; for Brazil, it was lower but still significant and in the
range 11-20% during the decade, while for Uruguay the same ratio was in the range 74-
28The optimal output implications of this are discussed in Section 1.7.2
29The dataset covers a wide variety of firms, of different size and trade orientation.
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84%. It is also possible to see that dollar debt seems to be longer term than non-dollar
debt. In the case of Argentina, for example, the ratio of long-term dollar liabilities to
total dollar liabilities is in the range of 30-55%, while the ratio of long-term non-dollar
liabilities to total non-dollar liabilities is in the range of 11-21%. For Uruguay, the former
ratio is in the range 23-54%, while the latter in the range 3-17%.30
A framework for the analysis of output decisions under real exchange rate uncertainty
should incorporate these elements into account. This is what we do in next section.
1.6 An Alternative Approach: A Production Model with
Bankruptcy Costs and Liability Dollarization
Here we present a simple production model with two key characteristics: production takes
time, and firms finance working capital using dollar debt contracts. The firm operates in
Sc(3). We start by considering the output effects of increases in expected depreciation,
then we introduce bankruptcy costs, and attempt to answer what is the output effect of
mean-preserving increases in exchange rate risk. We start by looking at the case of a
firm producing non-tradable goods, and then discuss the implications for one producing
tradable goods. Our model owes most to Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993).
The main result of the analysis that follows is that in a world of liability dollarization,
in which firms face bankruptcy costs and exhibit mismatches in their balance sheets, even
assuming away risk-aversion, exchange rate uncertainty will decrease optimal output. This
is because an increase in uncertainty increases expected marginal bankruptcy costs, which
are a component of expected marginal costs, to be equated to expected prices. Instead,
when firms have matched balance sheets, say, because they produce tradable goods, whose
prices are linked, via the law of one price, with the exchange rates and international prices,
30There is no data available for Brazil in this respect.
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so that both their assets and liabilities expressed in pesos are affected symmetrically by
currency movements, then, exchange rate uncertainty has no effect on optimal output of
a risk-neutral firm, as it exerts no effect on expected marginal bankruptcy costs.
1.6.1 The Model
The firm is neutral to risk and produces a non-tradable good whose price is determined
domestically. The firm operates in Sc(3). A single input is used to produce. It is bought
at the beginning of the period in a perfectly competitive market. Output is only sold in
the period after production, in a perfectly competitive market. For these reasons, the firm
needs working capital to buy inputs. Working capital can only be borrowed in foreign
currency from financial markets. The exchange rate is expressed as dollars per peso, and
it is a random variable.
At the beginning of the period, the firm inherits liquidity balances of size a. These
balances are generated by last period’s difference between the revenue from the sale of
output, and debt repayment.
The price of the only input equals w and is determined in a perfectly competitive input
market.
This leads to a level of foreign-currency denominated debt B, along with a nominal
interest rate to be paid to the lender, R, which is inherited at the beginning of next period.
The peso-value of the debt repayment is unknown today, and will depend on the exchange
rate prevailing in the next period.
The following assumptions are made:
(A1) Production Technology: Firms produce using only one input, and the production
process exhibits diminishing returns. The input requirement function is φ(q), with
φ′(q) > 0, and φ′′(q) ≥ 0. Note that the input requirement function is the inverse of
a production function. Let A be the efficiency parameter of this production function.
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For simplicity, we assume A=1.
(A2) The Source of Randomness: The exchange rate, measured as dollars per peso, is
a random variable e˜. The expected depreciation over the period, δe = e0/e˜1− 1 = 0.
e˜ is distributed with distribution function Fe˜(.) and density function fe˜(.)
(A3) Dollar debt: The level of debt is determined by the difference between the value of
the input bill, and the liquidity balances of the firm at the beginning of the period.
Debt can only be contracted in dollars. The peso-value of the repayment to the
creditor in the next period is random, as so is the exchange rate.
(A4) Prices: There is only one good produced in the economy. To be able to focus on
exchange rate uncertainty only, we exclude price uncertainty, and assume a fixed
price. The fact that exchange rate volatility tends to be substantially greater than
price volatility supports this assumption.
(A5) Bankruptcy: Default risk is zero. Firms don’t go bankrupt.
(A6) Creditors’ market: Creditors are risk neutral and perfectly informed.
Expressed in pesos, firms borrowing needs, B, are given by today’s difference between
the input bill and the inherited liquidity balances:
B = (wφ(q)− a) (1.22)
In foreign currency, B$ = B × e0. What is to be paid back to the creditor in pesos,
is known once the exchange rate is revealed next period, and equals: B$ = B × e0
e˜1
=
B × (1 + δ).
To choose the level of output to be produced, managers will maximize an expected
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end-of-the-period wealth function which can be re-expressed as in (1.23):
maxqE
{
pq − (1 + δ)(1 +R)(wφ(q)− a)
}
(1.23)
The first order condition is:
p− (1 +R)(1 + δe)wφ′(q) = 0 (1.24)
Profits are a concave function of q when φ′′(q) > 0. The second order condition is:
− (1 +R)(1 + δe)wφ′′(q) < 0 if φ′′(q) > 0 (1.25)
1.6.2 Increases in Expected Depreciation
Proposition 3. Optimal output is a decreasing and convex function of depreciation ex-
pectations, the dollar-return, and the input price if φ′(q) > 0 and φ′′(q) > 0.
Proof.
dq∗
dδe
= − φ
′(q)
(1 + δe)φ′′(q)
< 0 (1.26)
d2q∗
d(δe)2
=
φ′(q)φ′′(q)
[(1 + δe)φ′′(q)]2
> 0 (1.27)
dq∗
d(1 +R)
= − φ
′(q)
(1 +R)φ′′(q)
< 0 (1.28)
d2q∗
d(1 +R)2
= − φ
′(q)
(1 +R)2φ′′(q)
> 0 (1.29)
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dq∗
dw
= − φ
′(q)
wφ′′(q)
< 0 (1.30)
d2q∗
d(w)2
=
φ′(q)φ′′(q)
[wφ′′(q)]2
> 0 (1.31)
Higher depreciation expectations increase the expected peso-cost of working capital,
and induce firms to decrease output to produce at lower marginal costs. The relationship
is shown in Figure (1.8).31
An increase in efficiency, A, increases optimal output (the rate at which q increases
depends on the structure of φ′):
dq∗
dA
= −dφ
′(q)/dA
φ′′(q)
> 0 (1.32)
Figure 1.8: Optimal Output - Expected Depreciation
31The figures for input price and dollar-cost of borrowing are analogous.
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1.6.3 Bankruptcies
We now relax A5. When firms’ capital structure relies on debt, as argued here, the risk
of bankruptcy emerges. Bad states of the world may prevent the firm from meeting its
financial obligation due to what Baxter (1967) calls a state of “financial embarrassment”.
Bankruptcy is costly for firms, and thus to be avoided. We divide costs into direct and
indirect costs:
(1) Direct (administrative and restructuring costs): these entail trustees’ fees, legal fees,
referees’ fees as well as the time spent by the managers in litigation, plus, if the
firm is forced into receivership by creditors, then costs associated with production
disruptions, etc. These are likely to be increasing in firm’s size.
(2) Indirect (opportunity cost of lost managerial energies): “financial embarrassment”
may affect the stream of operating earnings because of difficulties in obtaining trade
credit, disruption in customer relationships, etc. In addition, as argued by Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1993), bankruptcies will affect the future prospects by managers, and
that effect is likely to be increasing in output. This is because the choice of output
levels is a significant role of managers. Bankruptcy with high levels of output should
reflect unfavourably on their ability to do this. It implies bad judgement by managers
and may thus be unusually costly to their future prospects.
Firms will take the probability of bankruptcy into account when making operating
decisions, if the costs associated with that outcome are of sizable magnitudes. Warner
(1977), for example, argues that bankruptcy costs are insignificant. He uses data on
railroad firms in the US and calculates the ratio of bankruptcy costs to the market value
of the firm, and finds this to be at around 1% when the firm’s value is considered seven
years before bankruptcy, and rising to about 5% when the firm’s value is considered one
year before bankruptcy. However, his focus is mainly on direct costs. In an attempt to
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quantify both direct and indirect costs, Altman (1984) compares predicted profits (using
data corresponding to three years before bankruptcy) with actual profits and obtains an
estimate of bankruptcy costs for industrial firms close to 17.4% of their value three years
before bankruptcy. Opler and Titman (1994) reported that during downturns, highly
leveraged firms facing financial distress tend to lose substantially more market share than
their more conservatively financed competitors — this points to a significant indirect cost
of financial distress.
The specification of bankruptcy costs is a moot point, but it seems reasonable to
think they are increasing in output, because a) direct costs depend on firm’s size, and
b) indirect costs — and mainly those related to the manager’s reputation, are likely to
increase as output increases. In addition, as argued by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), for
the possibility of bankruptcy not to be ever ignored, bankruptcy costs must increase in
output. Otherwise, if, say, they are a fixed cost, profits (increasing in output) may grow
so large relative to bankruptcy costs that these are eventually ignored.
In what follows we assume that the associated costs are increasing in output in the
form described in equation (1.33), for the reasons outlined here:
Bankruptcy Costs = cq (1.33)
1.6.4 Solvency Exchange Rate and Ouptut
Because the firm borrows in foreign currency to finance working capital, there is a bank-
ruptcy risk associated with exchange rate levels that would make the debt repayment
higher than the output proceeds (the firm operates now in a modified Sc3, with default
risk). Lenders can invest their wealth at the risk-free dollar-rate, r, so their expected
return from lending to the firms must be, in dollars, at least r. The contracted interest
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rate at which firms borrow in the debt-market is R. The bankruptcy condition is:
(1 +R)Be0
e˜1
≥ pq
(1 +R)(wφ(q)− a)e0
e˜1
≥ pq (1.34)
A critical value for the exchange rate in period 1, e¯1, that leaves the firm just solvent,
assuming e0 = 1, for simplicity can be obtained from (1.34):
e¯1 =
(1 +R)(wφ(q)− a)
pq
(1.35)
If in period 1 the exchange rate turns out to be lower (more depreciated) than e¯1, the
firm goes bankrupt, while if it is higher (less depreciated) than e¯ the firm remains solvent.
Notice that the solvency exchange rate, e¯1, is the promised repayment per unit of revenue.
Firms in better than average financial shape (i.e. those with above average inherited
liquidity balances (a)) will survive relatively more depreciated exchange rates than the
average firm before becoming bankrupt. The lower the portion of working capital that is
financed through debt, the larger the depreciation needed to make the firm bankrupt: e¯1
is decreasing in a.
de¯1
da
= −(1 +R)
pq
< 0 (1.36)
The relationship between e¯1 and output is explained by whether production technology
exhibits diminishing, constant or increasing returns. We discuss the cases of diminishing
and constant returns (both consistent with competitive equilibrium, and the former, with
A1). We don’t consider the case of increasing returns as that case would lead to a mono-
polistic outcome, with endogenous prices, which is out of the scope of this model. Note
that e¯1 is a ratio between costs and revenue. Look first the case of a = 0, in which firms
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do not inherit liquidity balances. All input purchases are financed through debt. If as
output increases, costs increase at a slower rate than revenue, then, a more depreciated
exchange rate is needed to bring the firm to bankruptcy (and conversely).
For any production technology the relationship between the solvency exchange rate
and output is given by:
de¯1
dq
=
(1 +R)wp
[
φ′(q)q − φ(q)]+ pa
(pq)2
(1.37)
To be able to sign equation (1.37), we will assume a Cobb-Douglas production tech-
nology. That implies φ(q) = q1/α. We focus on situations in which firms borrow, i.e.:
wφ(q)− a > 0, and a ≥ 0. Let us consider two cases:
(1) If α < 1⇒ Diminishing Returns⇒ φ′(q)q > φ(q)⇒ de/dq > 0. As output increases,
working capital requirements increase at an increasing rate φ′(q) (φ′′(q) > 0), while
revenues increase at a rate p. This implies that increases in output increase exposure
to bankruptcy because they increase the size of debt relative to that of expected
revenue. It follows that less depreciated exchange rate realizations will bring firms
to bankruptcy, as output increases.
(2) If α = 1 ⇒ Constant Returns ⇒ φ′(q)q = φ(q) ⇒ de/dq ≥ 0. If a = 0, then, e¯ is
constant. Both costs and revenue increase at a constant rate (w and p respectively),
and the ratio remains constant (red line in Figure (1.9)).
Figure (1.9) shows the relationship between e¯1 and output for the two cases discussed.
In each case, we consider three different levels of liquidity balances (zero, “low”, “high”).
1.6.4.1 Lenders’ Return and Equilibrium Solvency Exchange Rate
The solvency exchange rate defined in equation (1.35) can be used to define the dollar-
return of lenders, (1 + r˜), as function of the random variable e˜1, as in equation (1.38):
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Figure 1.9: Solvency-Exchange Rate and Output
(1 + r˜) =

(1 +R) if e˜1 > e¯1 (Solvency)
pq
(wφ(q)− a) e˜1 if e˜1 ≤ e¯1 (Bankruptcy)
(1.38)
Its expected value, (1 + r) equals the sum of the promised return times the probability
of solvency plus the output proceeds relative to the debt, valued at the expected exchange
rate conditional on bankruptcy (which equals
∫ e¯1
−∞ xdF (x), where x is the exchange rate
and F (x) its distribution function). This is presented in equation (1.39):
(1 + r) = (1 +R)(1− F (e¯1)) + pq(wφ(q)− a)
∫ e¯1
−∞
xdF (x)
(1 + r)
(wφ(q)− a)
pq
=
(wφ(q)− a)
pq
(1 +R)F (e¯1) +
∫ e¯1
−∞
xdF (x) (1.39)
We re-arrange equation (1.39), and consider the case of constant returns to scale, with
φ(q) = q. This yields equation (1.40), which shows, on the left-hand side, (h(q)), the
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expected repayment per unit of revenue as a function of output, and on the right-hand
side, (z(e¯1)), the expected repayment per unit of revenue as a function of the solvency
exchange rate, which in turn is equal to the promised repayment per unit of revenue.
Thus, (1.40) expresses the implicit relationship between the level of output produced by
the firm and the corresponding exchange rate that leaves the firm just solvent.
h(q) =
{
(1 + r)
(wq − a)
pq
}
=
{
e¯1(1− F (e¯1)) +
∫ e¯1
−∞
xdF (x)
}
= z(e¯1) (1.40)
Figure 1.10: Output-Solvency Exchange Rate
A plot of that implicit relationship between output and the solvency exchange rate is
useful, as it allows a more intuitive understanding of the link. This is what we do in Figure
(1.10). The left quadrant of the figure maps the relationship between the firm’s promised
repayment per unit of revenue (the solvency exchange rate), and the expected repayment
per unit of revenue. The right quadrant shows the relationship between the level of output
and the expected repayment per unit of revenue. Now, consider an increase in the level
of output. That will increase the expected repayment per unit of revenue. Consequently,
the promised repayment per unit of revenue must increase as well. And that promised
repayment equals the solvency exchange rate, e¯∗1. Therefore, e¯∗1 increases in q. Given
constant returns, an increasing production makes the firm vulnerable to less depreciated
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exchange rate outcomes. Notice that as q increases towards infinity, h tends to (1 + r)w/p
(which must be lower than 1, if output is positive), while e¯1 approaches a finite limit e¯01,
which solves equation (1.41).
w
p
(1 + r) =
{
e¯01(1− F (e¯01)) +
∫ e¯1
0
xdF (x)
}
(1.41)
At the same time, the promised repayment per unit of revenue must be 1 when the
firm is insolvent for any realization of the exchange rate: as e¯01 tends to infinity, z(e¯1)
tends to E(e˜1) = 1. This means that as q tends to infinity, the probability of bankruptcy
tends to a finite limit, F (e¯01). For a profit maximum to exist, then at equilibrium levels
of w and r, p− (1 + r)w − cF0 < 0, otherwise, q could be increased without bound. This
condition holds for a sufficiently large value of c.
Proposition 4. The solvency exchange rate of equilibrium is an increasing function of q,
convex and increasing of w, and a convex decreasing function of p and a.
Proof. To find the equilibrium response of e¯1 to changes in q, w, p or a we use the implicit
function differentiation rule, which expresses that (take the case of de¯1/dq):
de¯∗1
dq
=
1
z′
× dh
dq
(1.42)
Using equation (1.42) we confirm that in equilibrium, the sign of the responses of e¯1
to changes in a and in q are consistent with those showed in equations (1.36) and (1.37)
respectively. In equilibrium, the more the firm produces, the less depreciated exchange
rates needed to bring it to bankruptcy (equation (1.43)). Increases in output increase
their exposure to bankruptcy, because the rate of change of debt is higher than the rate of
change of expected revenue as output increases. Second, that the higher the firm’s liquidity
balances, the more depreciated exchange rate is needed to bring the firm to bankruptcy
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(equation (1.44)). And e¯∗1 decreases at an increasing rate with a, because higher values
of a not only decrease the size of the debt, but they also decrease the required promised
interest payment to lenders, as they reduce the probability of bankruptcy (and conversely
for q):
de¯∗1
dq
=
(1 + r)a
(1− F (e¯∗1))pq2
> 0 (1.43)
de¯∗1
da
= − (1 + r)
(1− F (e¯∗1))pq
< 0 (1.44)
d2e¯∗1
da2
= −(1 + r)f(e¯
∗
1)de¯
∗
1/da
[(1− F (e¯∗1))pq]2
> 0 (1.45)
Analogously we show that a higher output price takes more depreciated exchange rates
for the firm to go bankrupt, while the converse applies for a higher input price in equations
(1.46) and (1.48).
de¯∗1
dp
= −(1 + r)(wq − a)
(1− F (e¯∗1))q
< 0 (1.46)
d2e¯∗1
dp2
= −f(e¯
∗
1)de¯
∗
1/da(1 + r)(wq − a)
[(1− F (e¯∗1))q]2
> 0 (1.47)
de¯∗1
dw
=
(1 + r)q
(1− F (e¯∗1))
> 0 (1.48)
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d2e¯∗1
dw2
=
f(e¯∗1)de¯∗1/da(1 + r)q
(1− F (e¯∗1))2
> 0 (1.49)
The probability of bankruptcy, illustrated in Figure (1.11) can be expressed by substi-
tuting the solution value of e¯1, e¯∗1 into F (e¯1).
P (Bankruptcy) = 1− F (e¯∗1(.)) (1.50)
Figure 1.11: Exchange Rate Distribution: Solvency and Insolvency Zones
1.6.4.2 Optimal Output Decision
To choose the level of output to be produced, managers will maximize expected wealth
at the end of the period (akin to an expected profit function) as presented in equation
(1.51) that incorporates the standard components (i.e.: expected revenue from output sale
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minus expected repayments to lenders) minus an expected cost of bankruptcy, subject to
equation (1.40). Bankruptcy costs are as in equation (1.33) for the reasons argued in
Section (1.6.3).
maxqE
{
pq − (1 +R)(wq − a)e0
e˜1
− cq
}
(1.51)
Equation (1.51) can be re-expressed as in equation (1.52), given that expected depre-
ciation is zero (so, E(e0/e˜1) = (1 + δe) = 1)
maxq
{
pq − (1 + r)(wq − a)− cqF (e¯1)
}
(1.52)
The first order condition can be expressed as:
p = (1 + r)w +MBC (1.53)
where MBC is the marginal bankruptcy cost:
MBC =
dE(BC)
dq
=
dcq(F (e¯∗1))
dq
= cF (e¯∗1) + cqf(e¯
∗
1)
de¯∗1
dq
= cF (e¯∗1) + cf(e¯
∗
1)
a(1 + r)
(1− F (e¯∗1))pq
(1.54)
Increases in output increase expected bankruptcy costs for two reasons: first, for a
given probability of bankruptcy, higher output means higher bankruptcy costs, at a rate
c. Second, increases in output increase the probability of bankruptcy. This is because
increases in output increase the critical exchange rate at which firms are just solvent.
Note that if the production technology exhibited increasing returns, then the sign of
MBC would be a priori ambiguous. An increase in output would increase the costs of
bankruptcy for a given probability, but the effect on the probability of bankruptcy would
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be ambiguous.
The optimal level of output, q∗ can be found just by plugging in equation (1.54) in
(1.53) and solving for q. This gives:
q∗ =
cf(e¯∗1)a(1 + r)
p(1− F (e¯∗1))(p− (1 + r)w − cF (e¯∗1))
(1.55)
The second order condition equals the opposite of dMBC/dq. q∗ consistent with
equation (1.55) corresponds to a profit maximum if and only if dMBC/dq > 0, which is
true under certain conditions, and shown in equation (1.56).
dMBC
dq
= c
[
f
de
dq
+
a(1 + r)
p
(f ′
de
dq
(1− F )−1)q−1 + f(1− F )−2f de
dq
q−1 − f(1− F )−1q−2)
]
= c
[
a(1 + r)
p
f ′
a(1 + r)
p
(1− F )−2q−3 + f2(1− F )−3 [a(1 + r)]
2
p2
q−3
]
= c
[
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p2
1
(1− F )2q3 f
′ +
a2
p2
f2(1− F )−1
(1− F )−2q3
]
= c
[a(1 + r)]2
p2(1− F )2q3
[
f ′ +
f2
(1− F )
]
(1.56)
The sign of equation (1.56) depends on the sign of [f ′ + f2/(1 − F )]. Given that
bankruptcies are rare, it is reasonable to think that solvency exchange rates tend to be on
the lower tail of the exchange rate distribution (as illustrated in Figure (1.11)). We discuss
this further in Section 1.6.5.1 and here we make that assumption. If the distribution is
unimodal, then f ′ is positive at relevant levels of output. That implies dMBC/dq >
0. Marginal bankruptcy costs increase in output, and the second order condition of a
maximum holds. Figure (1.12) shows the equilibrium where the MBC curve cuts from
below the net marginal revenue curve (net marginal revenue= p− (1 + r)w).
Irrespective of where in the distribution are the firm’s solvency exchange rates, if
the hazard function of the exchange rate distribution is monotonically increasing, then
dMBC/dq > 0. This is because, as shown in equation (1.57), an increasing hazard
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function implies f ′ + f2/(1− F ) > 0. The hazard rate can be thought as the probability
of a value of the exchange rate, e1, occuring, given that a set of values {e} < e1 have not
occurred. An increasing hazard function means that the likelihood of a realization of the
exchange rate e1, conditional on no lower values having occurred is increasing in e.
d
de
[
f
(1− F ) ] =
f ′
(1− F ) +
f2
(1− F )2 > 0 which implies
(1− F ) d
de
[
f
(1− F ) ] = f
′ +
f2
(1− F ) > 0 (1.57)
Figure 1.12: Firm maximising behaviour with costs of bankruptcy
Proposition 5. Optimal output increases with prices and with liquidity balances if the
firm operates with solvency exchange rates in the lower portion of a unimodal exchange
rate distribution.
Proof. Proposition (4) expresses that e¯∗1 is decreasing in output prices, which implies that
also MBC are decreasing in output prices:
dMBC
dp
= cf(e)
de
dp
+ cf ′(e)
de
dp
a
pq(1− F ) −
cf(e)
(1− F (e)
aq
[pq(1− F )]2
+ cf(e)
a
pq
f(e)de/dp
[pq(1− F (e)]2 < 0 (1.58)
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The output effect of an increase in output prices, can be seen in Figure 1.12. It increases
net marginal revenue at the same time as it decreases the MBC. Both effects lead to an
increase in optimal output. Analytically, we find the optimal output response to changes
in the price by totally differentiating the first order condition, which yields:
dq
dp
=
1− dMBC
dp
dMBC
dq
> 0 (1.59)
Optimal output is increasing in a. By inspection of equation 1.53, it is possible to
see that dq/da is the quotient of −dMBC/da and dMBC/dq. Because higher liquidity
balances reduce bankruptcy costs, it follows that output increases in a. (See Figure 1.12)
dMBC
da
=
de¯1
da
[
cf(e¯1) +
cf ′(e¯1)a
pq(1− F (e¯1)) +
cf2(e¯1)a
pq(1− F (e¯1))2
]
+
cf(e¯1)
pq(1− F (e¯1))
dMBC
da
=
de¯1
da
[
cf ′(e¯1)a
pq(1− F (e¯1)) +
cf2(e¯1)a
pq(1− F (e¯1))2
]
< 0 (1.60)
dq∗
da
= −dMBC
da
/
dMBC
dq
> 0 (1.61)
The last result is relevant because it implies persistence. Any shock that affects
today’s profits will have an effect on tomorrow’s liquidity balances. Firms with higher
liquidity balances will produce a higher level of output. So, shocks to today’s profits will
affect tomorrow’s output.
1.6.5 Increases in Uncertainty
Our purpose is to identify a pure uncertainty effect on output. We explore the output
effects of a change in firms’ perception about the distribution of the exchange rate, from
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e˜ to e˜′. As illustrated in Figure (1.13), the change considered, henceforth “increase in
tail-risk”, implies that the probability mass in the tails increases, and that in the centre
of the distribution falls, while E(e˜) = E(e˜′). This makes extreme exchange rate outcomes
more probable, while keeping the mean value constant.
Figure 1.13: An Increase in Exchange Rate Uncertainty, from e to e’
Proposition 6. Increases in exchange rate uncertainty lead to a decrease in the level of
output produced.
Proof. The output effect of an increase in uncertainty depends on what happens to the
MBC. If the MBC increases after an increase in uncertainty, then output will fall. To
observe that, see Figure (1.12): an increase in MBC leads to a decrease in output produced
as the curve MBC shifts upwards (and conversely for a decrease in MBC).
The effect of increases in exchange rate uncertainty on the MBC at the optimum can
be calculated by looking at a change in uncertainty that preserves the density function, f ,
but shifts the distribution F , and then looking at another change that preserves F , and
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alter f . We examine these changes in equations (1.62) and (1.63)32:
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= c
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pq
d
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[ f
(1− F )
]
= c+
[
p− (1 + r)w − cF ] d
dF
ln
[ f
(1− F )
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= c+
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p− (1 + r)w − cF ] 1
(1− F ) > 0 at the optimum. (1.62)
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]
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> 0 at the optimum. (1.63)
Both types of changes lead to an increase of the MBC, which implies that output falls
after an increase in exchange rate uncertainty.
1.6.5.1 Are Firms in Zone I or II?
We have argued that there is an ambiguity in the sign of dMBC/dq. If the hazard function
of the exchange rate distribution is monotonically increasing or if the firms’ solvency
exchange rates are in the lower portion of a unimodal distribution, then dMBC/dq >
0. While the former condition is not easily interpretable, the likelihood of the latter
condition holding can be scrutinized. As already argued, bankruptcies are not frequent
in practice, and it seems reasonable to assume that solvency exchange rates are on the
left tail of the distribution. De Brun et al. (2008) gives us a more accurate indication,
32If we denote the change in the distribution by dy, then we can write the total effect on MBC as
dMBC/dy = cdF/dy + (p− (1 + r)w − cF )dln[f/(1− F )/dy]
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Figure 1.14: Two Zones: I f ′(e¯∗1) ≤ 0, II f ′(e¯∗1) ≥ 0
though only for Uruguay. The authors performed stress tests to a sample of manufacturing
firms in Uruguay. They defined a firm as financially stressed “whenever an exchange-rate
depreciation made it unable to meet its amortization and interest payments falling due
and or whenever it pushed the firm into a negative equity position” (De Brun et al., 2008,
p.229). In Figure (1.15) we combine the distribution of annual exchange rate changes
(solid line, density measured in the axis on the left), with their data on the distribution
of firms’ solvency exchange rates (% of firms that would be financially distressed if the
exchange rate was to change by x%, measured on the axis on the right). It is possible to
see that for the great majority of firms, the solvency exchange rates are well to the right
of the distribution, probably corresponding to zone II, in our analysis.
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Figure 1.15: Distribution of actual and solvency exchange rates in Uruguay
1.7 Extensions
1.7.1 Firms Producing Tradable Goods
If the risk-neutral firm produces a tradable good ‘T’, with pT = pT∗/e, where pT∗ is
the international price of the good ‘T’, expressed in foreign currency, then, the value of
the exchange rate (and the riskiness of its distribution) is irrelevant for the probability
of bankruptcy, as long as this firm has assets (revenue) and liabilities matched in terms
of currency denomination. This can be seen by re-examining the bankruptcy condition,
expressed by (1.34) in the light of the new setting, and assuming p∗=1, and e0 = 1 for the
sake of simplicity.
(1 +R)B$e0/e˜1 ≥ pq
(1 +R)(wφ(q)− a)× e0/e˜1 ≥ q/e˜1
(1 +R)(wφ(q)− a) ≥ q (1.64)
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1.7.2 Soft Budget Constraints
If we examine the episodes of sharp depreciations in the countries under analysis, the
line of argument proposed by this model, that relies on firms internalizing the costs of
potential balance-sheet effects could be contested. This is because, as argued in Section
1.5.2, it may be ex-post optimal for the government to bailout debtors that are financially
distressed as a consequence of the extreme exchange rate. In fact, governments have
often acted in support of firms in order to relax the financial constraint they faced. For
example, in Argentina, after a sharp real devaluation in 1982 that implied the collapse of a
crawling peg system against the dollar, foreign currency denominated corporate debt was
converted into domestic currency at the pre-devaluation exchange rate, at the expense of
the Argentinean Central Bank. Something similar happened after the abandonment of the
currency board regime in 2002, when the government enforced a compulsory conversion
of dollar denominated liabilities up to 100,000 dollars into peso denominated liabilities at
the one-to-one exchange rate, what is known as the “pesification” of debt. Any potential
balance sheet effects were then eliminated (Galiani et al., 2003, p.344). In Uruguay, after
the sharp devaluation in 2002, the state-owned bank, which is the main creditor to the
manufacturing sector, called for a renegotiation of corporate debt in milder terms. This
implied, for example, accepting government bonds as a means of debt-repayments at face
value when their market price had plunged to about 60%.33 Thus, sufficiently liquid firms
faced a substantial reduction of their debt. At the same time, the government encouraged
the private banking sector to offer debt renegotiation alternatives to the non-banking
corporate sector. In Brazil, the “Banco do Brasil” provided some exchange rate risk
hedging opportunities some days before the large devaluation of the currency in January
1999.34
33Source: Montevideo Stock Exchange.
34Personal communication with Pedro Bonomo, from Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Sao Paulo, Brazil.
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These type of arrangements are akin to the notion of “soft budget constraints”. Ac-
cording to Kornai et al. (2003), a firm faces a soft budget constraint if there is a support
organization ready to alleviate part or all of the debt, and the firm managers or owners
are aware of this possibility, and internalize it, when making decisions. In the context of
our model, let us assume that the government is the support organization, and that it
acts by exerting pressure on the banking sector for them to roll over corporate debt. That
would mean that firms may only have to pay a portion λ of the debt they face at the be-
ginning of next period.35 Figure 1.16 shows the optimal output response to the possibility
of a softening of the budget constraint. If firms only pay a portion λ of the debt, that
increases the expected net marginal revenue, and at the same time reduces the MBC, as
the soft budget constraint reduces the firm’s solvency exchange rate. Both effects induce
an increase in optimal output. The first order condition of the maximization problem of
the firm is:
p = (1 + r)wφ′(q)λ+MBC ′ (1.65)
where MBC ′ < MBC.
If the government only intervenes when there is substantial exchange rate uncertainty,
and so, important risks of economic and social disruptions, then, an increase in exchange
rate risk will, on the one hand, increase the expected costs of bankruptcy, thus inducing
a more “cautious” behaviour of firms (i.e.: reduce output), but on the other hand, will
decrease λ, thus inducing the opposite effect on output. The final effect on output is
therefore, ambiguous, depending on the relationship between the size of λ and the change
in uncertainty.
350 < λ < 1
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Figure 1.16: Firm maximising behaviour with costs of bankruptcy and soft budget con-
straints
1.7.3 High Uncertainty: The Unknown Unknowns
“...When, as today, the unknown unknowns dominate, and the economic en-
vironment is so complex as to appear nearly incomprehensible, the result is ex-
treme prudence, if not outright paralysis, on the part of investors, consumers
and firms. And this behaviour, in turn, feeds the crisis.” Blanchard (2009)36
While Blanchard’s quotation refers to the business environment in the financial crisis
of 2008/9, it depicts well that of Southern Cone countries in episodes of high exchange
rate uncertainty. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) seems to give analytical support
to Blanchard. While their focus is on financial risk management decisions instead of
production decisions, their insight is relevant for our purposes. The authors show that in
the presence of fundamental (or ‘Knightian’) uncertainty about the economic environment
that leads agents to question their world-views and challenge their models used for decision-
making, there will be an excessive demand for safety on the part of businesspeople, which
36The concept of the “Unknown unknowns” has been “coined” by former US Defense Secretary, Donald
Rumsfeld, on February 12, 2002, referring to the unstable situation in post-invasion Afghanistan.
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leads to disengagements with risky activities and liquidity hoarding.
We argue that in the context of the countries under analysis, high exchange rate
uncertainty implies “structural” uncertainty. The concept of “structural” uncertainty is
borrowed from Arza (2006) and refers to uncertainty about “the whole set of parameters
that defines an economic system at a given time.”37 This set of parameters subject to
uncertainty include the new exchange rate regime, if the current one actually collapses, but
also other relevant parameters for the firm, such as the government reaction in terms of
enforcement of property rights, the level of demand that the firm will face after the severe
wealth effects of a possible depreciation, the access to credit, the access to marketing
channels the firm may use in the event of possible chained bankruptcies, etc..38
Some anecdotal information on the communicational strategy of the government around
(before and immediately after) drastic exchange rate movements illustrates how their ac-
tions actually tended to increase the perception of uncertainty among decision-makers, in
the context of property rights enforcement. The regularity is that there is no discussion on
the “reconstruction” agenda for the period after the large depreciation has actually taken
place. In an attempt to grant credibility to the about-to-collapse system, governments
tend to rule out the possibility of a depreciation in the first place, even when the rest
of the actors in the economy (and the economic fundamentals) argue differently. This is
likely to increase the degree of uncertainty faced by all agents in the economy, and paralyze
those that make production decisions. In November 1982, journalists asked the General
who was acting as de-facto president in Uruguay if there was going to be a devaluation. His
answer was: “No, not even if Martians land here”. Two days after, the dollar tripled its
37(Arza, 2006, p. 6). This concept is better suited for our purposes than that of “Knightian uncertainty”
used by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008). While latter one is related to immeasurable risk over a
particular variable, the former is related to a set of parameters that are relevant for the decision-maker.
38It is worth mentioning that most of the episodes of extreme RER movements in the countries under
analysis have had associated output contractions that were large enough to be called “rare disasters”, by
Barro (2006) in his analysis of rare disasters and asset markets. In particular, he identifies as disasters, the
episodes in Argentina in 1979-1985 and in 1999-2002 and those of Uruguay in 1981-1984, and 1998-2002
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value against the Uruguayan peso. Then, in 2001, months before the Uruguayan peso was
to be devalued again, the President was encouraging people to borrow in foreign currency,
arguing that they were not going to devalue. Something similar happened at the time in
Argentina, where the President persistently claimed they were not going to devalue their
currency. Just a few months later, the currency board was to be abandoned and the value
of the dollar drastically increased. Uncertainty is also likely to increase if the strategies
designed to deal with the potential balance-sheet problems lack credibility. On this re-
spect, more anecdotal evidence can be presented: in January 2002, after a significant
exchange rate depreciation and an ongoing banking crisis, the Argentinean government
announced a plan according to which bank depositors were going to recover their deposits
in the currency in which those had been originally denominated. At the same time, they
announced that debtors would have their dollar-debts converted automatically into peso-
debt (Clarin, 2002). The apparent incompatibility of both announcements, in a period in
which the Argentinean government did not have access to credit markets to finance the
cost of such a combination of proposals, and a depleted stock of foreign exchange reserves,
is likely to have increased the degree of uncertainty perceived by agents in the economy.
How reasonable is it to assume that in this context, firms will internalize the behaviour
that governments have had in the past and act as if they faced a soft budget constraint,
deciding to increase their exposure to exchange rate risk?
Our conjecture is that firms do not take the soft budget constraint for granted. Instead,
they will react to high uncertainty with conservatism and caution - or in Blanchard’s
words: “outright paralysis”. Our contention is that the effects of high uncertainty on
output decisions will be dominant over any possible effect of perceptions of soft budget
constraints. Thus, firms will tend to defer production decisions in a context of high
uncertainty.
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1.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we proposed a framework to analyze the impact of exchange rate uncer-
tainty on output decisions when production takes time, and firms finance their working
capital needs with dollar debt contracts. The framework seems to be well suited to under-
stand the output implications of currency mismatches in the context of economies with
undeveloped exchange rate risk hedging instruments, as it explains a stylized fact: output
fluctuates significantly with exchange rate uncertainty.
The main results of this chapter are the following:
First, shocks to profits have persistent effects on output through their effects on liquid-
ity balances. The financial “health” of the firm, understood as the size of the liquidity
balances it holds at the beginning of the period matters for the output choice. Firms
with higher liquidity balances face lower marginal bankruptcy risks. Thus, any shock that
affects today’s profits, will affect tomorrow’s liquidity balances, and so, firms’ output.
Second, when firms face bankruptcy risks, increases in exchange rate uncertainty will
increase marginal bankruptcy costs if the firm produces non-tradable goods (i.e.: exhibits
currency mismatches), thus inducing firms to reduce output. By internalizing the bank-
ruptcy cost, the firm acts as averse to bankruptcy costs. Because firms are aware that
most others are borrowing in dollars, it is reasonable to think that they may anticipate a
government bailout in the event of drastic exchange rate depreciations. This is because
it may be ex-post optimal for the government to intervene, so as to avoid chained bank-
ruptcies and disruptions in the payment system. Under those circumstances, the effect of
increases in uncertainty on output are analytically ambiguous, as the higher the likelihood
of extreme exchange rate outcomes, the higher the probability of benefitting from a gov-
ernment bailout. However, our contention is that firms do not take bailouts for granted
in the event of high exchange rate uncertainty, for those periods are characterized by lack
of information with respect to possible reconstruction agendas, and a generalized state
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of “irreducible” uncertainty that leads firms to disengage with risky activities and hoard
liquidity.
This framework can be extended either to explain other firms’ decisions in response to
exchange rate uncertainty (e.g investment) or to analyse other uncertainty-output chan-
nels such as that operating through input or technology prices (i.e. imported inputs are
not easily substitutable and firms may have signed contractual arrangements on foreign
technology licenses).
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Chapter 2
Real Exchange Rate Uncertainty
and Output: A Sectoral Analysis
2.1 Introduction
It is a well established fact that developing countries have experienced a more uncertain
economic environment than developed countries. Within developing countries, heterogen-
eity is quite marked, and it can be shown that Mercosur countries — Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay — have a particularly high volatility record, which in turn gen-
erates a more uncertain environment.1 At the same time several trade agreements, and
then the creation of Mercosur have resulted in an increase in intra-regional trade, which
has been heterogeneous across sectors and countries, but generalized, and has therefore
implied an increase in exposure to markets characterized by uncertainty.2
1For example, ? document large cross-country differences in the long run volatility of the real exchange
rate between developing and developed countries. In particular, they show that the real exchange rate of
developing countries is approximately three times more volatile than the real exchange rate in industrial
countries. We compare series on GDP growth, CPI inflation, and nominal exchange rate depreciations for
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, with those for Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom
and find that for the former group of countries, the standard deviation of the series is systematically larger
than for the latter — this is reported in Table C.1 of the Appendix C.
2The heterogeneity across sectors in this process can be exemplified. For example, in Argentina, sector
311 (Food Processing) increases its participation of intra-region exports from 2.71 percent to 4.85 percent
while sector 384 (transport materials) increases its share from 13.33 to 34.01 percent.
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The extant literature on uncertainty and productive decisions has generally focused
on investment, given the irreversibility that surrounds this decision, after the pioneering
work of Hartman (1972), Abel (1983), and McDonald and Siegel (1986). Their theoretical
contributions have been matched by extensive empirical research. However, less attention
has been put on the impact of uncertainty on output — the textbook approach that
follows from the seminal work of Hawawini (1978), predicts that the output response to
price uncertainty will depend on the firm’s attitude to risk. The relatively low interest
in the uncertainty-output link is surprising given that production is also characterized by
some degree of irreversibility, as firms have to pay for inputs before output is sold, thus
making any decision to produce an inherently risky investment decision. This has been
argued by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) who develop a production model in which firms
finance working capital through borrowing and face bankruptcy costs. Then, an increase
in price uncertainty will induce firms to contract output, even if firms are neutral to risk,
as the probability of falling into bankruptcy will increase. In Chapter 1, we adapt their
model to a context in which uncertainty comes from real exchange rates and firms contract
dollar-debt, and show that the contraction of output after an increase in real exchange rate
uncertainty depends both on how productive the firm is and on the size of the currency
mismatch in the firm’s balance sheet, which in turn depends on the trade orientation of
the firm.
Given the aforementioned uncertain macroeconomic environment, the increase in the
relative importance of Mercosur partners for the different manufacturing sectors, and the
scant empirical literature on the effects of uncertainty on output, this chapter explores
empirically the impact of uncertainty on the output of manufacturing sectors in Mercosur
member countries, concentrating on one particular dimension of macro uncertainty: that
of the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER). In these countries the expected value of the
REER and the uncertainty surrounding that expectation are key factors affecting most
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production decisions and not only those that imply cross-border transactions. There are
three reasons for this. First, the REER has an effect on the price of tradable goods sold
by manufacturers. Second, because during much of the 1980s and 1990s a large portion of
firms contracted dollar-debt to finance their production plans, and third, because hedging
instruments to cover against exchange rate risk have been largely unavailable. A pilot
survey conducted on Uruguayan firms at the beginning of the research confirmed that the
evolution and predictability of the REER are among the top concerns of manufacturers.3
Our contribution in this chapter is threefold. First, we identify the average effect of
REER uncertainty on output in the manufacturing sectors of Mercosur countries. For
these purposes, we estimate an output supply function using data from 28 manufacturing
sectors in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay over the period 1970-2002, tackling the output-
price simultaneity problem with instrumental-variable techniques, and using alternative
sets of instruments to check the robustness of our results, whilst also allowing for het-
erogeneous effects across countries.4 Second, we test for the presence of threshold effects
on the relationship between REER uncertainty and output. Third, we test for sectoral
heterogeneity in the output response to REER uncertainty and try to identify whether
trade orientation, the intensity with which the sector trades within Mercosur, and labour
productivity are drivers of that heterogeneity.
We present new evidence suggesting that REER uncertainty has negatively affected,
on average, the level of output produced in the manufacturing sectors in Southern Cone
countries over the period 1970-2002. Further to this, we find that the average effect
masks significant specificities in the relationship. Although the effect seems to be stable
when allowing for country heterogeneity in the response, there seems to be a threshold
above which uncertainty affects output negatively, but below which the effect may even be
3The importance attached to REER evolution among manufacturers and policymakers is not restricted
to Uruguay, as discussed in Frieden and Stein (1999).
4Paraguay is excluded from the analysis as data for that economy are unavailable.
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positive. Moreover, those sectors that exhibit a higher exposure to export markets tend to
be less responsive to REER uncertainty, although the opposite is true for those that trade
intensively with Mercosur member countries. In addition, those sectors displaying a higher
degree of labour productivity are less sensitive to REER uncertainty. Last but not least,
we find that output is not only responsive to the first two moments of the distribution of
REER (mean and variance), but also to higher moments such as skewness and kurtosis.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the sources
for the data used in this chapter. Section 2.3 documents the stylized facts that motivate
this chapter and the research questions. Section 2.4 presents the methodology to be used.
Section 2.5 presents and discusses the results, and finally Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data
To explore the empirical relation between output and REER uncertainty, we draw from
the Industrial Dynamics Analysis Program dataset (PADI, in Spanish), complied by the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on yearly series of
sectoral output, prices, exports and labour productivity for 28 manufacturing sectors at a
3-digit aggregation, for the period 1970-2002, for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. REER
data are also obtained from ECLAC with monthly periodicity (the REER is defined such
that increases correspond to real depreciations and it is calculated as the weighted average
of the bilateral real exchange rates, with the trading partners, where the weights are defined
according to the trade share explained by each of the partner). Other macro variables used,
such as GDP and population growth are obtained from the IFS database of the IMF. We
use Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)’s indicator of crises “BCDI” (banking, currency, default,
and inflation). Data on exchange rate regimes (‘fixed’, ‘floating’ or ‘intermediate’) follow
the classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). A brief description of the main
series used in the analysis and some descriptive statistics is presented in Appendix B.
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2.3 Integration and REER Uncertainty
This chapter is motivated by two stylized facts: a) the increase in trade integration among
Southern Cone countries during the period 1970-2005, and b) the high record of REER
uncertainty exhibited over this period, by these economies. In this section we document
trade integration among Mercosur member countries using export intensity indices (EII)
at an aggregate level (defined below), and export shares to Mercosur at a sectoral level,
as well as REER uncertainty using three alternative measures.5
2.3.1 Trade Integration: Measurement and Evolution
The increase in trade integration among Mercosur member countries is documented using
export intensity indices (EII), a measure of intra-bloc export penetration introduced by
Anderson and Norheim (1993) that adjusts the traditional regional export shares, using as
a parameter the relevance of the region in world exports, by simply dividing the regional
export share by the region’s share of the world imports.6
(
Xi,m
Xi,w
)/(
Mm−,w
Xw,w
)
= EIIi,m (2.1)
where Xi,m are exports from country ‘i’ to Mercosur, Xi,w are exports from country ‘i’ to
the world (including Mercosur), Mm−,w are imports of the world from Mercosur excluding
country ‘i’, Xw,w are the world’s total.
As can be seen in Equation 2.1, the EII yields the quotient of the ratio of openness
of country ‘i’ to Mercosur and that of Mercosur to the world. If trade was frictionless
5In this chapter we use “Southern Cone countries” and “Mercosur member countries” interchangeably
referring to Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Only trade data are available for Paraguay. For this reason,
we excluded it from the analysis in the rest of the chapter.
6The use of export shares is avoided as these could give a misleading message. Take a scenario in which
Mercosur is expanding much faster than the rest of the world economies, it will naturally account for more
of everybody’s exports through time, quite independently of any policy interventions aimed at increasing
trade integration. Data are obtained from the Comtrade Database of the World Bank.
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and balanced, and if goods were homogeneous, then, these two ratios should be equal.
If, for example, the value of Uruguayan exports to Mercosur is 10, while the value of
total Uruguayan exports are 90, then trade would not be regionally biased if the weight
of Mercosur in the world is one ninth, measured as the participation of Mercosur exports
(excluding Uruguay) on total world exports. Thus, EII = 1. This will be our benchmark
for comparison.
Figure 2.1: Mercosur - Aggregate Export Intensities (Source: Comtrade)
The evolution of the EII over the period 1983-2005 is presented in Figure 2.1.7 Dur-
ing the nineties, the intra-bloc export intensity indices exhibit an inverted-U shape for
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.8
The increase the EII exhibit for the first part of the 1990s can be attributed to a
systematic decrease in intra-bloc trade protection, including reductions of both tariff and
non-tariff barriers to intra-bloc trade. Plausible explanations for the trade reversal ob-
served in the late 1990s are: a) the important rise in ad-hoc within-bloc tariff and non-tariff
barriers that were imposed after 1999 — this rise corresponds to an attempt to counteract
7The choice of the period of analysis was constrained by data availability.
8 For Paraguay the evolution of the index is irregular. This is likely to be related to problems with
reported data.
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the enhanced competitiveness of the trading partners whose currencies had been deval-
ued9 — and b) trade agreements that Mercosur as a bloc, or each of its member countries
individually subscribe with third parties will affect the relative importance of Mercosur
for each of its members, thus decreasing the EII. 10
Despite the inverted-U shape, the comparison of the average EII in the period before
the formation of the trading bloc (1983-1990) and after (1991-2005) shows a significant
increase in the indicator.11 At the same time, the share of Mercosur exports on world
exports decreased significantly. In other words, the regional bias in Mercosur exports
increased over the period 1983-2005.
We also calculated Mercosur export shares, at 2-digit aggregation using the ISIC 2nd
Rev. classification. These shares are calculated as the ratio between the exports of a sector
in a given country to a Mercosur country and the total exports of that sector/country.
Difference-in-means tests to compare the average EII over the period 1983-1990 against
the average over the period 1991-2005 for each of the three countries suggest unambiguous
increases in the share of exports with destination Mercosur for all sectors considered in
Argentina and Brazil. In Uruguay, increases in the share of exports over the period are
identified for sectors 31, 32, 33, 34 and 38. When focusing on the average levels for the
period, the lowest regional bias is displayed by sector 31, while sector 38 displays the
9ECLAC (2003), for example, argues that the shocks experienced by Mercousur countries had negative
effects on the integration process. An example of this is the rate of 3% on all imports that was introduced
by Uruguay as a service charge of the “Banco de la Republica”. It also demanded funding for accepting
Argentinean exports and implemented specific import duties in 2002. These led to a complaint lodged by
Argentina to the Common Market Group. On the other hand, Paraguay established an import levy in
2001, on the basis of what it refers to as the “shortcomings and inadequacy” of the Group’s macroeconomic
coordination. (pp:74-78) Furthermore, Fernandez-Arias et al. (2002) claims that “The Brazilian devaluation
of 1999 did produce substantial protectionist pressures, as well as a drastic drop in public opinion’s surport
for Mercosur in these countries.”. (p.6)
10ECLAC (2003), for example, claims that “the mediocre results of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations
mean that more emphasis is placed on the group’s external relations” (p. 80). One example, is the
complementarity agreement reached with Mexico (Economic Complementarity Agreement No 55), which
laid the foundations for free trade between Mercosur and Mexico in some specific sectors. More information
on this and other agreements of Mercosur with third countries can be found in ECLAC (2003).
11The significance of the increase should be understood in the statistical sense. This comparison is
performed using a difference-in-means’ test. We compare the average intra-bloc EII over the period 1980-
1990 against the average over the period 1991-2005. The null hypothesis is that the two values are equal.
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highest.
The size and evolution of the EII calculated at aggregate and the export shares cal-
culated at the sectoral levels reveal three patterns. First, there was an increase in the
participation of Mercosur on total trade of its member countries. That this increase was
not related to an increase in the importance of Mercosur in world markets, but to an
increase in the importance of Mercosur for its member countries. Second, there are im-
portant regional biases, as the size of the EII is systematically larger than unity. The
region is a key export destination for each of its members. Third, the picture is quite
heterogeneous when looking at sectoral shares. The sectors that account for the largest
share in manufacturing do increase their regional biases in the period. In terms of the size
of the bias, sector 31 shows the lowest, while 38 shows the highest.
2.3.2 REER Uncertainty: Measurement and Evolution
We use three alternative measures to proxy uncertainty with respect to REER changes
that differ on the degree of sophistication assumed for the agent’s expectation formation
mechanism. The three measures assume that agents are backward-looking, and forecast
using an autoregressive model. This model is estimated using monthly data on the REER
as constructed by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Al-
though the assumption of backward-looking expectation formation mechanisms can be
criticized, it is widely used in the literature. Its validity will be discussed more carefully
in Part II of this thesis (in particular, in Chapter 4).
Then, uncertainty surrounding that forecast is measured as the volatility of the forecast
error of the past periods. Then, we use these monthly measures of uncertainty to obtain
an annual one, to match the data on production and prices that will be used in the analysis
that follows.
The first measure is obtained using Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity mod-
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els (ARCH). In essence, the squared residuals of the series of the REER changes after being
purged of its systematic component (the squared forecast errors) are assumed to be het-
eroscedastic. The structure of the heteroscedasticity (an autoregressive, and a moving
average component) is estimated, and thus, a measure of the conditional variance of the
series is obtained. This is taken to be the measure of REER uncertainty (Volat-ARCH).
The relevant past volatility that determines the agents perception of uncertainty today is
determined by the data.12
A simpler structure for expectation formation may be more appealing if there are
costs of processing information. Although our second measure (Volat-RollVar) also as-
sumes that agents forecast using an autoregressive rule, and that the forecast errors are
heteroscedastic, now uncertainty with respect to REER changes is calculated as the rolling
variance of the last twelve forecast errors. The difference with the first measure is two-
fold. First, with Volat-RollVar, we impose the lag structure that matters in determining
today’s uncertainty. With Volat-ARCH the choice is based on the best-fit of the model.
Second, with Volat-RollVar we impose equal weights for each of the twelve months of the
lag structure. With Volat-ARCH those weights are estimated by the model.
The third measure (Variance REER) assumes a naive agent with static expectations
about the changes in the REER. The agent predicts no movement whatsover. As in the
previous cases, REER uncertainty will be determined by the variance of the past forecast
errors, but this variance will now be equal to the variance of the series of REER changes
itself. Here as well, we impose a window of twelve months. Notice that if part of the REER
changes are predictable, then this measure will be overestimating the forecast error, and
thus, the amount of uncertainty perceived.
Given that the series of REER changes is found to be non-normal, higher moments
12The best-fit model for Argentina was an ARCH(2), for Brazil an ARCH(4) and for Uruguay an
ARCH(4). These suggest a memory of 2 months in the conditional variance series for Argentina and
of 4 months in the series for Brazil and for Uruguay.
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need to be considered when characterizing the degree of uncertainty it generates, so we
also include a measure of their skewness and kurtosis.13 These measures are computed
as twelve-month rolling skewness and kurtosis of the residuals of the best-fit ARIMA on
the series of the REER growth, and are common for the three aforementioned measures
of uncertainty.
Figure 2.2: Conditional Variance of the REER growth
Figure 2.2 displays the evolution of the first two measures of uncertainty with respect
to REER changes, constructed using monthly data, using the method described above, for
each of the three countries considered, over the period 1969.01 to 2006.04.14
Averaging over the whole period, our measure of uncertainty for Argentina (the volat-
ility of the forecast error) suggests a standard deviation from the mean equal to 3% or
2.8%, depending on whether we look at the Volat-ARCH (top) or Volat-RollVar (bottom)
13Gravelle and Rees (1992) show that when probability distributions cannot be fully characterized by
parameters of location and scale, then, uncertainty generated by these variables can be understood by
looking at all moments of the distribution and not only the first two.
14The conditional variance series plotted here are the author’s calculations on the basis of data on REER
obtained from ECLAC.
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measure respectively. For Brazil, the standard deviation is 2.58% or 2.34% respectively
and for Uruguay 2.67% or 2.93%. Given that the average of the absolute monthly changes
in REER is around 4.8%, 2.25% and 2.5% for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay respectively,
the measures of uncertainty seem large, as they imply that on average, the size of the
forecast error, relatively to the actual change in the REER is close to 60% for Argen-
tina, and well above 100% for Brazil and Uruguay.15 Even if large, these numbers are in
sharp contrast with the third measure considered. The standard deviation of the growth
rate of the REER, as reported in Table B.2, equals, for Argentina 14.2%, for Brazil 3%
and for Uruguay 6.3%. However, as argued before, it is likely that “Variance REER” is
overestimating actual uncertainty.
The difference in the degree of inertia that can be observed in Figure 2.2 when com-
paring Volat-ARCH and Volat-RollVar is explained by the difference in the methodology
of construction. For Volat-ARCH, the estimated memory of the first measure is at most,
of four months for the cases of Brazil and Uruguay, and two months for the case of Argen-
tina, while the memory imposed on the Volat-RollVar measure is of twelve months. It is
not surprising, then, that shocks to volatility appear to have a relatively shorter life when
looking at the Volat-ARCH series than when looking at the Volat-RollVar series.
We have argued that REER uncertainty has been particularly high in the Southern
Cone economies of interest in this analysis during the period 1970-2002. To investigate
this matter, we ask the following question. How do Southern Cone economies fare in terms
of REER uncertainty vis-a-vis other South American economies?
To answer the question, we calculate the same measures of uncertainty with respect
to REER changes, but now for other South American countries, and perform a cross-
country comparison across countries using difference-in-means tests, and comparing the
15These calculations are, of course, valid, under the assumption of agents forecasting using the autore-
gressive model described above. Descriptive statistics of the series of REER changes for the three countries
are reported in Table B.2 in the Appendix B.
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magnitudes of the measures for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, versus that of the other
countries. Table 2.1 shows the ratios of Volat-ARCH for country ‘i’ and country ‘j’.16 The
intersection of the first row and first column shows the ratio in mean REER uncertainty
between Argentina and Brazil (Argentina′s/Brazil′s : 1.39). In this case, the difference is
statistically significant at a 1% significance level. The ratio being larger than one informs
us that uncertainty in Argentina has been significantly larger than in Brazil, on average,
during the period of analysis. The size of the ratio and the results of the tests also suggest
that the mean of Argentina’s uncertainty over the whole period is significantly higher
than that of any of the rest of the countries in the analysis, including the other Mercosur
members. Brazilian REER growth volatility is also significantly higher than that of most
of South American countries, except Argentina, Peru and Uruguay. Finally, Uruguayan
REER growth volatility is significantly higher than that of all the rest of South American
countries.17 These results give empirical support to our statement, Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay have experienced a more uncertain environment with respect to REER.
Table 2.1: Ratios of Means of Volat-ARCH across Countries
Col Mean/ Argentina Brazil Uruguay
Row Mean
Argentina
Brazil 1.390***
Uruguay 1.262*** 0.909
Bolivia 2.512*** 1.805*** 1.988***
Chile 1.845*** 1.326*** 1.459***
Colombia 3.731*** 2.688*** 2.958***
Ecuador 2.114*** 1.519*** 1.672***
Peru 1.577*** 1.134 1.248***
Venezuela 4.219*** 3.030*** 3.333***
Notes: ‘***’ indicates differences are significant at 1%,
‘**’ significant differences at 5% and ‘*’ significant diff. at 10%
We now turn our attention to the evolution over time of uncertainty with respect to
REER in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Our measures suggest that uncertainty was
16The purpose of these tests is to be able to compare these figures in a robust way. We are not trying
to test whether REER realizations of, say, Uruguay, come from the same parent population as REER
realizations of Brazil. The same applies when the comparisons are made for a given country over time.
17The same conclusions emerge if we compare the uncertainty records using Volat-RollVar.
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larger during the 1970s and 1980s than during the 1990s and of 2000s, and the differences
are significant at a 5%. No difference was found between the levels of the 1990s and 2000s.
There are a number of episodes (currency crises and hyperinflation episodes) that can
explain these differences by decade, the most notorious taking place in 1974, 1982 and
1989. The 1990s, by contrast, was a decade of relative stability due to the implementation
of a price stabilisation plan with an exchange rate anchor which lasted until December
2001. The collapse of this last stabilisation plan did not come with extremely high records
of inflation, as had happened during the 1970s and 1980s. That explains the relatively
low records of uncertainty during the early years of 2000.
The top and bottom central panels of Figure 2.2 show the evolution of the Brazilian
uncertainty, which appears to increase during the period. The period of the 1970s dis-
played the lowest REER volatility, exhibiting a peak around 1975. The 1980s and 1990s,
which experienced two currency crises that respectively led to the implementation of the
“Plan Cruzado” and the “Plan Real”, and the 2000s, which experienced the shock of the
Argentinean crisis, were significantly more volatile in terms of the REER than the 1970s.
In turn, the first decade of the 2000 was significantly more volatile than the 1980s. The
null of equal mean volatility across the 1980s and 1990s was upheld by the data.
In the case of Uruguay, the 1970s also experienced a peak of uncertainty around 1975
- this peak is the highest for the whole period, and it should be noted that unlike the
Brazilian case, this peak was preceded and followed by relatively high levels of uncertainty,
whereas the 1980s were hit by a number of high uncertainty episodes, some of domestic
origin and some “imported”: the currency crisis that affected a number of Latin American
countries in 1982 and the hyperinflation episodes of the neighbour countries in 1986 and
1989. This can be observed in the top and bottom right-hand side panels of Figure 2.2,
and it is also reflected in the statistical tests. The 1970s and 1980s were significantly
more uncertain than the 1990s and 2000s in terms of the REER. The relative calmness
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of the 1990s is probably a consequence of a long-lasting price stabilisation plan based in
a nominal exchange rate anchor, that was only abandoned in 2002 after the Argentinean
collapse hit the Uruguayan economy severely, both on the trade and financial fronts.
Differences between the 1970s and 1980s and between the 1990s and 2000s were not found
to be statistically significant.18
Measures of Conditional Skewness and Kurtosis. The measures of conditional
skewness and kurtosis of the residuals of the best-fit ARIMA on the series of the REER
growth are calculated using a window of 12 months, and are common for the three measures
of uncertainty. They are reported graphically in Figure 2.3. Symmetry in the distribu-
tion of Brazilian REER growth cannot be rejected while for Argentina and Uruguay the
series are right-skewed, with a longer tail on the ‘depreciation’ side. The kurtosis indicator
suggests non-normality of the series of REER growth.19 Peaks in kurtosis are inevitably
associated with episodes of exchange rate jumps or hyperinflation (1974, 1980, 2001 for
Argentina; 1985, 1994 for Brazil; 2002 for Uruguay). The measure of kurtosis is signific-
antly higher for Argentina and Uruguay than for Brazil, which suggests that more of the
variation in the REER is due to extreme adjustments for Argentina and Uruguay than it
is the case for Brazil.
2.4 Research Questions & Methodology
2.4.1 Research Questions
Given the two documented phenomena: that Mercosur countries have experienced an
increase in integration over time, and that they exhibit a particularly high record of REER
uncertainty, in what follows, the chapter attempts to answer these research questions:
18Table B.3 in the Appendix B shows the ratios of the volatility of decade ‘i’ and decade ‘j’ for each
Mercosur country.
19The null of normality is rejected at 99% significance.
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Figure 2.3: Conditional Skewness and Kurtosis of the REER
(1) What has been the impact of REER uncertainty on manufacturing output in South-
ern Cone countries over the period 1970-2002?
(2) Has this impact been heterogeneous across countries?
(3) Is the effect of REER uncertainty on output stable across different levels of uncer-
tainty, or are there thresholds above which the effects change significantly?
(4) Are there sectoral heterogeneities in the effect of REER uncertainty on output? Can
the heterogeneity be accounted for differences in trade integration, and in particular,
for differences in the export exposure to Mercosur?
2.4.2 Baseline Model
To answer the research questions above, we specify a supply function and estimate it
using the data described in Section 2.2 with yearly periodicity. Our baseline model, fully
motivated below, and attempting to shed light on the first of the questions above, relates
real sectoral output supplied to real relative sectoral prices, real effective exchange rates,
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alternative measures of real exchange rate uncertainty (as described above), a measure
of misalignment of the real exchange rate, an indicator of crises, dummies controlling
for different exchange rate regimes, sector-country fixed effects and year dummies, as
presented in equation (2.2):
qtij = αij + αt + β1ptij + β2reertj + β3reerUncerttj +
+β4reerSkewtj + β5reerKurttj + β6reerMisaltj +
β7BCDItj + β8Floatingtj + β9Intermtj + utij (2.2)
where qtij is the value in constant domestic currency units (base year is 1985) of output
produced at time t by sector i and country j, αij are country-sector fixed effects, αt are
time dummies, ptij is a relative price index at time t for sector i, in country j, reertj is
the real effective exchange rate of country j at time t, reerUncerttj is our measure of
REER uncertainty of country j at time t, reerSkewtj is a measure of REER skewness
and reerKurttj is a measure of REER kurtosis of country j at time t, reerMisaltj is a
measure of REER misalignment, BCDItj is the Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) indicator of
crises that goes from zero to four, and considers banking, currency, default and inflation
crises.20 Floatingtj and Intermtj are dummies constructed on the basis of the exchange
rate regime classification of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) into floating, intermedi-
ate and fixed regimes (baseline is a fixed exchange rate regime).
Our dependent variable, qtij is the sectoral level of output. Much of the research that
examines the effects of REER uncertainty on productive decisions focuses on investment
— stressing its condition of irreversibility, or on international trade flows.21 We look at
20BCDI = 0 if at a given period, in a given country, there are no banking, currency, default or inflation
crises. BCDI = 4 if at a given point in time the country experiences the four types of crisis.
21The literature on uncertainty and investment was reviewed in Chapter 1. Some of the most influential
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the output effects because the output decision is also characterized, to a certain extent, by
irreversibility, because of regulations in the labour markets, and because firms have to pay
for inputs before output is sold. In addition, and because the dollarized condition of the
economies under consideration, the potential effects of REER uncertainty is not limited to
those that engage in international trade, or not even to those producing tradable goods.
Both sectoral prices and the real effective exchange rate are included. While these are
correlated, each attempts to capture different effects. The indicator of sectoral prices will
capture competitive effects in a broader way than real exchange rates. For example it
will capture the effect of changes in international prices of the relevant goods. Therefore,
we expect β1 > 0. On the other hand, given that sectoral prices are averaged across
different economic activities that fall together in a three-digit ‘sector’, as classified by
the international standard industrial classification (ISIC), the indicator may contain more
noise than signal, so the with the inclusion of the real exchange rate — which is a variable
of reference to manufacturers in these economies, we may be capturing some competitive
effects. In addition to this, there are other potential effects associated with the REER.
In the context of economies in which dollar-debt is substantial, movements in the real
exchange rate may affect output supplied by affecting the net wealth of the firms, and
then, their ability to obtain credit, as suggested by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and
Cespedes et al. (2004). For these reasons the expected sign of β2 is ambiguous.
The inclusion of the BCDI indicator attempts to capture the fact that banking, cur-
rency, default and inflation crises have substantial effects on the payment system of the
economy, severely affecting the availability of credit. Notice that we control for REER
movements, and this variable also captures something similar: currency crises. With re-
spect to this type of crisis, what we expect this indicator to capture is the effect of large
papers on uncertainty and trade flows are those of Ethier (1973), Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978), McKenzie
(1999), and Byrne et al. (2008).
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movements, picking up non-linearities. Given that REER uncertainty tends to be high
during crises, the proper identification of the crises effect is key to be able to isolate a pure
uncertainty effect. For this variable, we expect a negative coefficient.
Dummies for different exchange rate regimes, as classified by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzeneg-
ger (2005), attempt to capture output effects that these may have, independently of the
other covariates. Their inclusion is important, as different regimes may affect both uncer-
tainty and output. The measure of misalignment attempts to capture the effect that large
downward departures from a ‘perceived’ equilibrium (an appreciated REER), may delay
output expansions, as agents may expect a realignment. β6 is expected to be positive.
The country-sector fixed effects, αij , attempt to capture the effects of omitted re-
gressors that are country-sector specific, but time-invariant, such as factor intensities,
institutional arrangements, special regulatory treatments, et cetera. The time dummies,
αt attempt to capture the effects of omitted regressors that are country-sector invariant,
but time-specific, such as global trends in energy prices, productivity shocks in the man-
ufacturing sector, generalised increases in trade, et cetera.
To these determinants, we add measures of uncertainty described above. We report
empirical experiments in which the three alternative measures are considered. These meas-
ures of uncertainty are constructed using a macro indicator of the real effective exchange
rate. One concern that arises is that, if some sectors trade predominantly with a subset
of countries with which bilateral real exchange rates are particularly volatile, while oth-
ers trade predominantly with other subset with which bilateral real exchange rates are
particularly stable, the using a macro measure of uncertainty may be a crude approxim-
ation. Two possible solutions were considered. First, we could have constructed sectoral
measures of uncertainty on the basis of the sectoral price indicators. We discarded this
possibility because our sectoral price indicators are likely to contain significant noise, for
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the reasons outlined above. Moreover, the use of sectoral real exchange rates to construct
a measure of uncertainty is problematic in the presence of sectoral policies in the form of
non-tariff barriers, quotas, et cetera, that may differ across countries. These will make
them poor indicators of competitiveness, and undermine the importance of a measure of
uncertainty calculated on their basis. In addition to this, data on sectoral prices have an-
nual periodicity and start in 1970. The identification of an autoregressive forecast equation
and the calculation of the variance of the forecast error as a measure of uncertainty would
imply losing some years at the beginning of the sample period. For these reasons, we
did not pursue this strategy. Second, we could have used aggregate prices, but construct
sectoral real effective exchange rates, by giving sector-specific weights for the bilateral real
exchange rates, based on the trade destination structure of each sector. This is a more
appealing strategy. However, the trade data required to calculate the appropriate weights
since 1970, with a three-digit disaggregation were not available. In fact, these data are the
basic input for the calculation of the Mercosur export shares discussed in Section 2.3.1,
and they are only available at a one-digit level since 1980, and only since 1985 for most
sectors at a two-digit level. Therefore, and in order to avoid losing almost half of our
sample, we decided to use our macro measure of uncertainty in the analysis that follows.
In addition, and to tackle this possible source of misspecification, we use Mercosur export
shares to adjust this macro measure for different levels of exposure to uncertainty — the
method will be described in Section 2.4.4, and report the results in Section 2.5.3.3.
Finally, we also include a measure of real exchange rate misalignment as a control.
This is motivated by the fact that during a pilot survey carried out among Uruguayan
manufacturing firms, their managers tended to refer to ‘uncertainty’ and ‘misalignment’
interchangeably. By controlling for misalignment, we attempt to test whether there is a
pure uncertainty effect on output.
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2.4.3 Threshold Model to Explore Non-Linearities
The specification in equation (2.2) assumes that REER uncertainty and changes in output
are linearly related. A reason to cast doubt on the validity of a linear relationship is
related to balance-sheet effects associated with future REER changes. In economies in
which firms have important currency mismatches in their balance sheets, high and low
uncertainty may affect output decisions differently. There may be a threshold above which
further increases in uncertainty may increase the bankruptcy risk, and then induce firms
to act more cautiously, and postpone their plans to increase output. What is more, in
countries in which the Central Banks have frequently committed to fixed exchange rates,
uncertainty generated after the collapses of the regimes may trigger additional channels
through which output is affected, related for example, to the loss of credibility of the
government’s announcements.
The existing literature on the existence of threshold effects in the relationship of un-
certainty and productive decisions has been explored in the context of investment de-
cisions, where the seminal work of Sarkar (2000) triggered research on the presence of
non-linearities or threshold effects of uncertainty on investment. The ‘real options’ ap-
proach to the analysis of investment under uncertainty, pioneered by McDonald and Siegel
(1986) states that an increase in uncertainty depresses investment as it increases the critical
investment trigger. Sarkar argues that increases in uncertainty also affect the probability
of investing, and this effect cannot be unambiguously determined analytically (Sarkar,
2000, p.223). By using numerical results to illustrate the uncertainty-investment relation-
ship, he finds an inverted u-shape. Their main result is that an increase in uncertainty
may increase investment. Subsequent empirical work has often found that data supported
threshold effects. For example Serven (2003), using aggregate data on investment for 61
developing countries spanning the years 1970 to 1995, finds that it’s only ‘high’ real ex-
change rate uncertainty that depresses investment, while the effect of low uncertainty is
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positive although not well determined. Lensink and Murinde (2006) use firm-level data for
the UK over the period 1995-1999 and find evidence of an inverted u relationship between
investment and uncertainty regarding stock market returns. More recently, and with a fo-
cus on six Latin American countries, Clausen (2008) finds threshold effects of uncertainty
on investment. While the effect of high uncertainty is unambiguously negative, that of
low uncertainty is positive on investment in Chile and Mexico.
To answer research question (3), we test for threshold effects of uncertainty with respect
to REER changes, on output changes, and estimate the following models.
qtij = γi− ∗ δj + β1ptij + β2reertj + β3reerUncerttj + β4reerUncert2tj +
+β5reerSkew.tj + β6reerKurt.tj + β7reermisal.tj + β8BCDItj
+β9Floatingtj + β10Intermtj + utij (2.3)
qtij = γi− ∗ δj + β1ptij + β2reertj + β3LowUncerttj + β4HighUncerttj +
+β5reerSkew.tj + β6reerKurt.tj + β7reerMisal.tj + β8BCDItj
+β9Floatingtj + β10Intermtj + utij (2.4)
The model of equation (2.3) allows us to test for an inverted-u shape relationship
between uncertainty and output, while the model in (2.4) allows us to identify whether two
different slopes for “high” and “low” uncertainty may fit the model better than imposing
a single one.
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2.4.4 Interacted Model to Explore Sectoral Heterogeneity
To disentangle some of factors that are behind the relationship between REER uncer-
tainty and output, and so being able to answer research question (4), we also estimate an
interacted model, that takes the generic form of equation (2.5):
qtij = αij + αt + Xγ + β1reerUncerttj + β2reerUncerttj ∗ Ztij + β3Ztij + utij(2.5)
where X is a matrix containing all the controls of equation (2.2), γ is a vector of the as-
sociated coefficients, and Ztij is the hypothesized determinant of the relationship between
REER uncertainty and output, which are also allowed to have level effects on the de-
pendent variable. In particular, we consider three variables to interact with the REER
uncertainty, and discuss their roles in the estimable equation in what follows. The first
two are introduced in the analysis as potential determinants of the output sensitivity to
uncertainty, while the last one is introduced as an adjustment for the macro measure of
uncertainty considered here.
Trade Orientation We measure trade orientation as the share of sectoral output that is
exported, and try to identify whether sectoral differences in this respect, explain differences
in the output response to changes in uncertainty with respect to REER changes. The
effects are a priori ambiguous. Thinking in terms of the standard textbook approach, one
would expect that — as long as firms are averse to risk — sectors with a higher exposure
to export markets are going to be more sensitive to REER uncertainty than those whose
output is mainly oriented to the domestic markets, because REER will influence a larger
portion of the price received.
On the other hand, in the context of Southern Cone economies, in which the degree of
debt dollarization is significant, REER uncertainty affects output through another mech-
anism, that operates through the firms’ financial structure, as discussed in Chapter 1.
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Because firms exhibit mismatches in their balance-sheets, REER movements affect dis-
proportionately their liabilities. Higher uncertainty increases expected bankruptcy costs,
and induce, even among risk-neutral firms, output contractions. In this case, a higher
exposure to export markets contributes to match the currency of denomination of the
firm’s assets with that of liabilities, and therefore provides a mechanism to insulate firms’
output decisions from REER uncertainty.
Labour Productivity For each sector, we measure labour productivity as the quotient
of the total wage bill and the value of output. We also calculate the distance to the
‘frontier’ of productivity, given by that of the corresponding sector in the United States’
economy. Assuming an association between productivity and profitability of the sector,
these data would help us test the hypothesis of whether higher profitability helps insu-
lating output from REER uncertainty (we use this proxy in the the absence of data on
sectoral profitability). As argued in Chapter 1, in the presence of dollar-debt, the output
of those firms with higher liquidity, or current profits, was going to be less sensitive to
increases in REER uncertainty than that of firms with lower liquidity balances, since,
for the latter type, the increase in uncertainty would increase expected bankruptcy costs
by more, meaning that the output response will be correspondingly larger than for the
former type. Even without dollar-debt, more profitable firms will face better prospects for
adjustment than less profitable ones, in the event of adverse competitiveness shock arising
from movements in the REER.
Export Exposure with Mercosur Markets This is measured using the export shares
described and reported in Section 2.3.1. There are several reasons why we include the
shares in the interacted model.
(1) Misspecification. The use of a macro measure of REER uncertainty may introduce
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a source of misspecification in the model of equation (2.2). A large portion of the
REER uncertainty is generated within Mercosur economies — which, as discussed
above, tend to be relatively volatile. For this reason, the use of a common uncertainty
measure across sectors, regardless of the intensity with which they trade with the
volatile region may be misleading. In an attempt to control for this, we adjust our
macro measure of uncertainty by multiplying it to our indicator of export shares to
Mercosur markets.
Ceteris paribus, if those sectors trading more intensively within Mercosur are ex-
posed to more uncertainty, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term will be
negative.
(2) Adaptation to High Uncertainty. It is possible that the export share may not
only act as an adjustment factor to the measure of uncertainty, but also as a determ-
inant of the output sensitivity to REER uncertainty. One hypothesis that emerged
from the pilot survey we performed on a small number of manufacturers in Uruguay
is that firms that trade intensively with the volatile region may adapt their produc-
tion processes to better cope with uncertainty. Most firms expressed that to cope
with uncertainty, they introduced shorter-term labour contracts, incorporate short
notice termination clauses in agreements so that long-term commitments are avoided,
and maintain relatively higher liquid assets.22 This might imply that export share
decreases the sensitivity of output to uncertainty. However, it could also be argued
that if these firms have already adjusted to better cope with uncertainty, and now
face further increases in uncertainty, they may find themselves with fewer instru-
ments to use. Instead, those that have not yet adapted their production processes,
22It is worth mentioning that although forward contracts would allow hedging nominal exchange rate
risk, these have been largely unavailable in the countries considered, over the period of analysis. In the
last few years, the markets have developed to some extent. However, firms tend to claim that the costs
associated to these instruments are significantly high.
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as they predominantly trade with the low-volatility region, may have a wider range
of margins to adapt and decrease their vulnerability to REER shocks, in the face of
increases in uncertainty. Hence, the effect of export share on the output-uncertainty
relationship is ambiguous.
(3) Lower Ability to Diversify Export Markets. Even if REER uncertainty was
faced homogeneously by all firms, independently of where they exported, it would
be plausible to expect that those firms that have a more diversified export market
structure — or are more capable of diversifying, will be less vulnerable to uncer-
tainty shocks. Now, it could be argued that if the high export shares with Mercosur
are related to trade protection that firms within certain sectors obtain, and if this
trade protection is associated with relatively low productivity, then in a context of
REER uncertainty, firms producing in protected sectors will find it more difficult to
diversify, and so, will be more cautious than the non-protected ones. An example
may be illustrative. Firms in the Uruguayan automobile sector export almost ex-
clusively to Mercosur countries under a special regime that incorporates substantial
protection. Instead, meatpackers in Uruguay tend to have their export destinations
largely diversified, and face international competition. In the event of high REER
uncertainty with their main trading partner, it would be reasonable to expect a more
cautious behaviour of producers in the automobile sector than that of meatpackers,
as the latter are likely to be able to re-orientate a larger portion of their output to
a new market, in a faster way than the former. If this is the prevalent mechanism,
then a higher export share would increase the sensitivity of output to uncertainty.
Another line of argument to explain the capacity of diversifying the export destin-
ation structure is related to the type of goods produced by a firm, irrespective of
productivity or protection levels. As argued by Rauch (1999), when trading differ-
entiated products, proximity, common languages, and cultural similarities may be
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very important in matching international buyers and sellers. This may explain why
trading of this type of goods by Mercosur firms is predominantly concentrated within
the region. In addition, the author presents evidence suggesting that the search costs
associated with trading differentiated goods are higher than those associated with
homogeneous goods, which result in the former type of goods being traded mostly
where the costly networks are already in place. For goods such as bovine meat, or
milled rice, that are rather homogenous and tend to trade in organised exchanges,
the re-orientation of export destination is likely to be easier than for goods such as
bicycles or cars, for example. A quick inspection of the export shares calculated
in Section 2.3.1 shows that these tend to be larger for sectors that produce goods
that could be considered as “differentiated”, so one could expect that those sectors
exhibiting high export shares, may find re-orientation more difficult because of the
type of product they produce, and so may be more vulnerable to REER uncertainty.
Therefore, if this channel is predominant, one would expect the coefficient on the
export shares interaction with REER uncertainty to be negative, to capture this
vulnerability effect.23
The estimation of both (2.2) and (2.5) presents a number of challenges. These are
presented in what follows, along with the strategy pursued here to deal with them.
2.4.5 Dynamics
Given that the time period is relatively long (1970-2002), we tested for non-stationarity
of the series of output and prices and found some evidence of non-stationarities. Non-
stationarity makes a specification in levels problematic and would call for a panel coin-
tegration analysis. The literature on this subject is still being developed and subject to
23Byrne et al. (2008) find some evidence that exchange rate uncertainty affects exports of differentiated
goods, but it does not for homogeneous goods, when looking at US trade over the period 1989 to 2001.
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controversy. In addition, most of the statistical theory supporting it looks at the case in
which T/N →∞ (where T is the time dimension, and N is the number of groups), while
in our case the number of groups (three countries, twenty-eight sectors) is substantially
larger than the number of periods (thirty-three).24
For these reasons, we opted for estimating the relationship in growth rates (which are
all stationary). Conceptually, is worth stressing that as we estimate all models consid-
ering growth rates, the relationship of interest becomes the impact of uncertainty with
respect to the rate of growth of the real exchange rate, on the rate of growth of industrial
output. Methodologically, by taking growth rates, we are introducing a serially correlated
error term in the model. The presence of serial correlation would make standard errors
look smaller than they really are, thus rendering inference invalid. To control for this,
we re-estimate the models using heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
standard errors. The estimator we use for the covariance matrix is the Newey and West
(1987) (Bartlett kernel function) specification.25
2.4.6 The Estimator
Ordinary Least Squares or Instrumental Variables? If all the right-hand side
variables in equation (2.2) were independent of the error term, and the errors were in-
dependent and identically distributed, then, the ordinary least-squares estimator (OLS)
would provide the best linear unbiased estimator of the vector of parameters β (actually,
the model in equation (2.2) is a two-way fixed-effect).
However, it is likely that sectoral output is jointly determined with sectoral prices.
Then, supply shocks, for example, will affect both equilibrium price and quantity in the
market, and both variables will be correlated to the error term by construction. Price
24See Baltagi (2008) for a detailed discussion.
25It is worth mentioning that this estimator of the covariance matrix needs large samples to perform
well.
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endogeneity makes the OLS estimator of β, βˆOLS inconsistent. Consider, for simplicity of
exposition, that the only explanatory variable is p, so that the estimable equation turns
into qtij = βptij +utij . Then, βˆOLS = (p′p)−1p′q = β+p′u. Because p′u 6= 0, the expected
value of estimator equals the true parameter plus a bias, which does not tend to zero as
the sample size increases.
The solution to this source of inconsistency lies in finding an “instrument” (Z), that
affects sectoral output only through its effect on prices. How good a solution to the
problem of endogeneity is provided by the instrument depends on whether the instru-
ment is “valid” (i.e., it is exogenous to the market), and “relevant” (i.e. it matters for the
process of production). These two conditions imply that Z ′u = 0 and Z ′p 6= 0 respectively.
Two Stage Least Squares or GMM? Two alternative estimators that address the
inconsistency problem arising from endogeneity by using instrumental variables are the
two-stage least squares (2SLS-IV), and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-IV)
estimators.
The estimation with instrumental variables (IV) can be seen as the application of least
squares in two stages. In the first, each of the right-hand side variables in equation (2.2)
are regressed on the instruments, Z, and a matrix of fitted values, pˆ, is obtained. In the
second stage, the dependent variable, q is regressed on pˆ, and a vector of instrumental
variables estimates, βˆIV , is obtained.
Alternatively, IV estimation can be seen as a Generalized Method of Moments optimiz-
ation problem. Following the exposition of Baum et al. (2007), with exogenous instruments
Z (i.e.: Z ′u = 0), then L instruments give a set of L moments:
gi(β) = Z ′iui = Z
′
i(qi − piβ) (2.6)
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where gi is L × 1. The exogeneity condition means that at the true value of β, the L
moment or orthogonality conditions will be satisfied:
E(gi(β)) (2.7)
There is a sample moment corresponding to each of the L moment equations, so for a
given estimator βˆ, these L sample moment can be written as:
g¯(βˆ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
gi(β) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Z ′i(qi − piβˆ) =
1
n
Z ′uˆ (2.8)
Then, the idea behind GMM is to choose βˆ that brings g¯(βˆ) as close to zero as possible.
If, as in our case, the number of instruments is larger than the number of explanatory
variables (i.e.: L > K, so the equation is overidentified), there are more equations than
unknowns and it will not be possible to find βˆ that sets all moment conditions to zero.26
In this case, a weighting matrix W is used to construct a quadratic form in the moment
conditions. So, the GMM objective function is now:
J(βˆ) = ng¯(βˆ)′Wg¯(βˆ) (2.9)
So, the GMM estimator for β is the βˆ that minimises J(βˆ):
βˆGMM = argminβˆJ(βˆ) = ng¯(βˆ)
′Wg¯(βˆ) (2.10)
Solving the set of first order conditions, the IV-GMM estimator is obtained:
βˆGMM = (p′ZWZ ′p)−1p′ZWZ ′q (2.11)
26The instruments to be used in our context will be presented below.
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Hansen (1982) shows that when the weighting matrix, W chosen is equal to S−1, where
S is the covariance matrix of the moment conditions, then, the most efficient estimator is
obtained (S = E[Z ′uu′Z] = limN→∞[Z ′ΩZ]). S is then the optimal weighting matrix. If
the residuals from 2SLS are used to derived a consistent estimator of S, then, the feasible
and efficient IV-GMM estimator is:
βˆFEGMM = (p′ZSˆ−1Z ′p)−1p′ZSˆ−1Z ′q) (2.12)
If the errors are independent and identically distributed, then the optimal weighting matrix
is proportional to the identity matrix (σ2uI) and IV-GMM equals the standard 2SLS
estimator.
As argued by Baum et al. (2007), GMM should be preferred to IV in the presence of
heteroscedasticity of unknown form, as in this case, the IV-GMM estimator that uses as
a weighting matrix an estimate of the inverse of S, computed from the 2SLS residuals,
will be more efficient than the 2SLS estimator.27
Or back to Ordinary Least Squares? It has been pointed out that though consistent,
both the 2SLS and the GMM estimators may perform poorly in small samples, as they
are biased, and less precise than OLS. Our decision of preferring an IV estimator is guided
by economic theory. In the context of the manufacturing sectors of the three countries
analysed here, it is reasonable to think, as argued above, that sectoral output and prices are
simultaneously determined. We also use a statistical test to determine whether p should
be treated as endogenous. The ‘C’ test considers if the null hypothesis of exogeneity of p
is upheld by the data. In essence, the test compares OLS and IV estimates and explores
whether the differences in the estimates are systematic. If they are, the null is rejected,
27The author argues that even in the absence of heteroscedasticity, GMM is no worse asymptotically
than the IV estimator. However, reasonable estimators of the optimal weighting matrix — key to the
efficiency of GMM — are only obtained with very large sample sizes.
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suggesting a bias of OLS, and IV should be preferred. We report the C test-statistic after
the estimation output of each model considered.
Our Choice In the analysis that follows, we use the GMM-IV estimator, as tests sug-
gested the presence of heteroscedasticity.28 For the actual estimation we use the Stata
package ‘xtivreg2’ (Schaffer (2005)), which requests the two-step feasible efficient GMM
estimator and corresponding variance-covariance matrix. As it will see in what follows,
the C-statistics suggest that, as suggested by economic theory, prices are endogenous and
instrumental variables are needed in most of the models reported below.
2.4.7 Instruments
We use alternative sets of instruments for the “troublesome” variable, i.e.: sectoral prices,
and compare results in order to investigate the credibility of our estimates. The first
instrument is given by US sectoral price changes. These are likely to be independent of
industrial output of Mercosur countries, while they will have an effect on domestic sec-
toral price changes, given the tradable nature of the goods produced in the manufacturing
sectors we are considering. Second, we use lagged values of sectoral price changes. Given
that our periodicity is annual and that the production processes in manufacturing are
relatively shorter than in other sectors of the economy, lagged price changes are likely to
influence output changes through their effect on current price changes only. In both cases
we include the growth rate of population as a shifter of the demand curve. We report
two additional diagnostic tests for the GMM-IV estimation, and discuss the results. First,
a test of “relevance” of the instruments. This is given by the joint significance of the
excluded instruments in the first-stage of the GMM-IV procedure (Kleibergen and Paap
statistic (KP)). A “large” value of the KP suggests that the instruments are correlated with
28We performed Pagan and Hall (1983) tests. These tests whether there is heteroscedasticity in the
estimated regression, related to one or more indicator variables.
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the troublesome variable, which implies our instruments are relevant to explain sectoral
prices. The rule-of-thumb for “large” being when the F-statistic≥10. Second, a test of
the overidentifying restrictions of model, or “validity” of the instruments (Sargan-Hansen
test). This consists of regressing the residuals from the GMM-IV regression on all instru-
ments (excluded and included). The null is that all instruments are uncorrelated with the
the error term, and its rejection would cast doubt on the validity of these instruments.
This is because that rejection would be suggesting that the exclusion restriction may be
inappropriate as the instrument exerts a direct effect on the dependent variable, instead
of only affecting it via its effect on the troublesome regressor.
2.4.8 Cross-Sectional Dependence
Cross-sectional dependence arises when, in a panel, the errors are correlated across groups:
E(eitejt) 6= 0. The consequences may be serious, as explained in Baltagi (2008), since pool-
ing may provide little gain in efficiency over single equation estimation, and estimates can
be biased. In our panel, a likely source of cross-sectional dependence arises from the fact
that the countries included in our panel are of very different dimensions, and during the
period of analysis there has been a reduction in trade protection among them. These
changes in trade policy may have contributed to an adjustment in the patterns of produc-
tion within the bloc, and the adjustment in one sector in a country, may have affected the
sector in another country. An example will be illustrative: say that after a reduction in
tariffs between Argentina and Brazil, there is a structural change in production following
comparative advantage, so that output of food and beverages in Argentina increases (and
falls in Brazil), while the output of automobiles increases in Brazil (falling in Argentina).
If there is a portion of that adjustment that is not driven by sectoral price changes or by
changes in other factors captured in the controls we include in the model, then, inevitably,
it will appear in the errors, making them correlated across groups, with the implications
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on efficiency and bias of the estimator mentioned above.
For these reasons, we first test for cross-section dependence using the Breusch-Pagan
test. This is based on the following statistic:
CD = T
N−1∑
i=j
N∑
j=i+1
ρˆ2ij (2.13)
where N is the number of groups, T is the number of periods, ρˆ is the sample estimate of
the pairwise correlation coefficient of the residuals, and these are obtained as in:
eit = qit − αˆi − βˆ
′
iXit (2.14)
with αˆi and βˆi is the vector of estimates of the parameters computed using a regression
of q on an intercept and a matrix X containing all the regressors in the model described
in equation (2.2) for each group (country) separately. Under the null hypothesis of no
cross sectional dependence, CD ∼ χ2N(N−1)/2. If the null is rejected, we use Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) techniques.
2.4.9 Country Heterogeneity
If in the true model, the responsiveness of output to uncertainty (β) is country specific,
as below:
qjt = αj + βjreerUncertjt + ujt (2.15)
but we estimate a common slope:
qjt = αj + βreerUncertjt + wjt (2.16)
where j is the country, and t is the time period, then, the error term will be: wit =
(βi − β)xit + uit, and X ′wit 6= 0, rendering the estimator of β inconsistent.
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Given that our panel includes three countries of different characteristics and that the
time dimension of the data is relatively large, we treat the heterogeneity by running
separate regressions and examining parameter stability across countries.
2.4.10 Outliers.
In the empirical analysis that follows, we excluded those observations for which the de-
pendent variable lay more than 5 interquartile ranges away from the median. The outlier
threshold is defined in a conservative way, in an attempt to identify those observations
whose atypically large deviations from the median are likely to be related to data input-
ting errors. We define it in terms of interquartile deviations from the median so that
the threshold is not itself affected by the extremes (as it is the case when thresholds are
defined on the basis of standard deviations away from the mean. The chosen threshold
implies discarding nine observations in the analysis (out of 2563).
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2.5 Results
Here we report and discuss the results from estimating the models presented in Section
2.4. In Section 2.4.2 we start by estimating the most parsimonious model (described in
Section 2.5.1). We test whether the identified uncertainty effect on output growth is robust
to the inclusion of a variable that captures changes in REER misalignments with respect
to an “equilibrium” value. In addition, we examine how robust results are to the choice
of instruments, by using a different set and comparing results. Then, we explore whether
there is evidence of country-heterogeneity in the parameters.
In Section 2.5.2 we present the results of estimating the threshold model presented in
Section 2.4.3, as in equations (2.3) and (2.4). These models will allow us to understand
the non-linearities at work in the output growth-REER uncertainty link.
In Section 2.5.3, we discuss the results of estimating the three interacted models pro-
posed in Section 2.4.4, using export orientation, labour productivity and Mercosur export
shares. These three variables enter the estimable equation in levels and interacted with
REER uncertainty. In this way, we are able to identify any direct effect they may exert
on output growth, plus indirect effects that they may exert by affecting the vulnerability
of sectoral output to REER uncertainty. Consider, for example, the export shares. It
could turn out, for instance, that the level coefficient was positive, while the interaction
coefficient was negative. This would mean that high export shares in itself was growth-
enhancing, but at the same time it raised the vulnerability of the sector, meaning that a
rise in uncertainty would have a particularly larger depressing effect on growth.
Initially, we investigate the effects of augmenting the baseline model by adding the
level and interaction of export orientation, labour productivity and Mercosur export shares
separately (in Sections 2.5.3.1, 2.5.3.2, and 2.5.3.3, respectively). The reason for examining
the effects of each of these variables separately at first, is that labour productivity and
export shares are only available for a subset of observations. This means that when
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including them, we substantially lose degrees of freedom in the estimation. By including
one at a time, we can scrutinize the effect of each one, with as many observations as
possible.
Finally, we augment the baseline model including together the three aforementioned
variables in levels and interacted with uncertainty. This implies losing all observations
from 1970 until 1980, and for some sectors, until 1986. We then interpret the results and
compare them with those obtained when each was included separately.
2.5.1 The Baseline Model
In this section we test the hypothesis of whether REER uncertainty exerts a negative
effect on the growth rate of industrial output, and whether this effect is heterogeneous
across countries. Table 2.2, on page 116, presents GMM-IV estimates of equation (2.2)
in growth rates using three alternative uncertainty indicators. In all cases, country-sector
fixed effects and time dummies are included, as well as dummies controlling for different
exchange rate regimes. To control for correlations within groups in the errors, we clustered
standard errors at country and 2-digit sector level.
Coefficients for continuous variables are reported in elasticity form, those on the uncer-
tainty measures are semi-elasticities, and those on categorical variables are impact effects.
Column (1-3) report results when alternative measures of uncertainty are included. The
price coefficient is positive and of a plausible size, suggesting that output supplied is in-
elastic to prices, but not always well-determined, while the coefficient on growth of the
REER is close to unity and very well determined in all cases, suggesting that output sup-
plied is very close to be unit-elastic to real depreciations, on average and ceteris paribus.29
Clearly, sectoral prices and REER are correlated, given the tradable nature of the man-
29From a statistical point of view, we reject the null of the coefficient on the growth of REER being
equal to one.
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ufactured goods produced considered here. However, as already argued, sectoral prices
contain information that is more idiosyncratic to the sector than REER. An example is
the evolution of world prices of the relevant goods. The fact that output seems to be more
responsive to REER than to sectoral price changes is somehow puzzling. A likely explan-
ation for this is that, due to averaging over different economic activities grouped under
the same three-digit sector, the price series contain more noise than signal, relative to the
REER series, that probably exert a rather homogeneous competitive effect across trad-
ables, and that in the context of Southern Cone economies is considered by manufacturers
as the emblematic indicator of competitiveness.
Another interesting element in these results, is that given the positive coefficient on
the REER, the effect of competitiveness of REER depreciations seems to dominate over
possible balance-sheet, or other negative effects on output that arise from depreciations.30
This is likely to be related to the fact that these balance-sheet effects are captured in
the Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)’s BCDI indicator of crises. In fact, the coefficient on the
BCDI is well determined and yields a negative coefficient. Ceteris paribus, the outbreak of
each of the crises that are captured on the index decreases output growth on average, by
about 4− 5%. This is a sizable and plausible effect. Banking and sovereign default crises
are associated with disruptions in the payment system of the economy, with important
consequences on the availability of credit. Currency crashes in economies with dollarised
liabilities trigger harmful balance-sheet effects, which may further affect credit availability.
High inflation is associated with relative price distortions, and may significantly affect real
revenue when there are lags between sales and payment. Take as an example, the case
of Argentina in 2002, where the index takes value 4. All other things equal, our model
30Many explanations have been given for the finding of contractive depreciations, since Diaz Alejandro
(1963). Operating through the supply side, these are the mentioned balance-sheet effects arising when
liabilities are dollarised, and the increases in production costs arising from difficult-to-substitute imported
inputs.
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predicts a reduction in industrial output of about 22%.31
The point estimate for the effect of REER Uncertainty on output is always negative,
irrespective of the measure of uncertainty considered, but it is well-determined only for the
Roll-Var measure. A number of conclusions can be reached by looking at these results.
First, the effect is better determined when using the Roll-Var measure. This measure
differs from the GARCH measure in two respects: (a) it implies that agents forecast in a
less sophisticated way, and (b) it implies a longer memory of agents (12 months instead
of 3-4 months with GARCH). The reason behind the better performance seems to be the
longer horizon it considers, as we tried a modified version of RollVar with a 4 month
window, and the effect was similar in size, but only significant at 10%. Second, ceteris
paribus, when RollVar doubles, output falls, on average, by 2.45%, while if it is the REER
variance, output contracts by less than half percent.32 These differences are reasonable,
given that the latter measure probably overestimates “true” uncertainty, as discussed in
Section 2.3. Not all of the variance in the REER can be attributed to uncertainty, and
thus affect behaviour.33
Columns (4-5) report results of estimating equation (2.2) when uncertainty is defined
in a broader way, including measures of the third and fourth sample moments. Tests of
joint significance on the conditional variance, skewness and kurtosis suggest that their
effect on output is different from zero, both when the conditional variance measure is
the GARCH or the RollVar one. A closer look, however, casts doubt on the relevance of
adding the third and fourth moment of the distribution of the REER in these models.
The kurtosis is significant at 5% only when the measure of conditional variance is of short
31The effect is calculated as: e−0.05×4 − 1.
32The elasticity is calculated as βˆ × ¯RollV ar. ¯RollV ar = 7.4E04.
33Diagnostics are reported the bottom of the table. The low values of the Hansen statistic lead to a
non-rejection of the null of no correlation of the residuals with the instruments, suggesting instrument
validity. The size of the K-P suggest that instruments are relatively weak, and that caution should be
put at drawing conclusions. The relatively large values for the C-statistic suggest that IV methods are
needed. The low value of the Cross-Sectional Dependence Breusch-Pagan test (CSD) indicates no evidence
of cross-country dependence in this data.
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memory (GARCH), but only significant at 10% in the specifications that include Roll-Var.
Given that the kurtosis is calculated on a window of 12 months, and that it is significantly
correlated with the GARCH conditional variance measure (ρKurt,GARCH = 34%)), the
role being played by the kurtosis may be just capturing the longer horizon that agents
consider. That would explain why the kurtosis becomes less well determined when the
long-memory RollVar measure is incorporated.34
2.5.1.1 REER Uncertainty or Misalignment?
During a pilot survey we conducted in the early stages of this research among manufactur-
ing firms in Uruguay, managers pointed out REER uncertainty as a serious impediment for
planning production. However, in our small sample of firms surveyed, managers tended to
use the terms ‘REER uncertainty’ and ‘REER misalignment’ interchangeably. The reason
for the association is likely to be related to the fact that agents find it more difficult to
predict future movements of exchange rates, when they perceive them to be misaligned
with respect to an “equilibrium value”. Under those circumstances, a wider spectrum
of exchange rate movements are likely and the confidence in any point estimate will fall.
Another interpretation is that agents plainly confuse the terms, and their concern is with
misalignments and not with mean preserving changes in uncertainty. Because we are in-
terested in identifying a pure uncertainty effect, we decided to perform a robustness check,
by controlling for changes in the degree of misalignment of the REER with respect to a
long-run value.
The concept of REER misalignment with respect to an equilibrium value, however,
34It could be argued that REER growth is endogenous in this specification. If larger exports lead to
growth in output, and to substantial inflows of foreign exchange, then the REER would appreciate, ceteris
paribus. We argue this is not likely to be the case, as we are working here with sectoral data at 3-digits,
which means that each sector explains a small portion of total exports. As a robustness check, we excluded
from the estimation sample the observations corresponding to the sector that explains, by far, the largest
portion of exports in the three countries: 311. The exclusion of these observations does not alter the results
reported here, as can be seen in Table C.6 of Appendix C.
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is an elusive one, given that the equilibrium level is unobservable. For the purposes of
our robustness check, we use a simple statistical procedure to decompose the REER series
into a long-run and a cyclical component that relies on the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter,
due to Hodrick and Prescott (1997). Strictly, this method does not allow us to determine
misalignment with respect to value of the REER that, for example, secures internal and
external balances for the economy, or that is consistent with purchasing power parity, or
that is aligned with the values of long and medium term fundamentals. It simply allows
us to decompose the REER series into a slow-moving long run trend (τt) and a transitory
deviation or cycle (ζt) component, assuming that on average, over the sample of analysis,
the variable has been on “equilibrium”. The extraction of the trend is performed by
minimising the variance of the ζt component subject to a given “smoothness” of the trend
τt, as in equation (2.17):
minτt
T∑
t=1
(reert − τt)2 + λ
T−1∑
t=2
[(τt+1 − τt)− (τt − τt−1)]2 (2.17)
where λ is the noise-to-signal ratio, and acts as a penalty attached to the volatility of
the trend component. We apply the HP filter to our monthly data of the REER, and
set λ = 14400.35 Then, we construct our measure of misalignment, by extracting τ from
the series of REER, and include it in the analysis. A note of caution is in order, when
interpreting results. As argued above, this is an ‘atheoretical’ method, and there is no
reason for the long run trend extracted here to be in line with an “equilibrium” REER that
emerges from other methodologies that rely on different theoretical models.36 In addition,
our measure does not allow us to identify the sources of the misalignment (e.g: transitory
factors, random disturbances or misalignment of the fundamentals). Also, from a purely
35This value is commonly used in the literature.
36For a review on these methods see MacDonald (2007)
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statistical perspective, this filter assumes that agents know the future, since the extraction
of τt relies on the knowledge of τt+1. Acknowledging its limitations, and given that the
purposes here are to provide a robustness check, we chose this avenue as it is relatively
simple to calculate and frequently found in the literature.37
Columns (6-7) report results when measures of REER misalignment changes are in-
corporated as explanatory variables. The coefficients are practically unchanged with the
inclusion of the REER misalignment measure, and those on the misalignment measures
are statistically insignificant and very small.38
2.5.1.2 Are Results Robust to the Choice of Instruments?
In Table 2.3 we try to replicate the results reported in Table 2.2, but using US prices
instead of lagged prices, as instruments for sectoral domestic prices.39 The price effect on
output produced is systematically positive and generally statistically significant and with
magnitudes in the range (0.35-0.54), suggesting that output is relatively inelastic to price
changes. The rest of the estimated coefficients is robust to the choice of the instruments,
which enhances the credibility of our results.40
2.5.1.3 Country Heterogeneity
The conclusions drawn above rest on the validity of the restriction of identical parameters
across countries. Given that the time dimension of our panel is reasonably long, we can
37See for example: Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) or Goldfajn and Werlang (2000)
38Cottani et al. (1990) also used a measure of REER misalignment in addition to one for REER instability
to explain GDP growth, export growth and investment at a macro level, and find a negative and significant
effect on the first two dependent variables. Dollar (1992) combines a measure of misalignment of the REER
with one of its variability to construct an index of outward orientation, and find that index to be highly
correlated with GDP growth.
39The number of observations is now increased, as we have one more year in the sample.
40Although all diagnostics point to this set of instruments as the best (Hansen suggests validity, KP are
in general above 10, suggesting that these instruments are stronger than the previous set, and C-stats that
IV procedures are necessary), a negative estimated coefficient for US prices in the first stage of the IV
procedure is puzzling. We find comfort in the large invariance of the estimated coefficients in the reduced
form to the set of instruments used, and use lagged prices as instruments in the rest of the paper.
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investigate whether the data upholds this restriction. We re-estimate (2.2) separately
for each country in the panel and compare the estimated coefficients (Table 2.4). The
general picture is largely unchanged, with the exception of the estimated coefficients on
the REER and the misalignment of the REER, where substantial country heterogeneity
is found. The output elasticity with respect to REER changes seem to be significantly
larger in Argentina and Uruguay than in Brazil. This is likely to be explained by the lower
degree of openness of the latter economy. Regarding the misalignment, when the REER
is below the equilibrium value, one would expect that firms delay increases in output,
thus pushing sectoral output changes downwards. This mechanism is supported by the
sign of the coefficient in the case of Argentina, but not in the case of Brazil, where the
misalignment variable yields a negative coefficient, though of small magnitude.
In terms of our parameters of interest, although the point estimates for the effects of
REER Uncertainty on output differ, these differences are not statistically significant. We
used these country-specific estimates to plot the estimated effect of REER uncertainty on
output over time (βˆuncert × reerUncert). This is displayed in Figure 2.4 for each of the
countries under analysis. The effects are calculated against a baseline of zero uncertainty,
which means that all series in the graph must be negative. Two elements emerge from
the visualization of the graph. First, that the effects of uncertainty on output are not
negligible. There are several episodes during our sample in which these have induced, on
average, a reduction in output of more than 5%. Second, that the effects of uncertainty
have been larger in Argentina and Uruguay, which is a direct product of their larger record
of uncertainty relative to Brazil, given that the estimated sensitivities are similar.
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Table 2.4: Country-Heterogeneous Response of Output to REER Uncertainty
Dep. Var.: Argentina Brazil Uruguay
Growth Ind Output Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Growth of Rel Prices -0.098 (0.092) -0.026 (0.069) 0.077 (0.268)
REER Growth 1.049*** (0.031) 0.504*** (0.037) 0.967*** (0.197)
REER Uncert RollVar -20.604* (10.666) -21.824** (8.580) -26.508** (12.809)
REER Skewness 0.056*** (0.011) 0.046*** (0.009) -0.018 (0.022)
REER Kurtosis -0.007 (0.006) 0.026*** (0.007) -0.022** (0.011)
BCDI -0.064*** (0.010) -0.059*** (0.006) -0.017 (0.040)
REER Misalignment 0.047*** (0.014) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.015 (0.014)
Observations 923 890 859
Time Dummies 7 7 7
Sector FE X X X
Hansen Overid Test 2.299 4.735 0.009
K&P Statistic 19.444 21.499 5.777
C Statistic 0.277 0.034 0.696
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The Hansen Overid and the C tests
are distributed χ21, the K&P statistic: χ
2
2. C.V. at 5% significance for χ
2
1=3.84 and for χ
2
2=5.99.
Figure 2.4: Plot of Estimated Effects of REER Uncertainty on Output
2.5.2 Threshold Effects
To test for threshold effects of uncertainty with respect to REER changes, on output
changes, we estimate the models described in equations (2.3) and (2.4):
Equation (2.3) allows for the identification of an inverted-U shape relationship with a
linear and a quadratic term for uncertainty. Equation (2.4) allows for two different linear
relationships between output and uncertainty, depending on whether the latter is ‘low’ or
‘high’. We consider ‘high’ the episodes that are in the upper quintile of the distribution
119
of REER uncertainty, and examine the sensitivity of the results by allowing the break
between low and high uncertainty to take place at 20 different percentiles in the the upper
quintile.
Column (1) of Table (2.5) reports the results of estimating equation (2.3). The hy-
pothesis of an inverted-u shape relationship between uncertainty and output is upheld by
the data. Uncertainty affects output in a non-linear fashion. The effect is positive for rel-
atively low levels of uncertainty, while it becomes negative for relatively higher levels. The
turning point seems to be around the 75-80th percentile of the distribution of uncertainty.
On the basis of this result, we determined “high uncertainty” to correspond to the episodes
in the upper quintile of the distribution, and investigated the robustness of the results to
different breaking points within the 5th quintile. Figure 2.5 depicts the estimated effects
of low and high uncertainty, along with their confidence intervals at 95% confidence, for
the 20 different breaking points. It is possible to see that the estimated effects of low and
high uncertainty are significantly different. While the former are generally positive, the
latter are negative. In addition, the effects of high uncertainty seem to be more precisely
estimated (a narrower interval) and seem to be quite stable irrespective of the choice of
the breaking point. Column (2) reports the results of estimating equation (2.4) when the
break for high uncertainty being at the 90th percentile of the distribution. In line with the
quadratic specification, we find the effect of REER uncertainty to be different depending
on whether we considered ‘low’ or ‘high’ uncertainty.41
41Both the AIC and the BIC favoured these models to that of equation (eqrefeq:quadraticchp2.
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Table 2.5: Thresholds
Dep. Var.: (1) (2)
Growth Ind Output Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Growth of Rel Prices 0.26* (0.14) 0.28** (0.14)
REER Growth 0.88*** (0.03) 0.87*** (0.03)
REER Uncert RollVar 64.30*** (21.08)
Sq REER Uncert Roll Var -27806.21*** (5326.84)
REER Skewness 0.02** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
REER Kurtosis -0.01** (0.01) -0.01* (0.01)
BCDI -0.04*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01)
REER Misalignment 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Dumm Floating -0.02 (0.02) -0.03* (0.02)
Dumm Intermed. -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Low Uncert 37.69** (16.11)
High Uncert -28.00*** (10.25)
Observations 2563 2563
Time Dummies X X
Sector-Country FE X X
Clustered S.E. C&S C&S
Hansen Overid Test 1.471 2.190
K&P Statistic 5.914 5.123
C Statistic 4.787 3.946
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure 2.5: Threshold Effects of REER Uncertainty on Output
2.5.3 Sectoral Heterogeneity
The baseline estimation results proposed above pools across industries, imposing a com-
mon responsiveness of output to REER uncertainty. As sectors exhibit different charac-
teristics, it is interesting to explore whether differences in characteristics affect the vulner-
ability of sectoral output changes to REER uncertainty. Here we explore three possible
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triggers of heterogeneity: trade orientation, productivity and the intensity with which
they trade with Mercosur countries. We examine their direct effects on output, and their
indirect effects, through the output growth vulnerability to REER uncertainty.
2.5.3.1 Trade Orientation
Differences in trade orientation by sector may explain some of the heterogeneity in the
responsiveness of sectoral output to REER uncertainty, although the effects are a priori
ambiguous. The standard textbook approach would suggest that those sectors that are
more exposed to international trade are going to be more sensitive to REER uncertainty
than those whose output is mainly oriented to the domestic markets. This is because real
exchange rates (and their variations) are going to explain a larger portion of the price
received by firms in tradable sectors, and uncertainty about the price to be received will
induce an output contraction if firms in those sectors are averse to risk. However, in eco-
nomies in which firms contract dollar-debt, REER uncertainty affects output through the
firms’ financial structure — (see Chapter 1 for a full discussion). With dollar-debt, the less
the firms export, the larger the currency mismatch in their balance-sheets, and the more
sensitive sectoral output will be to REER uncertainty, even if firms are risk-neutral. Given
the theoretical ambiguity, we test empirically whether differences in exposure to interna-
tional trade determine differences in the sensitivity to REER uncertainty, and allowing
for a level effect of the measure of exposure to international trade on output changes, by
estimating equation (2.5), with Ztij being the ratio of sectoral exports to sectoral output,
as in equation (2.18):
qtij = αij + αt + Xγ + β1reerUncerttj + β2reerUncerttj ∗ Exp/Outputt−1,ij +
+β3Exp/Outputt−1,ij + utij (2.18)
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A specific challenge here is that output appears both on the left and the right hand
side of the equation given the way the measure of export exposure is constructed. This
means that shocks affecting output due to, say, measurement error, will lead to biased
estimates of our coefficients. We address this problem in three alternative ways. First,
we use the lagged exports/output measure, and interact this lag with the uncertainty
measure. Results are reported in column 1 of Table (2.6). Conditional on the effects of
the other covariates, the effect of REER uncertainty on output is heterogeneous across
sectors, and depends on the ratio of exports/output. The effect of uncertainty on output
changes is found to be negative, but it becomes smaller, the larger the exported proportion
of output is. The level effect of the lagged ratio of exports/output is insignificant.
Second, we consider averages of sectoral export/output instead of just the contempor-
aneous measure, and interact this average with the uncertainty measure. If measurement
error is imperfectly correlated over the years, then, by averaging, we reduce its importance.
Results of estimating equation (2.18) using this approach (taking 5-year averages) are re-
ported in Column 2. In line with the previous results, we find that those sectors that have
been exporting a larger portion of their output are less sensitive to REER uncertainty. In
addition, they seem to grow less, on average and ceteris paribus. We used 10-year averages,
and the results point to the same direction (reported in Column 3). The level effects of
export orientation on output changes, when using averages are now negative, suggesting
that more open sectors have been less dynamic. The third approach consists of using a
discrete measure of exports/output that indicates in which quartile of the distribution of
exports/output the sector is. For these purposes we construct quartile dummies. The
i− th dummy will take value 1 if the sector is in the i− th quartile and zero otherwise. We
interact the dummies with the uncertainty measure. In this way, output does not enter
directly on the right-hand side of equation (2.18). In addition to this, we exclude from
the estimation those observations that move from one quartile to another in a given year.
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Results are reported in Column 4. REER uncertainty seems to decrease output of those
sectors that are in the lowest quartile of the distribution of the export/output ratio. For
the second and third quartile, the point estimate is negative, but not well-determined. It
is worth mentioning that when using this approach, given that we exclude those sectors
that change quartile from one year to the next, the sample size is reduced by more than
20%. As in the first approach, the level effects of export orientation on output changes
are statistically insignificant, for all the quartiles.
Table 2.6: Trade Orientation
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth Ind Output Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Growth of Rel Prices 0.19 (0.14) 0.27* (0.15) 0.26* (0.15) 0.15 (0.18)
REER Growth 0.88*** (0.03) 0.87*** (0.03) 0.87*** (0.03) 0.89*** (0.04)
REER Uncert RollVar -38.54*** (9.64) -38.82*** (10.17) -39.99*** (10.68) 23.62 (23.69)
REER Skewness 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
REER Kurtosis -0.01* (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
BCDI -0.04*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01)
REER Misalignment 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Dummy Floating -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
Dummy Interm -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)
Uncert*Lagged Exp/Out 17.00*** (5.04)
L.Exp/Out 0.00 (0.01)
Uncer*5-y Ave Exp/Out 9.05** (4.51)
5-y Ave Exp/Out -0.01*** (0.00)
Uncer*10-y Ave Exp/Out 9.30** (4.08)
10-y Ave Exp/Out -0.02*** (0.00)
Uncer*Q1 Exp/Out -66.74** (28.56)
Uncer*Q2 Exp/Out -40.55 (26.84)
Uncer*Q3 Exp/Out -46.65 (31.08)
Q1 Exp/Out 0.04 (0.04)
Q2 Exp/Out 0.02 (0.03)
Q3 Exp/Out 0.03 (0.03)
Observations 2563 2563 2563 1992
Time Dummies X X X X
Sector-Country FE X X X X
Clustered S.E. C&S C&S C&S C&S
Hansen Overid Test 0.792 1.392 1.240 0.673
K&P Statistic 6.527 5.911 6.177 6.752
C Statistic 0.792 4.531 4.724 3.419
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2.5.3.2 Productivity
It is plausible to believe that the more profitable a firm is, the less sensitive it will be to
REER uncertainty. In Chapter 1, we argued that in a context in which credit was only
available in dollars, the output of those firms with higher liquidity, or current profits, was
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going to be less sensitive to increases in REER uncertainty than that of firms with lower
liquidity balances. For the latter type, the increase in uncertainty would increase expected
bankruptcy costs by more, which means that the output response will be correspondingly
larger than for the former type. But even if credit is not dollarised, more profitable firms
will have more chances to adjust to an adverse competitiveness shock that could arise
from movements in the REER than less profitable ones. Unfortunately, we do not have
data on sectoral profitability. However, we do have data on labour productivity, and on
labour productivity of the same sectors in the United States. Assuming an association
between productivity and profitability, we test whether there exists a second source of
sectoral heterogeneity in the output response to REER uncertainty, related to the level of
sectoral labour productivity.
To test this proposition, we include a measure of labour productivity (the quotient of
sectoral output and the wage bill), and an interaction between labour productivity and
the measure of REER uncertainty, and estimate equation (2.19):42
qtij = αij + αt + Xγ + β1reerUncerttj + β2reerUncerttj ∗ LabProdtij +
+β3 ∗ LabProdtij + utij (2.19)
Like when exploring the role of trade orientation in determining the heterogeneity of the
output response to REER uncertainty, in equation (2.19) output appears both on the left
and the right hand side of the equation, given the way the labour productivity measure is
constructed. We approach the problem as before.
We use the distance to the productivity frontier (DistFrontier) as an alternative to
labour productivity. The frontier is assumed to be labour productivity exhibited by USA
42Clearly, labour productivity is an imperfect measure of productivity. The choice is mainly motivated
by data constraints.
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manufacturing sectors (eq. (2.20)). DistFrontier defined as: (LPi,t,USA−LPi,t,j)/LPi,t,USA
(where LPi,t,j is the labour productivity of sector ‘i’, in period ‘t’, in country ‘j’). As
above, endogeneity is a problem. We deal with it in the same way as before, dividing the
distribution of the distance to the frontier in four quartiles and interacting each of the
four quartile dummies with the uncertainty measure.
qtij = αij + αt + Xγ + β1reerUncerttj + β2reerUncerttj ∗DistFrontiertij
+β3DistFrontiertij + utij (2.20)
Table (2.7) reports the results from estimating equation (2.19) using alternative ap-
proaches. Column 1 shows the results of when we include labour productivity in levels and
an interaction of labour productivity with the uncertainty measure in the model. Condi-
tional on differences arising due to other covariates, those sectors exhibiting higher labour
productivity tend to exhibit higher growth rates, as the level effect of labour productivity
is positive and significant. In addition to this level effect, productivity also affects the vul-
nerability of sectors to REER uncertainty. The more productive the sectors are, the lower
the effect of REER uncertainty on output, as the interaction term is very well-determined
and positive. The size of the estimated parameters of interest is, however, surprising.
Calculated at the average level of productivity, the effects of uncertainty on output are
positive (= −32.49 + 142.28× 7.06). The estimates become plausible once we control for
the endogeneity problem using the approaches outlined above. Column 2 shows the res-
ults of using 10-year productivity averages instead of the contemporaneous productivity
level. Here again, sectoral output changes become less vulnerable to REER uncertainty,
the larger the average labour productivity is. Figure 2.6 shows the marginal effect of un-
certainty on output growth at different levels of labour productivity. At the average, the
marginal effect equals: −51.12 + 3.85× 7.06 = −23.95. This is slightly more than half the
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size of the effect faced by low-productivity sectors, in the first decile of the distribution
(−51.12+3.85×2.70 = −40.71). Sectors in the top 30 percent of the distribution of labour
productivity seem not to be affected by REER uncertainty, as the marginal effect becomes
statistically insignificant. The level effect of average productivity on output changes is not
well-determined. Column 3 shows the results when the quartiles of the distribution of
labour productivity are interacted with the uncertainty measure. The findings are in line
with the previous ones. The effects of REER uncertainty on output are negative for those
sectors in the 1st and 2nd quartiles of the distribution, but not significant for those with
productivity levels in the upper half of the distribution. Here again, the level effect of
productivity on output changes is insignificant.
Columns 4-5 report the results of estimating equation (2.20). Results reported in
column 4 are as expected. The estimated marginal effect of REER uncertainty on output
at the mean distance to the efficiency frontier equals −93.88×0.66 = −62.27. In addition,
sectors that are further away from the frontier, tend to be less dynamic, as indicated by
the negative and significant coefficient on the level of distance to the frontier. Ceteris
paribus, an increase in the distance to the frontier by 1%, decreases the growth rate by
about one-fifth of a percentage point, on average. Column 5 shows the results when
quartiles dummies of the distribution of the distance to the frontier are interacted with
the uncertainty measure. Although the point estimates suggest that the sectors that
are closer to the frontier are less affected by REER uncertainty, the imprecision of the
estimates prevent us from drawing conclusions.
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Table 2.7: Sectoral Heterogeneity: Labour Productivity
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth Ind Output Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Growth of Rel Prices -0.03 (0.13) 0.14 (0.13) 0.39 (0.26) 0.10 (0.13) 0.02 (0.16)
REER Growth 0.98*** (0.03) 0.93*** (0.03) 0.92*** (0.05) 0.94*** (0.03) 0.94*** (0.04)
REER Uncert RollVar -32.49** (15.23) -51.12*** (13.52) -2.37 (16.10) 40.80 (33.71) -39.32** (16.22)
REER Skewness 0.02*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
REER Kurtosis -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
BCDI -0.06*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.08*** (0.02) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01)
REER Misalignment 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Dummy Floating -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
Dummy Interm -0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) 0.06 (0.04) -0.00 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Labour Productivity 0.01** (0.00)
Uncert*L.Prod 142.28*** (37.37)
Average L.Prod. 0.00 (0.00)
Uncert*AveL.Prod 3.85* (2.16)
Qtiles LP -0.01 (0.01)
Uncert* 1st Qtile. LP -53.93* (31.91)
Uncert* 2nd Qtile. LP -46.76* (23.89)
Uncert* 3rd Qtile. LP 23.64 (24.35)
Dist.to Frontier -0.18*** (0.06)
Uncert*Dist. to Frontier -93.88** (40.17)
Qtiles Dist Frontier 0.00 (0.01)
Uncert* 1st Qtile. Dist. 29.24 (21.41)
Uncert* 2nd Qtile. Dist. 26.18 (16.48)
Uncert* 3rd Qtile. Dist. 16.68 (14.77)
Observations 2235 2514 1931 2570 2048
Time Dummies X X X X X
Sector-Country FE X X X X X
Clustered S.E. C&S C&S C&S C&S C&S
Hansen Overid Test 1.054 0.303 2.787 0.039 1.39
K&P Statistic 1.709 7.340 6.061 6.807 12.823
C Statistic 0.248 3.530 4.254 3.150 0.340
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure 2.6: Marginal Effect of Uncertainty as a Function of Labour Productivity
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2.5.3.3 Orientation to Mercosur Markets
Motivated by the fact that the main sources of REER uncertainty come from Mercosur
economies, while we have used a macro-measure of uncertainty that is the same across
sectors of a given country, here we try to identify whether results change when we consider
sectors that exhibit high exposure and sectors that exhibit low exposure. High and low
exposure are defined on the basis of the export shares defined in Section 2.3.1. In addition,
and in accordance with the discussion in Section 2.4.4, we adjust our macro measure of
uncertainty by multiplying it to our indicator of export intensity to Mercosur markets.
This adjusted measure of uncertainty will vary now at a sectoral level, using the 2-digit
international standard industrial classification (ISIC).43 The estimable equation (2.21) is
presented below:
qtij = αij + αt + Xγ + β1reerUncerttj + β2reerUncerttj ∗ ExpShareti−j +
+β3ExpShareti−j + utij (2.21)
Columns (1-2) of Table 2.8 report the results of estimating the baseline model separate
for sectors that exhibit a low exposure to Mercosur markets (sector exhibiting, on average
across the period, an export share below the median, Col.1), and those that exhibit a
high exposure (sector exhibiting, on average across the period, an export share above the
median, Col.2). Export shares were used to classify sectors into ‘high’ and ‘low’ exposure
to Mercosur. So, for example, sector 311 will be classified into ‘low’ exposure for the whole
period of analysis 1970-2002, even when the export shares are only available for the period
1980-2002. The validity of this approach relies on sectors not to changing significantly the
intensity with which they trade with the neighbour countries over the years. Conditional
43This is because the export shares are defined at 2-digit level.
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on the effects of the other covariates, REER uncertainty affects negatively the output of
those sectors that are mainly oriented to Mercosur, while the effect on those that display
a low export intensity is not significantly different from zero. We then estimate equation
(2.21) in which the macro measure of uncertainty is adjusted using the sectoral export
shares, and in which the export shares also enters in levels. Results are reported Column
3 of Table 2.21. The estimated effect of the uncertainty on output should be read as
βˆ1 + βˆ2 ¯ExpShare. Results suggest that, conditional on the effects of the other covariates,
this estimated effect is larger for sectors with more exposure to Mercosur, but the effect is
poorly determined. On the other hand, the level effect of export shares on output changes
is also not well determined, suggesting no specific growth pattern associated to those
sectors that trade predominantly with Mercosur, conditional on the other covariates. As
argued in Section 2.4.4, there are a number of channels through which export shares may
exert significant effects in this model. In an attempt to better understand which channels
are at work, we first investigated whether there is an association between the intensity
with which sectors trade intensively within Mercosur, and their productivity. We found
that this is the case, as the correlation of the export shares with the distance to the US
frontier is 13.94%, and statistically significant at 1%. We then modified equation (2.21) in
the following way: we created a “high exposure to Mercosur” dummy on the basis of the
above classification of sectors (the dummy takes value one for sectors with an above the
median exposure), and interacted the dummy with the uncertainty measure. In addition,
we incorporated the distance to the US frontier in levels, and interacted with uncertainty
in order to control for the fact that the effect of the export shares may be concealing a
productivity effect. The new estimable equation is (2.22):
qtij = αij + αt + Xγ + β1reerUncerttj + β2reerUncerttj ∗HighExposureti−j + β3ExpShareti−j
+β4reerUncerttj ∗DistFrontiertij + β5DistFrontiertij + utij (2.22)
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Results are reported in Column 4 of Table 2.8. The estimated effects of distance to the
US, and its interaction with uncertainty are similar to those found in Section 2.5.3.2.
Displaying higher-than-average distance to the productivity frontier has an indirect effect
on output growth, increasing the vulnerability of the sector to REER uncertainty. The
fact that when including distance to the frontier in the model, the effect of export shares
remains significant suggests that the adjustment to the macro uncertainty measure with
the sectoral export shares may be necessary to reflect different degrees in exposure to
uncertainty.
Table 2.8: Export Exposure to Mercosur
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth Ind Output Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Growth of Rel Prices -0.12 (0.27) 0.20 (0.14) 0.06 (0.16) 0.05 (0.15) 0.06 (0.16)
REER Growth 0.94*** (0.07) 0.89*** (0.04) 0.65*** (0.04) 0.65*** (0.04) 0.62*** (0.04)
REER Uncert RollVar -23.93 (14.72) -30.13*** (11.53) 10.25 (24.71) 160.70*** (61.08) 155.80** (64.79)
REER Skewness 0.02 (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02)
REER Kurtosis 0.00 (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
BCDI -0.02* (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.02) -0.07*** (0.02) -0.06*** (0.02)
REER Misalignment 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
Dummy Floating -0.04 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.08** (0.04) -0.07* (0.04) -0.02 (0.04)
Dummy Interm -0.06*** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) -0.06* (0.04) -0.04 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04)
Uncer*ExpShare -34.66** (35.43)
Merco ExpShare 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Uncert*HighExposure -52.87* (28.71) -14.15 23.72
Uncert*Dist to Frontier -162.91** (76.31) -211.84*** (76.53)
Dist to Frontier -0.31*** (0.12) -0.30*** (0.11)
Uncert*Lagged Exp/Out 10.12* (5.8)
L.Exp/Out 0.01 (0.01)
Observations 1006 1557 1530 1530 1530
Time Dummies X X X X X
Sector-Country FE X X X X X
Clustered S.E. C&S C&S C&S C&S C&S
Hansen Overid Test 0.138 3.15 4.664 4.912 7.826
K&P Statistic 6.782 3.234 0.429 0.431 0.436
C Statistic 0.632 1.218 1.407 2.464 3.108
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Finally, we estimate our model including the lagged export/ouput ratio, the distance
to the frontier, and the Mercosur export shares together, both in levels and interacted
with the measure of REER uncertainty, as in equation (2.23):
qtij = αij + αt + Xγ + β1reerUncerttj + β2reerUncerttj ∗HighExposureti−j + β3ExpShareti−j
+β4reerUncerttj ∗DistFrontiertij + β5DistFrontiertij
+β6reerUncerttj ∗ Exp/Outputt−1,ij + β7Exp/Outputt−1,ij + utij (2.23)
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Results are reported in Column 5 of Table 2.8. Results are largely unchanged with
respect to those obtained when each of the interactions was scrutinized in isolation, when
looking at sign and size of the effects. While trade orientation and export shares exert no
significant direct effect on output growth, distance to the frontier significantly decreases
output growth. Further to this, the indirect effects on output growth that operate through
the vulnerability of the sector to REER uncertainty are also in line with those previously
found. It is worth mentioning that the point estimate of the interaction of REER uncer-
tainty and export shares decreases as we sequentially add the other covariates, although
the confidence intervals for that interaction term in the models reported in Column 3,
4 and 5 overlap. The interaction of the uncertainty measure with the “high exposure”
dummy is now not well determined.
It is worth mentioning that the estimated effects reported in this section should be
interpreted cautiously, because the diagnostic tests suggests that instruments are weak
and not valid for these specifications. This may be related to the fact that because
the export shares are only available for two thirds of the sample period considered, we
substantially lose degrees of freedom in the estimation of these models.
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter adds to the empirical literature on the effects of uncertainty on productive
decisions. The existing literature has generally focused on the relationship between uncer-
tainty and investment, while scant attention has been put on the effects on output. Given
that production takes time, the payment for inputs occurs before output is sold, which
makes output decisions, in effect, risky investment decisions.
The chapter draws on the case of Southern Cone countries over the period 1970-2002
and focuses on REER uncertainty. Southern Cone countries have exhibited a particularly
high record of REER uncertainty over the period, and in addition, they have become
more interlinked from a trade perspective. This latter phenomenon has further increased
their exposure to uncertainty. The focus on the REER is particularly relevant in the
context of these economies where the expected value of the REER and the uncertainty
surrounding that expectation are key factors that are constantly in the lobbying agenda
of manufacturers, and in the speeches of policymakers. This is because of the effect the
REER has on the price of tradable goods sold by manufacturers, because during much
of the 1980s and 1990s a large portion of firms contracted dollar-debt to finance their
production plans, and because hedging instruments to cover against exchange rate risk
have been largely unavailable.
In this chapter, we explored the impact of REER uncertainty on output by estimating
a supply function in which the output-price simultaneity was tackled using two alternat-
ive sets of instruments. We identified an average non-negligible negative effect of REER
uncertainty on output changes, when considering the pooled sample of 28 manufactur-
ing sectors for the 3 countries, after controlling for other determinants of output supply.
This finding was robust to our choice of instruments, and relatively homogeneous across
countries.
The average effect masks, however, a number of specificities. We found evidence of
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non-linearities in the uncertainty-output relationship. There is a threshold above which
uncertainty affects output negatively, but below which the effect may even be positive.
Furthermore, we found that differences in sectoral characteristics explain differences in the
sensitivity of output to REER uncertainty. Output in those sectors that are more export
oriented seem to be less affected by REER uncertainty. However, those sectors that export
more intensively to other Mercosur countries seem to be more affected by REER. This
finding is likely to be explained by the fact that exposure to uncertainty is larger in these
sectors, and not necessarily because they are more sensitive to uncertainty. In addition, we
found that higher labour productivity decreases the negative impact of REER uncertainty
on output.
Last but not least, we found that output is not only responsive to the first two moments
of the distribution of the REER, but also to higher ones, such as skewness and kurtosis.
Given that the series of REER changes are non-normal, then a measure of its uncertainty
should not only look at mean and variance, but also at higher moments.
Two policy implications emerge from this analysis. Firstly, given the finding of threshold
effects, suggesting that it is high REER uncertainty that exerts a negative effect on out-
put changes, it seems that the strategy of adopting fixed exchange rate regimes, or some
sort of hard pegs to the dollar in an attempt to reduce uncertainty may be counterpro-
ductive. This is because experience has shown that these regimes tend to come to an
end collapsing, and generate extremely high uncertainty. Instead, it is possible that the
REER uncertainty associated with a freely floating nominal exchange rate regime may be
within the benign range. In addition, if a portion of the effects of REER uncertainty on
output are explained by the high degree of dollarization of the economies under analysis,
then more flexible exchange rate arrangements may induce firms to internalise the risk of
borrowing in foreign currency, and contribute to a reversal of dollarization, which may in
turn reduce the vulnerability of output growth to REER uncertainty.
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Secondly, if REER uncertainty affects manufacturing sectors’ output growth negatively,
and if those sectors trading predominantly with other Mercosur countries are particularly
affected, because of their substantially higher volatility records, then policies that con-
tribute to the diversification of export markets are likely to be beneficial. One example
is to promote negotiations of free trade agreements with other trading blocs or countries.
Another, is to strengthen the international networks that each country has already estab-
lished in the form of their foreign service offices. Given that in the context of trade in
differentiated manufactures, the connections between sellers and buyers are made through
search processes that are costly, and that these costs tend to increase, the further away
the potential buyer is from the seller, the role that foreign service offices have in partner-
ing with the private sector to contribute to the diversification of export markets may be
substantial.
Happily, some of the policies implemented since 2003, by the countries under analysis,
have been in line with the recommendations that emerge from this study. Since 2003, the
three countries have moved —although to different extents of intervention — to relatively
freely floating exchange rate regimes.44 In addition to this, there have been several policy
initiatives for the diversification of export destinations. Examples of these are the increase
in free trade agreements (or negotiations to that end) that the bloc has implemented with
other countries or regions, and the increasing role played by the Secretariats of Foreign
Affairs in these countries in promoting exports of goods and services.45
A few caveats are in order, which point to directions of future research. First, our meas-
ure of uncertainty is restrictive, as it imposes a backward-looking expectation formation
mechanism. Although we argue that it is sensible to assume backward-looking expectations
44In Argentina, the Central Bank significantly intervenes in the foreign exchange market, but it does
not make public announcements or commits to a particular future value.
45Of a total of twenty agreements aiming at liberalizing trade, subscribed by Mercosur member countries
with other regions, seven have been subscribed before 2003, while thirteen have been subscribed since then
(source: Mercosur Secretatat).
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for the period under analysis, ideally one would like to construct a measure of uncertainty
that does not impose a particular structure on expectation formation, and compare the
results. Data for an ‘assumption-free’ measure of real exchange rate uncertainty would
require, for example, the availability of data on forecasts for nominal exchange rates and
relevant prices, with which to calculate the variance of a forecast error on the basis of a
true mechanism — whichever it is — for forecasting, instead of an assumed one. These
data are hard to find, and were not available for the three countries over the period of
analysis. Second, in this chapter we cannot identify whether the average negative effect of
uncertainty is related to risk-aversion, or to some other factors, such as agents contracting
dollar-debt and facing bankruptcy costs. We have no measure of risk-aversion, or data on
balance-sheet currency mismatches. We try to control for the latter with the trade ori-
entation of the sector, but this is clearly an imperfect indicator. Finally, the instruments
used to deal with the output-price simultaneity problem are in some cases weak, which
means that results should be interpreted cautiously.
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Part II
Uncertainty and Expectations
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Chapter 3
Measuring Real Exchange Rate
Uncertainty: A Discussion
3.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter we measured REER uncertainty by calculating the variance,
skewness and kurtosis of a forecast error from an autoregressive model estimated for the
REER. Economic literature abounds in similar or alternative measures of uncertainty
associated with a number of variables — typically focusing on the second moment (the
variance).
In this chapter we review the literature on uncertainty measures and classify them in
two groups: those that impose assumptions on the agents’ expectation formation mech-
anisms (like that of Chapter 2), and those that do not impose assumptions on these
mechanisms. Among the measures in the former group, typically, the assumptions im-
posed imply an autoregressive forecast model for the representative agent. Among the
latter, the measures are sometimes constructed on the basis of direct, observable data on
expectations (e.g.: survey data) or, more frequently, extracted indirectly. For example,
provided perfect capital mobility, information about depreciation expectations can be ex-
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tracted from interest rate differentials. Note that although assumptions are still needed
in this case (perfect capital mobility), these assumptions do not refer to the expectation
formation mechanism. The choice of which measure to use tends to be driven by data
availability and, generally, lacks conceptual justification.
In this thesis, where the focus is on the impact of REER uncertainty on behaviour,
we use a measure of uncertainty that imposes a backward looking expectation formation
mechanism in which the representative agent uses an autoregressive forecast model. Un-
certainty is then measured as the rolling variance (and skewness, and kurtosis) of the
forecast error. Our choice is motivated by data constraints.
Ideally, in order to understand how much uncertainty is attached to REER expecta-
tions, it would be necessary to have, firstly, a model of how the expectations themselves
are being formed to be able to have forecasts, and secondly, an understanding of whether
these expectations — however they were formed — have been accurate predictors of actual
REER changes, that is, an understanding of the size of the forecast errors. Understanding
the former allows us to assess the validity of imposing a particular forecast model on the
representative agent. Understanding the latter would give us a better idea of the amount
of uncertainty attached to expectations, one that would be less contaminated by assump-
tions. So, for example, if agents’ expectations formation mechanism is clever enough to
foresee a sharp depreciation in some given case, there is no surprise when it happens (the
forecast errors will be small), and so, an estimated amount of uncertainty based on the
history of the forecast error will be correspondingly smaller than if the sharp depreciation
had not been foreseen. Measures of uncertainty constructed as the variance of the forecast
error of a autoregressive forecast model will thus give misleading information if agents
do not attach much weight to the past behaviour of the variable to predict the future
realizations of that same variable.
Unfortunately, as argued in the preceding chapter, data for an ‘assumption-free’ meas-
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ure of real exchange rate uncertainty are not available. A way of bypassing these data
constraints is to shift focus from the real exchange rate to the nominal exchange rate,
where expectation proxies or direct expectational data are more readily available, and
explore how expectations are formed, and how well they are aligned with actual outcomes.
Surely, there is no guarantee that agents use the same mechanisms to forecast nominal
and real exchange rates. However, it seems likely that some lessons could be learned.
For the aforementioned reasons, the remainder of this chapter reviews the literature
on uncertainty measures in the way described above. Then, the chapters that follow
exploit data containing expectation information for nominal exchange rates, for the case
of Uruguay and investigate expectation formation mechanisms, unbiasedness and accuracy
of expectations. In Chapter 4 we do so by examining a proxy for expectations: nominal
interest rate differentials between deposits in domestic and foreign currency, over twenty
years that cover several exchange rate regimes. In Chapter 5 we use new survey data on
nominal exchange rate expectations over a period of relatively freely floating exchange
rates (2005-2010).
This chapter acts as a link between the previous analysis of the impact of uncertainty
on economic activity, and the analysis of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
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3.2 The Literature
There is no consensus on what constitutes the “right way” to empirically capture the
concept of uncertainty. In this section we review and discuss the alternative empirical
measures of uncertainty that can be found in the literature.1 Beyond data requirements
and the technical complexity embedded in the calculation of each of the measures, their
most significant discriminant factor is whether they are constructed on the basis of as-
sumptions placed on the agents’ expectation formation mechanism (type one) or whether
these assumptions have not been placed, which implies that measures are constructed on
the basis of direct, observable data on expectations, or extracted from some other measure
that, under certain conditions, reflect expectations about a given variable (type two):
• Type One: Measures that impose an expectation formation mechanism:
These are probably the most widely used in the literature. Typically, the assumption
is that agents use an autoregressive forecast model, and then uncertainty is calculated
as the variance of the forecast error. The argument here, in the context of REER,
is that uncertainty with regards to the future realisation of the REER is influenced
by past REER volatility, and is independent of expectations of changes in policy
or other environmental factors.2 Forecast models imposed are not restricted to an
autoregressive one. Think of an economy with a long lasting fixed exchange rate
regime, but with an alarming record of interventions of the Central Bank in the
foreign exchange market and a sharply declining stock of foreign exchange reserves.
In this scenario, the autoregressive forecast model would misleadingly suggest an
environment of low uncertainty. A rational agent may be looking at the evolution
of reserves or some other relevant variable. So, the forecast model imposed does not
1We look at measures of uncertainty of nominal and real exchange rates, inflation, etc..
2This seems to be conventional wisdom, mentioned by (Baldwin et al., 2005, p. 25)
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need to be restricted to be an autoregressive one, but could also take into account the
behaviour of other variables that, on the basis of some preconceptions (theoretically
grounded, or based on heuristics, et cetera) are considered to be relevant in the
determination of the variable to be forecasted.
• Type Two: Measures that do not impose assumptions on expectation
formation mechanisms: These measures are appealing, as they do not place re-
strictions on the mechanism behind expectation formation. Taking the previous
example of an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime, and a dramatically de-
clining stock of foreign exchange reserves, both the imposition of an autoregressive
forecaster or one with rational expectations that forecasts with the ‘true’ model in
mind may be a poor reflection of the actual mechanism driving expectations. Direct,
observable measures of expectations are often survey-based. Expectational inform-
ation can also be extracted from the evolution of other variables. For example, in
the context of expectations about exchange rate movements, and assuming perfect
capital mobility, interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign currency
denominated bonds reflect depreciation expectations.
3.2.1 Type One Measures
It is not uncommon to find literature in which all variation in a variable is taken as
indicative of uncertainty with respect to its future value. One example is the proxy of
uncertainty used by Baldwin et al. (2005). These authors use two measures of uncertainty
with respect to nominal exchange rates, to assess its impact on trade flows. The first
measure is defined as the annual variance of the weekly nominal exchange rate changes.
The whole of the variation in the series, over a period of time of ‘t’ years is assumed here
to reflect uncertainty. The authors assume a representative agent with forecast model
that predicts zero change in the exchange rate, hence all the variability corresponds to
142
forecast error. These authors find, empirically, that it is the previous 5-year variation that
influence uncertainty for the outcome of the variable in year ‘t’. Another example that
can be found in Driver and Moreton (1991) uses the unconditional variances of output
and inflation variables as a proxy for uncertainty with respect to these variables.
These measures are simple in terms of data requirements and computation. However,
they treat volatility and uncertainty as synonymous. These would be appropriate if volat-
ility was fully unpredictable. When that is not the case, a portion of the variability is
not uncertain. Therefore considering the former as an estimator of the latter would lead
to an upward bias. Take for example a series with some degree of inertia in the data
generation process. Then, it would be reasonable for the representative agent to expect
a higher realisation of the variable if it has been increasing in the recent past, or a lower
realisation if it has been decreasing. If this is the case, then uncertainty will actually be
lower than it would be considered to be with no predictable component in the variable’s
generation process. Therefore, these measures may overstate “true” uncertainty. This
leads us to discuss what we can call a not-so-naive approach — which corresponds to the
approach followed in Chapter 2 to define our measure of REER uncertainty. Now, the
representative agent, whose perception of uncertainty with respect to a particular variable
is the object of our interest, is able to identify patterns in the data generation process.
In this approach, the key issue has to do with distinguishing between predictable (or sys-
tematic) and unpredictable (or unsystematic) components of a series. The variance of the
unsystematic portion is a more appealing way of thinking about uncertainty.
The prediction could be viewed as the result of a univariate or multivariate modelling
exercise. In the former exercise, we can think of two cases. The first one, in the context
of a bounded rationality world in which the representative agent is able to identify simple
patterns in the data generation process. One example of this is that of an agent who
observes, as already mentioned, some inertia, and predicts Xt to be equal to Xt−1. If this
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agent forms expectations on the value of X with an AR(1) in mind, then we could model
uncertainty as the variance of the innovations of the forecast specification of this agent (an
AR(1)) over the series of interest. This type of approach is quite common in the literature.
(See, for instance: Goldberg (1993) —although this author talks about ‘volatility’ and not
‘uncertainty’, Ghosal and Loungani (2000), Campa and Goldberg (2005)).
The second case, within the univariate modelling exercise, considers a representative
agent, who has gone through an introductory course of Time Series Analysis, understands
the autorregressive and moving average components of the series and has a computational
package that allows her to identify the process. The appropriate measure of uncertainty
here would be again related to the variance of the unpredictable component of the series. In
this case, it would be the variance of the innovations on the ARIMA(p, d, q) specification
over the series of interest (where ‘p’ is the order of the autorregressive component, ‘d’ is
the order of integration of the series and ‘q’ is the order of the moving average component).
The predictable components of a series are not necessarily limited to its past behaviour
(i.e.: the forecast model does not necessarily have to be an autoregressive one). There may
be other variables that are correlated with the series of interest, X, whose realizations may
add information to the forecast of X. Here again, the agents can forecast on the grounds
of either simple rules of thumb or models with sophisticated specifications. In any case,
the uncertainty proxy will be related to the variance of the innovations of that forecast
equation, regardless of its degree of complexity. Examples of this multivariate approach
to control for the systematic component of the series can be find in the literature, see, for
example, Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Aizenman and Marion (1999).
In any of these two cases mentioned above, the authors calculate rolling sample vari-
ances over a number ‘k’ of periods of time. The assumption is that it is the movement
(variance) of the unsystematic component of the series (the residual of the ARIMA spe-
cification) over the last ‘k’ periods that influences perceived uncertainty in period ‘t’. But
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the preference of the researchers for the calculation of rolling sample variances suggests
heteroscedasticity, that is to say, that the expected value of all error terms, when squared,
is not the same at any given point in time (Engle (2001)). Otherwise there would be
no point in calculating the variances over different subsamples in order to estimate un-
certainty at a given point in time. Instead, the unconditional variance over the whole
period would be the best estimate of uncertainty. When the series is heteroscedastic, ex-
ploring and modelling the structure of that heteroscedasticity turns into an relevant issue
for a number of reasons, but mainly because a) heteroscedasticity affects the efficiency
of the OLS estimates of the relevant parameters found for the ARIMA process, and b)
understanding the structure may add information on the portion of the volatility of the
series that can actually be considered uncertainty (the truly unsystematic component). If
there is volatility clustering (Engle (2001)), then, the representative agent expects high
variability in the series if it has been already high in the recent past, or low when it has
been low. This means that there may be a systematic component in the series of squared
residuals themselves. This is why calculating the unconditional variance would overstate
actual uncertainty in periods of low volatility (and conversely in periods of high volatility),
if the representative agent is sophisticated enough to identify the pattern in the behaviour
of the residuals.
The literature has widely used Autorregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH)
models and its generalized version (GARCH) — also in this thesis we use this type of
approach to construct an alternative measure of REER uncertainty, as it was described in
Chapter 2 —, which, to put it simply, model simultaneously the best-fit ARIMA on the
levels of the variable and the structure of the heteroscedasticity (by fitting an ARIMA on
the squared residuals). The number of lags that are relevant for the estimation of future
volatility, and the importance given to these lags, i.e.: the weights, are parameters to
be estimated by the data, instead of being imposed by the researcher. The measure of
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uncertainty consists of the variance of the residuals of this specification — the unsystematic
component, which varies along time. Its users claim that it is the conditional variance
of a series that gives an accurate measure of uncertainty. As put by Huizinga “This
measure seems to best account for the idea that for series whose deviations from the
unconditional mean can be reliably predicted, it is not fluctuations around an average value
that are of concern (that is, the unconditional variance) but rather fluctuations about a
predicted future path” (Huizinga, 1993, p. 528). Then, Serven, for example, emphasizes
that “To measure real-exchange rate uncertainty (rather than just sample variability)”
he uses a GARCH(1,1) specification (Serven, 2003, p. 213). A problem of this measure
of uncertainty lies on its computational complexity. It would be difficult to argue that
firm managers’ perception of uncertainty is constructed by fitting ARIMA processes to
REER series and its squared residuals. However, the intuition behind a GARCH(1,1)
measure is appealing, as it allows volatility to depend on last period’s record but also on
the history of volatility. To consider a case of this way of thinking, we could bring the
example of Argentina during the 1990s. Volatility of the REER had been significantly lower
during the 1990s than it had been during the previous decade.3 In consequence, during
that period, agents perceived lower uncertainty than in the 1980s. Still, when compared
with another economy, with a decade of stability, but also with a history of stability,
uncertainty in Argentina was probably higher. This is because most probably, agents had
in mind the turmoils of 1975, 1982, 1986 and 1989, and even a decade of extremely low
REER variance would not be enough to fully eliminate those turbulent experiences. A
GARCH(1,1) represents the structure of the heteroscedasticity that underlies this way of
thinking. Here, uncertainty in ‘t′ is modeled as a function of volatility in ‘t − 1′, but
also as a weighted average of past squared residuals, with declining weights that never
3See Chapter 2 for the results of the tests.
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go completely to zero. From a conceptual point of view, the GARCH(1,1) is appealing,
though it implies a significant degree of sophistication in the way agents form expectations.
From an estimation point of view, as put by Engle, “it gives parsimonious models that
are easy to estimate”, and is successful in predicting conditional variances (Engle, 2001,
p.159).
3.2.2 Type Two Measures
The relevance of considering measures of uncertainty that make use of data on expecta-
tions that does not impose assumptions on the formation mechanism can be illustrated by
returning to an Argentinean example. Consider the representative agent standing in Ar-
gentina in November 2001. Argentina had had, up to that time and since 1991 a currency
board that fixed the nominal exchange rate in a one dollar-one peso relation. That cur-
rency board had also successfully helped to bring price inflation down to negligible levels.
This means that during most of the nineties, REER volatility had been low (as already
pointed out). And therefore, uncertainty for the prediction for REER in December 2001
(one month ahead of the crisis) as suggested by a ‘type one’ measure discussed above that
imposes an autoregressive forecast model, would be quite low. It would be naive to neglect
the impact on expectations of a number of events taking place at that moment, inter alia:
the denial of the International Monetary Fund to renew the credit line with Argentina,
the systematic and rapid increase in the fiscal deficit, and the dramatic increase in the risk
premium on the Argentinean government debt (a byproduct of the previous two things).
It would be reasonable to expect that this representative agent will stop looking at the
past behaviour of the exchange rate, and will start widening the range of possible values
in her subjective distribution of the exchange rate. A measure of uncertainty will then be
given by the range that contains all possible realisations, expected by the representative
agent for the exchange rate in December 2001. That uncertainty is affected by events
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expected to happen in the future, and not necessarily by those that happened in the past.
Of course, rational expectations could be assumed for the representative agent. The fore-
cast model imposed would be such that agent’s expectations matched the mathematical
expectation from the ‘true’ model that determines exchange rate. It seems, however, that
such an approach would give the wrong answers. It is likely that the ‘true’ model is un-
known — to the researcher, and to everybody else. In addition, agents are likely neither to
pay attention solely to the past behaviour of the variable to be forecasted, nor to display
rational expectations.4
The use of direct information on expectations allows for any expectation formation
mechanism, not requiring the awkward assumption of a particular type of forecast model
being used. An example is that of Guiso and Parigi (1999)’s work. Their paper investigates
the effects of uncertainty on the investment decisions of a sample of Italian manufacturing
firms. They consider uncertainty with respect to future demand for firms’ product and
their measure of uncertainty is obtained by using information on the subjective probability
distribution of future demand changes. Firms were asked to assign weights to a set of in-
tervals for the growth rate of demand over a given period of time, on the assumption that
the relative price of its product was kept constant. Then, the authors derived a measure of
idiosyncratic uncertainty related to demand, by using the calculated conditional variance
of the expected growth rate of demand, and the initial (known) demand level — the au-
thors find that uncertainty weakens the investment response to demand, and find evidence
supporting the hypothesis that the more irreversible the investment decision is, the larger
the investment response to uncertainty. These types of measures are very appealing as
they are based on actual perceptions of managers, instead of on the researcher’s precon-
ceptions. In addition, it allows to have cross-sectional variation in uncertainty, as it is a
4This is a conjecture. We will test this assertion in the Chapters that follow. Of course, if the ‘true’
model was known, agents would then use it.
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firm-specific variable. (In the case of Guiso and Parigi (1999), variation comes only from
the cross-sectional dimension).
The results support the view that uncertainty weakens the response of investment to
demand thus slowing down capital accumulation. Consistent with the predictions of the
theory, there is considerable heterogeneity in the effect of uncertainty on investment: it
is stronger for firms that cannot easily reverse investment decisions and for those with
substantial market power.
Another example is that one of Ferderer (1993) that analyses the impact of macroe-
conomic uncertainty on aggregate investment in the U.S.. In this case the authors do not
use observable data on expectations to construct a measure of risk, but extract it from
the term structure of interest rates, which gives a measure of the implicit risk premium
on long-term bonds. The author claims there is evidence that the risk premium rises in
response to increased uncertainty about interest rates and other macroeconomic variables.5
One of the few papers using a type-two measure of uncertainty in the context of ex-
change rates is Baldwin et al. (2005). The authors extract information on expectations
from forward rates — assuming perfect capital mobility — and define it as “the an-
nual average of the weekly growth rate of bilateral forward premium/discount rates in
absolute values”(Baldwin et al., 2005, p.25).6 The authors, who analyze the impact of
nominal exchange rate uncertainty on trade, claim that their measure has “the advantage
that it reflects the expectations on the exchange rate developments between the period
when the contract for exports is concluded and the period when the exports have to be
paid”(Baldwin et al., 2005, p.25). With respect to this measure, it could be argued that,
as with their type-one measure, Baldwin et al. (2005) consider a world of naive agents.
5The author also mentions evidence of “a positive relationship between backward-looking ARCH meas-
ures of interest rate uncertainty and the risk premium embedded in the term structure for U.S. Treasury
bills” found in previous studies (p. 32).
6These authors use two measures, one of type one (described above), and the one described here. It is
worth mentioning that in a world in which all agents can trade forward, uncertainty vanishes.
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Not all of the forward premium corresponds to uncertainty if agents are rational. Part of it
responds to a predictable evolution of the variable of interest. A ‘fundamentals-adjusted’
forward premium could be more in line with agents’ rationality. The naive nature vanishes
if the exchange rate could be assumed to follow a random walk, but the authors don’t make
this explicit.7
Finally, Bomberger (1996) investigates how a type one measure of uncertainty com-
pares with a type two measure of uncertainty for inflation. The type one measure used is
generated by an ARCH model, while the type two measure, a measure of “disagreement”
based on survey data, is calculated as the sample variance across forecasters responding to
a specific survey (Livingston). The author finds that the disagreement is proportional to
the ARCH measure. The author claims that one of the benefits of the disagreement meas-
ures is that, unlike those constructed on the basis of ARCH models, these are model-free,
and involve no retrospective procedure. He argues that given the dramatic differences
that are commonly found in survey results, it is hard to assume that one single model
is used to forecast, as conditional variance measures of uncertainty would assume. In-
stead, uncertainty regarding the model may explain a large portion of overall uncertainty.
(Bomberger, 1996, p.383)
Summary and a Note on the Use of the Term Forward-Looking. The predomin-
ance in the literature of uncertainty measures of type one is explained by data constraints.
Type two measures seem more appealing as they do not rely on assumptions about the
expectation formation process. However, measures with imposed backward-looking (or
other) expectation mechanisms use information that is often easily available, whereas
primary data on expectations tends to be scarce. Usually these data are obtained from
7In page 17 they say that “At all moments, firms take the exchange rate’s stochastic process as given. In
particular, changes in the process’s volatility, including a shift to a common currency, are unanticipated”.
This doesn’t imply a random walk nature of the exchange rate.
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derivative markets, e.g.: forward rates for the exchange rate, which have only existed for
a relatively limited number of years and countries.
Regarding all measures, a salient pattern in the literature is that the uncertainty
associated with the relevant variable, is captured by calculating the (conditional) variance
of the forecast error (whatever the forecast model is — assumed, or otherwise). As we
have argued in Chapter 1, the validity of this strategy is restricted to cases in which the
probability distributions have specific characteristics, or preferences of the decision-maker
are quadratic. Both of these restrictions are problematic when considering real exchange
rates.8
It is worth mentioning that the use of a type-two measure of uncertainty is not equi-
valent to a forward-looking measure of uncertainty. This will only be the case if agents
actually are forward-looking to form expectations, internalising expected changes in policy
and other environmental factors. This is worth mentioning as it is not uncommon to see the
term “forward-looking” associated to these type of uncertainty measures (see for example,
Carruth et al. (2000), and Leahy and Whited (1996) commenting on Ferderer (1993)’s
measure of uncertainty). This association should not be automatic, as the mechanisms
behind the expectation formation are, in general, unknown to the researcher.
8Motivated by this, in Chapter 2 we calculated variance, skewness and kurtosis of the forecast error in
order to measure REER uncertainty.
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3.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we turned our attention to the empirical measurement of uncertainty. The
measures found in the literature can be classified into those that impose assumptions on
expectation-formation mechanisms, and those that use observable data on expectations. In
general, the choice of the measure is driven by data availability, without a clear conceptual
justification.
Given that in Chapter 2 we used a backward-looking measure of RER uncertainty,
that assumes an autoregressive forecast model for the representative agent, the next two
chapters focus on expectations and explore, firstly, expectation formation mechanisms,
and secondly, unbiasedness and accuracy of forecasts.
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Chapter 4
The Extrapolative Component in
Exchange Rate Expectations and
the Not-So-Puzzling Performance
of the UIP: The Case of Uruguay
4.1 Introduction
The uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP) implies the domestic currency is ex-
pected to depreciate when domestic nominal interest rates exceed foreign interest rates.
However, empirical evidence since the seminal work of Fama (1984) has often found the
opposite: the currency of the country with the relatively higher interest rate tends to
appreciate. This is commonly known in the literature as the ‘forward premium puzzle’.
This puzzle has triggered significant research on the mechanisms underlying expectations
formation, with the seminal contribution of Frankel and Froot (1987).
Two regularities in the extant literature motivate this chapter. First, that most of
the tests done on the deviations from the interest parity and on expectations formation
153
mechanisms have been applied to major currencies and developed economies.1 Second,
that most of the tests done on expectations generating mechanisms implicitly assume time
stability. An exception in the literature is the work done by Prat and Uctum (2007), who
use a switching-regression framework with stochastic choice of regime for a set of European
currencies to find that expectation processes change gradually and smoothly over time.
The scant interest in the case of emerging economies, and in the evolution of expect-
ation generating mechanisms is surprising. Exploring determinants of expectations form-
ation and testing for UIP in the context of emerging economies is particularly interesting
for these economies which typically display two distinctive features: they evolve from high
inflation to low inflation levels, and they undergo changes in exchange rate policies.
Our contribution in this chapter is twofold. First, we test and identify a time-variant
exchange rate expectations formation mechanism in the context of Uruguay over the period
1980-2010, and second, we test the UIP across different exchange rate regimes. Uruguay
provides an interesting and representative case, since it is a small, open and highly dollar-
ized economy in which agents are familiar with the use of financial instruments denomin-
ated in both domestic and foreign currency. During this period it went from high to low
inflation levels, as well as different exchange rate regimes: a period of short-lived and non-
credible stabilization plans with the exchange rate as a nominal anchor (Pre-TZ), a period
of credible target zones for the exchange rate (TZ), and a subsequent period in which the
Central Bank had no target for the exchange rate, and this was largely determined by
market forces (Post-TZ).
We present new evidence suggesting the extrapolative component in expectations form-
ation mechanisms has been substantial on average, and it has changed over time. By
“extrapolative component” we mean the portion of yesterday’s depreciation that is expec-
1The few exceptions that compare the size of the deviations from the parity for developed and developing
countries are Bansal and Dahlquist (2000), and Frankel and Poonawala (2010), while Gilmore and Hayashi
(2008) focuses on emerging economies only.
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ted to occur today. Furthermore, we find that apart from an extrapolative component,
agents display also adaptive and regressive components in expectation formation, and also
internalise the potential effects of policy announcements on the path of exchange rates.
In addition, we present evidence of deviations from the UIP, although these are relatively
small compared to those typically reported in the literature. The size of the deviations
from the UIP is larger when looking at sub-periods than when looking at the whole period,
which points to the importance of the ‘peso problem’ in our data. Across sub-periods,
the largest deviations are found during the last period of freely floating exchange rates, in
which the economy experienced low inflation.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the links
between depreciation expectations and interest rate differentials. Section 4.3 introduces
the research questions, and defines a number of key concepts to be used in this chapter.
Section 4.4 presents the analysis of the determinants of exchange rate expectations. Section
4.5 explores the tests on the uncovered interest parity. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 Depreciation Expectations and Interest Rate Differen-
tials
To explore the exchange rate expectation generating mechanism one should ideally use
forecast data gathered in surveys of participants in the foreign exchange market. Un-
fortunately, these data are not available for Uruguay for the period under consideration.
Inevitably, we have to use an indirect measure of expectations equal to the interest rate
differentials obtained from the uncovered interest parity hypothesis.2
The hypothesis of uncovered interest parity states that as long as portfolio investors
are risk-neutral and have the choice of holding bonds denominated in domestic (pesos) or
foreign currency (dollars), with same default risk and no differences in transaction costs,
then the following condition is verified:
(1 + ikt,dc) = (1 + i
k
t,fc)× (
set+k
st
) (4.1)
where ikt,dc is the interest on a peso-bond at time t of maturity k-months, i
k
fc is the
interest on a comparable dollar asset, s is the nominal exchange rate expressed as pesos
per dollar, set+k is the expected exchange rate for period t + k, t is the time period in
months. Then, the expected depreciation rate for the domestic currency will be equal to
(1 + idc)/(1 + ifc)− 1. If agents are risk-averse, a risk premium is added to the right hand
side of equation (4.1). For the same expected return, the holder of the risky asset will
require an extra compensation.
During the period of analysis (1980-2010) agents in Uruguay have been allowed to
buy or sell assets denominated in foreign currencies without any restrictions. Moreover,
2A survey on exchange rate expectations has only been carried out since 2006 by the Central Bank of
Uruguay. Also, given the absence of forward markets in Uruguay for most of the period of analysis, we
cannot use data on the forward premium.
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the banking system faced symmetric regulation for their peso and dollar borrowing. In
fact, all banks in the market offered deposits both in pesos and in dollars, which meant
that when the agent faced the decision of choosing between the two assets, there were
no differences in transaction costs or risk of default. Masoller (1997) argues that the use
of interest rate differentials as a proxy for depreciation expectations at the beginning of
the 1980s may be problematic due to frictions in the banking system (mainly related to a
small number of players). However, we argue that the size of the domestic banking system
should not necessarily be taken as suggestive of a lack of competition, since the capital
account was fully liberalized in 1978, and restrictions to capital mobility were eliminated.
Thus, in the current chapter we use the interest rate differential as an indicator of expected
depreciation of the peso against the dollar.
4.3 Some Definitions & Research Questions
Given the aforementioned, in what follows, the chapter uses interest rate differentials for
Uruguay over 1980m2− 2010m3 and attempts to answer a number of research questions
listed below. For the sake of precision, before outlining the research questions, we make
explicit the way in which some key terms will be understood in the analysis that follows.
Backward-looking or Extrapolative expectations An agent forming expectations
in a “backward-looking” or “extrapolative” manner will be understood, here, as one that
uses an autoregressive forecast model for exchange rate depreciations. “Backward-looking
expectations” and “extrapolative expectations” will be used interchangeably.3
3Of course, strictly, the term “backward-looking”, when referring to expectations, only suggests that
agents look to the past in order to form expectations about the future. But they may look at the evolution
of any variable.
157
Backward-looking or extrapolative component in expectations: This will be
understood as the portion of the past depreciation that is extrapolated into the future.
That is, the portion of the depreciation that took place in period t− 1, that agents expect
to occur again in period t. “Backward-looking component” and “degree of extrapolation”
will be used interchangeably.
Intelligent expectations We will say that agents form “intelligent expectations” when
their expectations about the relevant variable (depreciation) are not only shaped by its past
behaviour, but by the evolution of relevant indicators that are bound to affect depreciation.
This may imply, for instance, the internalization of policy announcement, or the effects of
shocks to the exchange rate market.
The research questions to be addressed in this chapter are the following:
(RQ1) To what extent do agents extrapolate past trends when forming expectations about
nominal depreciations of the exchange rate?
(RQ2) To what extent agents behave differently in tranquil and crisis periods?
(RQ3) To what extent are they “intelligent” in forming expectations, that is, internalizing
policy or environmental changes?
(RQ4) Has the extrapolative component changed over time?
(RQ5) Has the interest rate differential been a good predictor of exchange rate move-
ments?
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4.4 Expectation Generating Mechanisms: How much do we
extrapolate?
In this section we address Research Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4. We test whether agents
have formed expectations by extrapolating past trends in Uruguay over the period 1980-
2010, and how the degree of extrapolation changed over time. It is argued that agents
in currency markets adopt extrapolative or bandwagon forecasting methods, by simply
extrapolating the changes in previous periods into future changes in the same direction.
Looking at low-inflation, developed economies, the existing literature finds evidence on
extrapolative expectations for short horizons only (up to 1 month), while there is a twist
in the mechanism when looking at longer horizons, and agents seem to expect a reversion
of the previous exchange rate movement (see, for example, Frankel and Froot (1987),
MacDonald and Torrance (1988), Cavaglia et al. (1993) and Chinn and Frankel (1994)).
The focus on Uruguay offers an interesting and representative case study of an emerging
economy. During the period of analysis the Uruguayan economy experienced periods of
high and low inflation. Consumer Price Inflation reached a maximum of 110% in 1990, then
decreased to single digits after 1998. In addition, the economy had different exchange rate
regimes. From 1980 until 1992 (Pre-TZ), a number of short-lived regimes were in place.
In March 1991, the Central Bank introduced a price stabilization plan with the exchange
rate as a nominal anchor. The most visible element of this plan was a target zone (TZ)
for the nominal exchange rate a` la Krugman (1991). It was not until June 1992 that the
amplitude and the slope of the TZ was publicly announced. The regime was abandoned
in June 2002, in the middle of a deep recession, a banking crisis and after the drastic
depreciations in Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2002). In our analysis, we define the TZ
regime as starting in 1993 to allow six months of ‘learning’ after the public announcement
of the width and slope of the bands within which the Central Bank was targeting the
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exchange rate to fluctuate.4 A third regime (Post-TZ) started after the abandonment of
the target zones in 2002. Since 2003, the Central Bank has not had any explicit target for
the exchange rate. It would be wrong, however, to define this regime as a freely floating
one, since it is possible to identify Central Bank interventions during this period. However,
these have not been systematic, and it was argued by the authorities that their rationale
was to decrease the volatility, rather than to affect the level of the exchange rate. These
changes in the economic environment are likely to have impacted the way agents formed
expectations.
To assist clarity, Figure 4.1 displays a timeline in which the three sub-periods are
located as well as the major external events and different policy announcements that
may have affected expectations. Figure 4.2 plots the time pattern of depreciation and
interest rate differentials, as a proxy for expected depreciation, and shows the depreciation
threshold that will be used for the definition of ‘tranquil’ periods and ‘turbulent’ periods.
Turbulent periods will be considered to be those immediately after a ‘jump’ in the exchange
rate has happened. This presents prima facie evidence of some degree of an extrapolative
component in expectations, as these seem to lag depreciation.
Firstly, we test the contribution of an extrapolative component in expectations as well
as the importance of a number of exogenous environmental variables. For these purposes,
we estimate a modified version of Frankel and Froot (1987), in which investors’ expected
depreciation rate for the following six months is a function of the depreciation over the last
six months, of extreme movements in the exchange rate, and of policy and other changes
4The TZ regime has been considered as credible during most of its duration. The credibility of the TZ
regime at an early stage has been argued first by Bergara and Licandro (1994), and later by Polgar (2002).
Masoller (1997) compares the credibility of a stabilization plan in the early 1980s with the TZ regime and
concludes that the latter was substantially more credible than the former.
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Figure 4.1: Regimes and Major External Events hitting the Uruguayan Economy
Figure 4.2: Actual and Expected Exchange Rate Depreciation
161
in the economic environment as in equation (4.2).
∆set+6 = β0 + β1∆st + β2Jumpt + β3Jumpt ∗∆st + X
′
tβ4 + t+6 (4.2)
where:
Jumpt =

0 if ∆st ≤ 50%,
1 if ∆st > 50%.
(4.3)
∆set+6 is what agents expect at time t the exchange to depreciate in the following six
months and ∆st is the observed depreciation at time t over the past six months.5 ‘Jump’
is included to allow for extreme events to have a direct effect on expectations (through β2).
The interaction of ‘Jump’ and ∆s is included to allow for a differential effect of ∆s on ex-
pectations after an extreme event has taken place (through β3).6 X is a matrix of variables
capturing events affecting the economic environment, including government announce-
ments and international and domestic events that may have an impact on depreciation
expectations: a trend during the period of the ‘Tablita’ stabilization plan (which collapsed
in December 1982) to allow for agents internalizing the devaluation announcements dur-
ing that period (‘Trend Tablita’), level-dummies controlling for the effects of the sales of
foreign exchange guarantees by the “Banco de la Republica” (BROU, 1981m1−1981m10)
and those sold by the Central Bank (BCU, 1982m1− 1982m3), the collapse of the Argen-
tinean ‘Tablita’ stabilization plan (‘Tablita Argentina’, 1982m11− 1983m6), the collapse
of the Argentinean ‘Austral’ plan (‘Austral Collapse’, 1986m3 − 1986m6), the collapse
of the Brazilian Cruzado plan (‘Cruzado Collapse’, 1986m9 − 1987m1), the hyperinfla-
5We use depreciation and devaluation interchangeably.
6 During the period, there have been 15 episodes of depreciations of at least 50% in a 6-month period.
The ‘extreme’ event was arbitrarily defined as a depreciation above 50% in a 6-month period. The threshold
was chosen by identifying the atypical episodes in a graph plotting depreciation over time (see Figure 4.2).
For sensitivity purposes, different thresholds were chosen and the results were robust to this choice. A
alternative method used to capture possible differential effects of ∆st on ∆s
e
t+6, for different levels of ∆st
was a linear spline of ∆st. The results were very similar to those reported here, but the goodness of fit
indicators favoured the model specified in equation (4.2).
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tion and banking crisis in Argentina (‘Hyper’, 1989m1 − 1989m12), the different an-
nounced slopes of the target zones (‘i− th Slope’), the depreciation of the Brazilian Real
(Real, 1999m1 − 2002m6), the collapse of the Argentinean currency board (Argentina,
2002m1− 2002m6); impulse dummies controlling for the effects of the Mexican debt crisis
(‘Mexican Debt Crisis’, 1982m8), the depreciation of the Brazilian Cruzeiro (‘Cruzeiro
Depreciation’, 1991m1), the Brazilian institutional crisis due to the impeachment of Pres-
ident Collor (Collor, 1992m9), the Tequila crisis in Mexico (Tequila, 1994m12), and the
rate of change of the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank.
Secondly, we explore whether a mixed expectation model fits the data better, by incor-
porating variables that would capture adaptive and regressive mechanisms. The rationale
for testing a mixed model from an economic point of view, is that forecasters may use
several models, or there are heterogeneity of forecasters, with different models. Given
that we use a proxy for average expectations, we cannot identify which explanation drives
a finding for a mixed model as the two hypotheses are observationally equivalent.7
To test for a mixed model, we then estimate equation (4.4):
∆set+6 = β0 + β1∆st + β2Jumpt + β3Jumpt ∗∆st + β4ForeErrort + β5(s∗t − st)/st +
β6∆CPIt + X
′
tβ4 + t+6 (4.4)
where:
(1) ForeErrort is the lagged forecast error, given by (set − st)/st. This would allow for
an “adaptive” component in expectations. Here, expectations about the future spot
rate, set+1, are formed by placing a weight (1−β4) on the current spot rate, and (β4)
7Most of the literature tends to estimate different models separately. An exception is Prat and Uctum
(1996), who find evidence supporting a mixed model, using average expectation data. Another is the work
of Benassy-Quere et al. (2003). These authors exploit a panel with disaggregate expectations data and
find evidence supporting the hypothesis that forecasters are heterogeneous in the models they use.
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on the past expected spot (set ).
8 β4 is usually hypothesized to be between 0 and 1
for expectations to be inelastic. We will refer to this added variable as reflecting the
“adaptive” component in expectations.
(2) (s∗t − st)/st is a measure of exchange rate disequilibrium. If agents perceive that
the exchange rate will eventually adjust to ensure a stable real exchange rate, their
depreciation expectations will be influenced by how far that s∗t that would ensure
that real exchange rate stability is from the spot rate st. Operationally, we defined
that “equilibrium” nominal exchange rate s∗, as s such that RER = ¯RER.9 β5 is
the speed at which the spot rate is expected to regress to the “equilibrium” value,
and is hypothesized to be positive. In that case, agents adjust depreciation expect-
ations upwards when the nominal exchange rate is below the perceived equilibrium
value, s∗ (and vice versa).10 We will refer to this added variable as reflecting the
“regressive” component on expectations. This notion of “equilibrium” is consistent
with purchasing power parity (PPP) in its absolute version. However, deviations
from absolute PPP are observed to have been large. For this reason, and given that
here we are considering a long period of about 30 years, in principle it would have
been possible to treat the equilibrium real exchange rate for Uruguay as a trend, on
Balassa-Samuelson grounds. With hindsight, however, over the period the evidence
in the data for such a trend is weak. It seems reasonable to neglect the possibility
of agents anticipating such a trend.11
(3) ∆CPIt is CPI inflation over the last six months, pre-determined at period t. Agents
8It is possible to see that rearranging, ∆se = β4ForeErrort.
9 ¯RER, the average real exchange rate is calculated over the whole period of analysis, 1980-2010.
10This follows the logic of Dornbusch (1976) in which variables such as good prices converge to their
long-run values over time. Frankel and Froot (1987) use a similar measure of disequilibrium to test for
regressive expectations.
11The best-fit trend that emerges from regressing the real exchange rate on a time trend is inconsistent
with the prediction of Balassa-Samuelson, and rather small. The estimated trend implies an annual rate
of growth of -0.4%.
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may form expectations about real exchange rates, but not be sophisticated enough
to respond to the disequilibrium as calculated above. If they face computational
costs, they may just look at past inflation and expect that its effects on the RER are
partially neutralized by a nominal depreciation. β6 > 0 would suggest that agents
revise expectations upwards after an increase in inflation.
Thirdly, given our interest in understanding if the expectation generating mechanism
changed over time, we run separate models for each of the three sub-periods mentioned,
and examine how heterogeneous coefficients are across periods. Given that there are a
number of extreme exchange rate movements, and that these may affect the estimates, we
have chosen the beginning and end dates of the three sub-periods such that the extreme
episodes are excluded. This means that when we estimate (4.4) for the period Pre-TZ,
we exclude the turbulent first two years. For TZ, we consider the period 1993m1-2002m5,
excluding the collapse of the TZ regime, while for Post TZ we estimate over the period
2003m1− 2010m3, thus excluding the turbulent second half of 2002.
Data are obtained from the Central Bank of Uruguay. The series used are 7536 for
peso deposits and 7538 for dollar deposits. Exchange rate data correspond to the monthly
average of bid prices. Data on foreign exchange reserves is obtained from the IMF IFS
database. Some descriptive statistics are presented in Table D.1 in the Appendix.
4.4.1 A Note on the Methodology
Here we discuss the methodological problems arising in the estimation of equation (4.2),
along with the strategy pursued in this chapter in an attempt to overcome them.
4.4.1.1 Overlapping Observations: Serially Correlated Errors
Because the forecast horizon corresponding to the interest rate differential is longer than
the observational frequency (monthly), a problem of overlapping observations arises, which
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implies that the forecast error t+k follows a non-invertible moving average process of order
k − 1.12
This can be showed as follows. Imagine a non-overlapping model, in which, say the
interest differentials, denoted below as ∆set are those for one-month time deposits, so they
capture the expected depreciation over one month only. We specify the following model:
∆set = α+ β∆st−k + ut (4.5)
where ut is assumed to be serially uncorrelated, homoscedastic, E(ut) = 0, V (ut) = σ2.
Now, if we look at interest rate differentials of k-month time deposits, then the dif-
ferential will contain the sum of the depreciation expectations for each of the k periods.
Denoting the sums in capital letters, then aggregating we have:
∆Set =
t+k−1∑
j=t
∆sej
∆St =
t+k−1∑
j=t
∆Sj
et =
t+k−1∑
j=t
uj (4.6)
Which means that, even if the u’s are independent and identically distributed, the e’s will
not be, displaying instead a moving average component of order k − 1:
E[et] = E[
k−1∑
j=0
ut+j ] =
k−1∑
j=0
E[ut+j ] = 0
V [et] = kσ2u
Cov[et, et+s] = (k − s)σ2u,∀k − s > 0 (4.7)
12This was first shown by Hansen and Hodrick (1980).
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While OLS estimates of the parameters remain consistent with serial correlation, the
standard errors are biased downwards. The standard approach in the literature is to
use a version of GMM introduced by Hansen (1982) to correct the standard errors. The
GMM estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of the OLS estimates of the regression
coefficients is:
Σˆ = (X ′X)−1X ′ΩˆX(X ′X)−1 (4.8)
where Ωˆ is the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. The element ijth of that matrix
is given by:
λˆ(i, j) =

uˆiuˆj if |i− j| ≤ (k − 1),
0 if|i− j| > (k − 1).
(4.9)
where λˆ is the estimated autocovariance. It has been shown that the estimates of Ωˆ need
not be positive definite when samples are small. A solution to this problem has been
suggested by Newey and West (1987), and it has been usually adopted in the literature.
This solution consists in weighting λˆi,j in equation(4.9) as follows:
λˆ(i, j) =

uˆiuˆjωi,j if |i− j| ≤ (k − 1),
0 if|i− j| > (k − 1).
(4.10)
where the choice of ωi,j is given by:
ωi,j = 1− [|i− j|/(m+ 1)] (4.11)
where m is chosen so that positive definiteness is ensured. Here we follow the authors’
suggestion, and set m = k = 6.
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4.4.1.2 Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
An additional problem associated to the error term arises if disturbances are conditionally
heteroscedastic. This has been frequently found in monthly financial data (and it is
almost a regularity in higher frequency data). For example, if large and small errors occur
in clusters, then the recent past may provide useful information about the conditional
variance of the errors. While OLS are still unbiased in the presence of conditionally
heteroscedastic errors, efficiency gains are possible by explicitly modeling the pattern of
that heteroscedasticity. Following Engle (1982) and taking our estimable equation (4.2),
that would imply estimating simultaneously a mean and a variance equation, in which the
latter has a constant, as well as an autoregressive component as specified below:
∆set = β0 + β1∆st + β2Jumpt + β3Jumpt ∗∆st + X
′
tβ4 + t
σ2t = α0 + α1
2
t−1 + ...+ αq
2
t−q (4.12)
The variance equation specified as above implies that recent disturbances influence the
variance of the current error. In equation (4.12), the pattern is described as an Autore-
gressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) process of order p, where p is the number
of lags that affect the current variance of the error. The parameters in this model are
estimated using Maximum Likelihood techniques (ML).
In order to test whether ARCH effects are present, we use a Lagrange Multiplier test
(ARCH LM) that consists in estimating equation (4.2) using OLS, extract the estimated
errors, and regress their squared values on lags as below:
eˆ2t = αˆ0 + αˆ1eˆ
2
t−1 + ...+ αˆpeˆ
2
t−p + νt (4.13)
and then test the joint significance of αˆ1...αˆp. We tested for ARCH effects in all the models
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estimated in this chapter, and given that these suggest unambiguously the presence of
conditionally heteroscedastic disturbances (ARCH effects), we used ARCH models.13
Unfortunately, the Newey-West procedure does not allow for ARCH effects. Our ad-
hoc strategy is to use ARCH models to estimate an augmented version of equation (4.2) in
which lags of the first differences of the dependent and independent variables are included
up to an order of k − 1, in an attempt to control for the moving average process.14
4.4.1.3 Non-Stationarity & Co-integration
Another consideration involves the time-series properties of the variables under consider-
ation. We performed augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of unit roots in both actual
depreciation rates and interest rate differentials, and results were mixed, depending on the
lag length, and on the periods considered (sample size).15 The inconclusiveness of these
unit root tests is not surprising, as it has been widely acknowledged that they have low
power in small samples. For these reasons, and in order to exclude the possibility of in-
terpreting results from spurious regressions, we test for cointegration by checking whether
residuals from the estimated long-run relationship contain unit roots. Because in the pres-
ence of non-stationary regressors, the usual t statistics have non-standard distributions,
we use tabulated critical values to perform the cointegration tests. These are reported
after each estimation result.
Although the estimator from the long-run relationship is superconsistent (it converges
to its true value at a faster rate — T — than it would be the case if the series were
stationary), this asymptotic characteristic may be of little use when working with finite
samples. Banerjee et al. (1993) show that large finite-sample biases can arise in static
13The results from the ARCH LM tests are reported after each estimation result.
14This idea was kindly suggested by Professor Ron Smith. For verification purposes, we estimated the
same models using the Newey-West procedure and found that the results are largely unchanged: while
standard errors increase, the main coefficients of interest remain highly significant. Newey-West estimation
results for the key coefficients are reported in the Appendix.
15These are reported in Table D.2 in the Appendix.
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OLS estimates of co-integrating parameters. A possible method of reducing finite-sample
biases, is estimating a single-equation dynamic regression, in the form of an Autoregressive
Distributed Lag model (ADL). For purposes of comparison, we run an ADL in which the
lag structure to be modeled is chosen using a set of information criteria indicators (Akaike
(AIC), and Bayesian (BIC)), compute the implied long-run relation and compare it with
that obtained when estimating the static relationship.
The mean equation of the ADL to be estimated can be expressed as in (4.14):
A(L)∆set = β0 +B(L)∆st + β2Jumpt + β3Jumpt ∗∆st + X
′
tβ4 + t (4.14)
where A(L) and B(L) are lag polynomials, whose order is determined by the information
criteria mentioned above (both the AIC and BIC suggest 6 lags for the dependent variable
and 2 lags for the explanatory variable). The implied long-run relation is given by:
∆set =
β0
A(1)
+
B(1)
A(1)
∆st +
β2
A(1)
Jumpt +
β3
A(1)
Jumpt ∗∆st + X′tβ4[A(1)]−1(4.15)
where replacing L by 1 in the lag polynomial gives the sum of the coefficients in the
polynomial. The cointegration test in the context of an ADL model consists of testing
whether A(1) and B(1) are zero. This is performed and reported in the section that
follows.16
4.4.2 Results
Results from estimating equation (4.2) over the whole period are reported in Column (1)
of Table (4.1). Consider tranquil times first, when the Jump variable and the interaction
term take a zero value. Our results suggest that agents extrapolate about 70% of the past
16See Chapter 8 in Johnston and DiNardo (1997) for a discussion on ADL models.
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Table 4.1: Expectation Generating Mechanism Regressions
Dep.Var: i− i∗ (1) Extrap (2) Mixed (3) ADL Extrap
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Lagged Dep 0.705*** (0.003) 0.439*** (0.018) 0.017** (0.007)
Lagged Jump 0.122*** (0.047) 0.204*** (0.024) 0.063*** (0.013)
Inter Lagged Jump*Dep -0.483*** (0.047) -0.484*** (0.039) -0.039** (0.016)
Lagged ∆ CPI 0.317*** (0.016)
L. Fore Error 0.125*** (0.026)
L. Diseq E -0.057*** (0.008)
Trend Tablita 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
Slope TZ to come -0.005 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003) -0.002* (0.001)
Mexican Debt Crisis -0.000 (0.029) 0.007 (0.036) -0.003 (54552.198)
Tablita Argentina -0.069*** (0.012) 0.132*** (0.025) -0.012** (0.006)
Austral Collapse 0.017* (0.010) 0.017*** (0.003) -0.005** (0.002)
Cruzado Collapse 0.024*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.004) 0.006*** (0.002)
Cruzeiro Depreciation 0.021 (0.881) 0.000 (0.039) -0.001 (0.036)
Forward Contracts BROU -0.003 (0.004) 0.017*** (0.005) -0.008** (0.003)
Forward Contracts BCU -0.018*** (0.006) -0.024*** (0.009) -0.025*** (0.006)
Hyper in Argentina 0.021*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.001)
Collor 0.004 (46399.193) 0.024 (179326.571) 0.008 (15330.109)
1st SlopeTZ 0.005*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001)
2nd SlopeTZ -0.045*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) -0.003* (0.002)
3rd SlopeTZ -0.055*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.001)
4th SlopeTZ -0.049*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.002) -0.000 (0.001)
Tequila -0.008 (0.060) 0.025 (344.482) 0.006 (0.006)
Real -0.006*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001)
Argentina -0.003 (0.019) 0.026*** (0.005) 0.008*** (0.002)
Var in Forex Reserves 0.008** (0.004) -0.026*** (0.007) -0.009*** (0.003)
Lagged L.Dep. 0.004 (0.007)
L2.L. Dep -0.008 (0.007)
L.Expected Depreciation 1.035*** (0.069)
L2.Expected Depreciation -0.037 (0.098)
L3.Expected Depreciation -0.015 (0.099)
L4.Expected Depreciation -0.026 (0.079)
L5.Expected Depreciation -0.025 (0.073)
L6.Expected Depreciation 0.041 (0.038)
Constant 0.065*** (0.001) 0.030*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
ARCH
Arch 2.061*** (0.218) 1.199*** (0.162) 0.806*** (0.130)
Garch 0.188*** (0.048) 0.447*** (0.060)
Constant 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
Observations 351 345 351
AIC -1586.258 -1744.099 -2387.480
BIC -1451.131 -1594.200 -2240.770
ADF on Res -6.352 -7.007 -12.977
ARCH LM 128.084 103.344 70.835
Standard errors in parentheses. CV for ADF on Res with 2 non-stationary vars. 3.78 at 1%, 3.25, at 5%, 2.98 at 10%
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
exchange rate movement into the future, on average, and ceteris paribus. This coefficient
is very well determined and suggests a strong extrapolative component in the expectation
formation mechanism.
The behaviour is subtler in ‘turbulent’ times, after agents observe a jump in the ex-
change rate. The estimated effect of lagged depreciation on expectations should now be
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calculated as: βˆ1 + βˆ3 ∗ Jumpt = 0.222.17 After jumps, agents do not extrapolate the
whole of the past exchange rate movement, but only a smaller portion. This portion is
still sizable, and statistically significant, as we reject the hypothesis of β1 = −β3 with
95% confidence. In addition, after jumps, agents revise their depreciation expectations
upwards, on average, by about 13%, ceteris paribus. The extrapolative component is less
pronounced after crisis periods than after tranquil periods, although it is still present.
In fact, it explains why agents under-predict large depreciations, but once these have
happened, they tend to over-predict them. To visualize this, look at Figure 4.2. In Table
D.1 (in the Appendix) it is possible to appreciate that the sample average of expected
depreciation during jumps is 12.7% while the actual equals 92.3%. Instead after the jump
has happened, expected depreciation is on average, 30.8%, while the actual is 13.2%.
While our results support the hypothesis of a strong extrapolative component in ex-
pectation formation, they also suggest that agents are aware of changes in the economic
environment, and internalize their effects on depreciation expectations. The collapses of
Argentinean (Austral) and Brazilian (Cruzado) currency stabilization plans induced in-
creases in depreciation expectations in Uruguay by 1.7% and 2.4% respectively while the
hyperinflation episode in Argentina induced an increase in depreciation expectations in
Uruguay by 2.1%, on average and ceteris paribus. The hypothesis of agents internalizing
the announcements on the slopes of the TZ is upheld by the data, as the coefficients are
jointly significant. The hypothesis of βSlopei = βSlopej , i, j ∈(1, 4) and i 6= j, is rejected
for the pairs (1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4) and (2, 3) with 95% confidence. It is worth noting that
the changes in the magnitude of the point estimates reflect the direction of the announced
changes in depreciation rates. The sales of cheap forward contracts by the Central Bank
exerted a negative and statistically significant effect on expectations, reducing them by
17A 95% confidence interval for this effect is given by (0.431, 0.013).
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1.8%. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients on Mexican Debt Crisis, the sales of
cheap forward contracts by the BROU, the sharp depreciation of the Cruzeiro, the insti-
tutional crisis in Brazil in 1991, the Tequila crisis, and more surprisingly, the Argentinean
crisis of 2001 are not well-determined.18
In Column (3) of Table (4.1) we report the results of estimating an ADL model, as
described in equation (4.14). The ADL model was estimated in an attempt to understand
whether the results are affected by explicitly modeling the dynamics. The implied long-
run relation between lagged depreciation and expectations can be obtained by calculating
B(1)/A(1), which yields 0.014/0.027 = 0.52 — which is in line with the one obtained from
the static model (reported in Column 1). We test for A(1) and B(1) = 0, and reject the
null hypothesis at 1% significance, which gives further evidence of cointegration.19
Column (2) of Table (4.1) reports the results of estimating equation (4.4), in which
adaptive and regressive expectation formation mechanisms are also allowed. The effect of
lagged depreciation on expectations during tranquil times is now reduced by about 35%.
After jumps, while the effect of lagged depreciation is not statistically significantly differ-
ent from zero, agents seem to revise their depreciation expectations upwards, on average,
by about 23%, ceteris paribus. When looking at the coefficients on the environmental vari-
ables, now the collapse of the Argentinean Tablita in 1982, the collapse of the Argentinean
currency board in 2001, and the changes in foreign exchange reserves carry the expected
signs and are statistically significant (positive, positive and negative respectively).
The sign on the estimated coefficient on the adaptive component is positive, implying
that the weight placed on the previous prediction is positive, although much lower than
18The coefficients for the depreciation trend during the Tablita stabilization plan, the one on the collapse
of the Argentinean ‘Tablita’, the one on the Real Devaluation, and the one on the rate of change of foreign
exchange reserves are well determined but do not yield the expected sign.
19The test of A(1) = 0 is equivalent to testing the sum of the lagged coefficients on the dependent
variable being equal to unity. The prob-value for this test is 0.000. The prob-value for the test B(1) = 0 is
0.000. We do not report the transformations for all of the covariates, for the sake of brevity of exposition.
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that placed on the current spot rate (βˆ4 = 0.125). The negative sign of the estimated coef-
ficient on the regressive component is puzzling as it implies that agents actually expect
the exchange rate to diverge away from the “equilibrium” value. One could argue that
the choice of a ‘wrong equilibrium’ value may determine this finding, although the strong
statistical significance of the (negative) coefficient is discomforting. An alternative explan-
ation is related to the finiteness of the sample size. Agents may expect a convergence to
an equilibrium value in the long run, but may have reasons to expect a divergence over
shorter time periods. The estimated coefficient on past CPI inflation suggests that agents
revise expectations upwards by slightly less than a third of what they observed inflation
to be in the previous period, on average and ceteris paribus.
The diagnostic tests on these estimated models suggest, firstly, that the mixed model
performs better than the extrapolative model, using the AIC and BIC information cri-
teria. Secondly, that the stationarity of the estimated residuals cannot be rejected, which
provides evidence of cointegration between the interest rate differentials and the depreci-
ation rates. Thirdly, that there is strong evidence of GARCH effects in the errors. For
this reason, the reported estimates were constructed on the basis of GARCH models.
Given that GARCH models do not allow for a treatment of the non-invertible moving
average process present in the errors due to the overlapping nature of the observations,
we re-estimated the models using GMM, with the Newey-West adjustment, as described
in Section 4.4.1, and report the results in Table D.3 in Appendix D. Those results are in
line with these reported here. 20
It could be argued that because we rely on the interest rate differential as a measure of
depreciation expectations, the observed increase in the interest differential after extreme
20The size of the coefficients on the ARCH and GARCH terms suggests non-stationarity in the variance,
as they add to more than one. This suggests that the system is not stable in the way it absorbs shocks to
volatility, which is problematic. We have tried different lag structures in the variance equation, as well as
estimated the model using different distributional assumptions for the error term (normal, gaussian and
t), but the high coefficients persisted.
174
exchange rate movements is not fully explained by changes in depreciation expectations,
but also by an increase in the risk-premium required by the holders of the peso asset. But
even if it is a combination of expected depreciation and risk that is revised upwards after
a drastic depreciation, that behaviour would still be indicative of a backward-looking,
extrapolative component in the expectation formation mechanism about the variance and
about the mean of the exchange rate.
Our findings of extrapolative expectations over long horizons may be related to a
perception of uncertainty with respect to the exchange rate exhibited during much of
the 1980s and early 1990s. It has been pointed out by DeGrauwe (1990) that when the
environment is uncertain, rules based on an autoregressive model become important. This
is, probably, because that is all the forecaster has available. One relevant question is how
stable the extent to which agents extrapolate has been over the period considered. This
is a relevant question, given that over the period considered, different regimes have been
in place and constitutes the focus of attention of next section.
4.4.3 A time-varying extrapolating factor
In this subsection we address RQ4. Firstly, we explore whether the extent to which agents
extrapolate changed across the three different periods considered in this chapter: Pre-TZ,
TZ and Post-TZ. Secondly, and motivated by the heterogeneity we find in the extrapolative
component estimated when looking at the sub periods separately, our contribution con-
sists of identifying a time-pattern in the degree of extrapolation in expectation formation
mechanisms.
To proceed, we estimate equation (4.4) for the periods Pre-TZ, TZ and Post-TZ sep-
arately. Results are reported in Columns 1-3 of Table 4.2. A number of conclusions can
be reached by looking at these results.
First, both the Akaike Information Criterium (AIC) and the Bayesian Information
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Criterium (BIC) indicate that estimating the model separately for these three sub-periods
fits the data better than pooling.
Second, the estimated effect of the extrapolative component in the expectation form-
ation mechanism is always well determined, and it decreases as we move from the Pre-TZ
period to the TZ.
Third, the economic environment variables take the expected sign and are of reasonable
magnitudes in most cases, although they tend to be less well-determined, probably due to a
smaller sample size used to estimate the models separately for each period. The coefficient
on the change in foreign exchange reserves changes sign from the Pre-TZ to the Post-TZ
period. This may be related to the fact that during the Pre-TZ, Central Bank intervention
in the foreign exchange market was relatively common (not only through actual foreign
exchange transactions, but also through announcements). Reductions in reserves could
have been perceived as an alert that the Central Bank’s ability to prevent the currency
from depreciating was affected, hence the negative estimate. Instead, the Post-TZ period
in which intervention is much less frequent, unsystematic, and the policymakers’ concerns
are related to the appreciation of the domestic currency, and not the converse, increases
in the stock of foreign exchange reserves could be perceived as a signal that the Central
Bank is committed to prevent the the currency from appreciating any further.21 The
puzzling result is related to the coefficient on the Real devaluation, which is statistically
insignificant. This variable may be capturing the fact that soon after the devaluation of
the Real, the Central Bank (BCU) reduced the amplitude of the TZ in an attempt to
show commitment to the regime. This could have convinced agents that the BCU was
21For example, on the 10th June 2010, the Ministry of Finance announced that they were going to start
intervening in the foreign exchange market to counteract forces towards an appreciation of the currency.
The announcement was followed by a the largest daily increase in the exchange rate that had happened in
the year. The additions to the stock of foreign reserves of the Central Bank could be seen as a factor that
enhances the credibility of the announcement, inducing expectations of further depreciation. This episode
is out of our sample, but it is helpful to illustrate our point.
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serious about its commitment to the exchange rate regime, which explains the negative
coefficient.
When investigating the sign and size of the estimated coefficients on the regressive
component of the model, an interesting pattern emerges. While the estimated coefficient
is negative for the TZ period, it is positive for the Post-TZ period. It is reasonable to
think that only if exchange rates are allowed to some extent to float, one could expect that
it converges towards an equilibrium value. If the exchange rate is instead manipulated
with other objectives, agents may reasonably expect it to diverge from that equilibrium
value. Our results are in line with this interpretation, as the estimated coefficient for
the regressive component over the Post-TZ period — when the nominal exchange rate
was allowed to float relatively freely — is positive and significant, suggesting that agents
expect about 6.5% of the disequilibrium to be corrected per period, on average and ceteris
paribus.
The estimated coefficient on the adaptive component is not well-determined for the
Pre-TZ and Post-TZ periods, although it is statistically significant and negative during
the TZ period.
In terms of the diagnostics, the ADF tests on residuals suggest no unit roots are present
— although for Pre-TZ the rejection is only at the margin. The tests on ARCH effects
on the residuals now suggest no ARCH effects for the periods TZ and Post-TZ. This is
reasonable. Over shorter periods, it is more likely that the assumption of a constant
variance is upheld by the data. Particularly, given that episode of substantial volatility
(the collapse of the target zone regime in 2002) is left out of the sample, for the reasons
argued in Section 4.4. We still report the estimates from ARCH models, and replicate the
analysis using GMM, reporting the results in Appendix D.22
22Here again, the estimated coefficients on the ARCH processes in the variance equation are larger than
one.
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The results reported above suggest that imposing a constant effect of past depreciation
on expected depreciation as in equation (4.4) is restrictive. For this case study analysed
here, given the number of policy changes, allowing for time variation in the expectation
generating mechanism is in order. Surprisingly, the hypothesis of the same expectation
generating mechanism prevailing at any time of the sample period has generally been
implicit in the literature.23 Even if there is no explicit change in exchange rate policy,
it would be reasonable to think that the true model of exchange rates evolves over time
(see, for example, Kaminsky (1993)) and so, one should expect some evolution of the
expectation formation mechanisms. To our knowledge, the one exception to be found in
the literature is attributable to Prat and Uctum (2007). These authors use a switching-
regression framework with stochastic choice of regime, and look at six European currencies,
to determine if expectation processes change gradually and smoothly over time. However,
little attention seems to be paid to the underlying causes of the switching process.
We allow the degree of extrapolation to vary non-linearly over time by interacting
lagged depreciation with a linear, and a quadratic time trend.24 For these purposes we
estimate the following equation:
∆set+k = β0 + β1∆st + β2Jumpt + β3Jumpt ∗∆st + β4∆st ∗ Trend+ β5∆st ∗ Trend2
+β6ForeErrort + β7(s∗t − st)/st + X
′
tβ8 + t+k (4.16)
Then, in order to be able to appreciate the evolution of the extrapolative component
without imposing any type of functional form to it, we perform rolling regressions, with
a window of 120 observations (10 years), starting at the beginning of our sample period
(January 1980). This implies running 247 regressions. We then extract the estimated coef-
23See MacDonald (2000) and Jongen et al. (2008) for reviews on the subject.
24We also experimented with a cubic time trend, but both the AIC and the BIC suggested that the
quadratic performed better.
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ficients of interest as well as their standard errors and plot their evolution over time (and
their confidence intervals). This will allow us to assess the validity of the approximation
with a quadratic functional form for the evolution of the extrapolative component.25
Table 4.2: Time-Varying Extrapolating Factor Regressions
Dep.Var: i− i∗ (1) Pre TZ (2) TZ (3) Post-TZ (4) Whole Per. TV
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Lagged Dep 0.354*** (0.041) 0.177*** (0.041) 0.077*** (0.015) -1.496*** (0.119)
Lagged Jump 0.117 (0.100) 0.232*** (0.022)
Inter Lagged Jump*Dep -0.360** (0.180) -0.496*** (0.033)
T.V. Extrapol 0.011*** (0.001)
T.V. Extrapol Sq. -0.000*** (0.000)
Lagged ∆ CPI 0.208*** (0.023) 0.158*** (0.027) 0.313*** (0.024) 0.265*** (0.015)
L. Fore Error -0.062 (0.051) -0.132** (0.062) 0.001 (0.013) -0.016 (0.018)
L.diseq E 0.017 (0.025) -0.023*** (0.009) 0.065*** (0.006) -0.035*** (0.008)
Trend Tablita 0.002*** (0.000)
Mexican Debt Crisis 0.003 (0.041)
Forward Contracts BROU 0.005 (0.005)
Forward Contracts BCU -0.012 (0.008)
Tablita Argentina 0.029 (0.140) 0.095*** (0.015)
Austral Collapse 0.023*** (0.006) 0.040** (0.019)
Cruzado Collapse -0.003 (0.004) 0.013*** (0.003)
Cruzeiro Depreciation 0.011 (0.197) -0.011 (0.032)
Hyper in Argentina 0.015*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.002)
Collor 0.018** (0.008) 0.019 (5096.624)
Var in Forex Reserves -0.032*** (0.007) -0.002 (0.008) 0.020*** (0.006) -0.013** (0.006)
Slope TZ to come -0.002 (0.005) 0.006** (0.002)
1st SlopeTZ 0.064*** (0.005) 0.004** (0.002)
2nd SlopeTZ 0.018*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.003)
3rd SlopeTZ 0.002 (0.003) -0.008** (0.003)
4th SlopeTZ -0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002)
Tequila 0.002 (0.003) 0.021 (4345.545)
Real 0.002 (0.001) 0.004 (0.002)
Argentina 0.052*** (0.005) 0.036*** (0.004)
Constant 0.102*** (0.011) 0.038*** (0.005) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.016*** (0.002)
ARCH
L.arch 1.740*** (0.530) 1.097*** (0.378) 1.883*** (0.521) 1.410*** (0.184)
L.garch 0.310** (0.140) 0.052 (0.038)
Constant 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000)
Observations 119 113 81 345
AIC -583.628 -799.586 -577.240 -1854.576
BIC -508.592 -728.674 -534.140 -1696.990
ADF on Res -2.844 -3.550 -6.042 -6.332
ARCH LM 25.544 6.091 4.495 -116.722
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column (4) of Table (4.2) reports the results of estimating equation (4.16) over the
whole period. Both the AIC and the BIC reveal substantial improvements in the fit of
this model compared to that postulated by equation (4.4). The marginal effect of lagged
25Results reported for the rolling regressions correspond to GMM models and not ARCH. This is because
convergence could not be achieved for the majority of the 247 regression models run.
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depreciation on expectations during periods of tranquility is given by β1 + β4 ∗ Trend +
β5 ∗ Trend2. The effect takes an inverted-U shape during this period, starting from 0.5,
and tending to zero at the end of the period. The analysis suggest that the maximum
is found in the period that goes from 1990m3 − 1993m2. This is consistent with the
beginning of the TZ regime (which started in March 1991 and was publicly announced
in June 1992). The point estimate at the midpoint of the period is 0.58. In line with
our previous results, our estimates suggest that after extreme exchange rate movements,
agents revise expectations upwards by 24%, on average and ceteris paribus, while the
effect of lagged depreciation gets close to zero.26 Although not formally explored here,
this inverted-U shape pattern in the extrapolative component may be indicative of a U
shape pattern in the evolution of Central Bank credibility during the Pre-TZ and TZ
periods. The coefficients on the economic environment variables exhibit, generally, the
expected signs. The size of the estimated coefficients on the slope announcements during
the TZ period are as expected, although now only the 1st and 3rd slope are statistically
significant. The estimated coefficient on the regressive component suggests that agents
expect the exchange rate to diverge away from the equilibrium value, although very slowly
(about 1.3% deviation per period). Instead, past inflation of 1% induce an increase in
depreciation expectations of about 0.26%, on average. The estimated coefficient on the
adaptive component is not statistically significant.
To examine the validity of the quadratic form for the variation over time of the extra-
polative component in expectations, in Figure 4.3 we plot together interval estimate for
the time varying effect of lagged depreciation on expectations, together with the evolution
of the coefficients on lagged depreciation, obtained from the 247 regressions, when the
estimation window of 120 observations was allowed to roll. A number of conclusions can
26At the midpoint of the period, the hypothesis of (β1 + β4 ∗ Trend + β5 ∗ Trend2) = −β3 is actually
rejected with 95% confidence. While (β1 + β4 ∗ Trend+ β5 ∗ Trend2) = 0.58, β3 = 0.496
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be drawn from this comparison. Firstly, that the interval for the quadratic time varying
extrapolative component contains almost all of the relevant coefficients from the rolling
regressions, and that the inverted-U shape pattern seems to be common. Secondly, the
evolution of the coefficients from the rolling regressions seem to suggest that during the
TZ period, the drop in the weight placed on lagged depreciation to form expectations
about the future is more pronounced than that estimated when the quadratic functional
form is assumed. The reason behind this drop may be related to the fact that the target
zone regime became credible soon after it was implemented. The quadratic form does
not allow a rapid decrease in that component. Thirdly, the estimated coefficients from
the rolling regressions are quite volatile, particularly those calculated from samples that
include the turbulent period of 2002. Given the small window considered, the extreme
movements in both the dependent and explanatory variables may be very influential in
the determination of the estimate. Overall, however, the quadratic time varying factor
seems to be a reasonable approximation of how the weight placed on the past depreciation
changed over time.
Figure 4.3: Time Varying Extrapolation Factor for All Period
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4.5 Predictive Power of the Interest Rate Differentials
Having explored what determines the expectation generating mechanism and its evolution,
we now turn our attention to RQ5 and investigate how well the interest rate differential
performs as a predictor of the future change in the spot exchange rate.
4.5.1 Estimation Strategy
The ‘traditional vehicle’ to test unbiasedness of the interest rate differential that is found
in the literature is to run some version of the Fama (1984) regression27, as follows:
∆st+6 = γ0 + γ1(ikdc − ikfc) + t+6 (4.17)
where ∆st+6 is the ex post future depreciation, defined as (st+6 − st)/st and (i6dc − ikfc) is
the interest rate differential corresponding to a six-month deposit in domestic and foreign
currency respectively, actually defined as: [(1 + i6dc)/(1 + i
6
fc)− 1]. The null hypothesis to
be tested is γ1 = 1, which implies no systematic time-varying component of the forecast
errors: E(∆st+k − (ikdc − ikfc)) = α. This hypothesis is a joint hypothesis of rational
expectations plus no time-varying risk premium.28
We estimate a model for the period 1980− 2010, and then for the sub-periods corres-
ponding to Pre-TZ, TZ and Post-TZ, as done above. The results are presented in Table
D.5. The scatter plots for the whole period, and for each of the sub-periods are depicted
in Figure 4.4.
27This has been widely used in the literature. The most recent example is Frankel and Poonawala (2010),
who use the forward premium instead of interest rate differentials.
28A second hypothesis that is sometimes tested in the literature jointly with γ1 = 1 is γ0 = 0, implying
no time-invariant bias in the forecast errors. Our focus here is based entirely on γ1.
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Figure 4.4: Ex-Post Depreciation on Interest Differential Regression Data
4.5.2 A Note on the Methodology
4.5.2.1 Overlapping Observations & ARCH effects
In Section 4.4.1 we discussed how when the forecast horizon associated with the interest
rate differentials (six months) is longer than the data periodicity (monthly), a problem of
overlapping observations arises. The same considerations apply here, and we deal with
the problem in the same way. Given the presence of ARCH effects, in addition to the
moving average process of order 5, we estimate ARCH models including lags of the first
differences of the dependent and independent variables.
4.5.2.2 Problems with the “Traditional Testing Vehicle”
Moore (1994) argued that the traditional approach used in the literature (and presented
in equation (4.17) above) to test for unbiasedness of the forward premium as a predictor of
the ex post depreciation (or that of the interest rate differential) is not generally valid. Its
validity relies on a number of restrictive assumptions. The author’s argument, invoking
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the Granger Representation Theorem, is as follows. If the spot and forward rate are two
non-stationary and cointegrated variables, then their vector autoregressive representation
can be expressed as an error-correction mechanism (ECM) — the cointegrating vector
being β = (1,−β1,−β0), and the error correction adjustment parameter vector being
α = (αs, αf ). Two related equations are involved here, as in:
∆St = αs(St−1 − β1Ft−1 − β0) +
k−1∑
i=1
bsi∆St−i +
k−1∑
i=1
csi∆Ft−i + st
∆Ft = αf (St−1 − β1Ft−1 − β0) +
k−1∑
i=1
bfi∆St−i +
k−1∑
i=1
cfi∆Ft−i + ft (4.18)
Long run unbiasedness requires, according to the author, cointegration between the
spot and the forward rate, with the cointegrating vector being β = (1,−β1 = −1,−β0 =
0). In turn, short run unbiasedness requires long run unbiasedness, an ECM adjustment
parameter in the spot equation (first one in (4.18)) equal to -1, and no short run dynamics
in the spot equation (bsi = csi = 0).
Under short run unbiasedness, the forecast error is white noise. This can be seen by
imposing the condition of short run unbiasedness on the spot equation of (4.18). This
yields:
(St − Ft−1) = st (4.19)
Johansen (1992) argues that in the context of a cointegrating system (as the one
outlined in (4.18)), the estimation of a single equations (as the one of (4.17)) generates
efficiency losses unless there is one variable that is weakly exogenous. That would be
implied if only one equation contains an error-correction term. In the case of interest here,
where the dependent variable is ∆St, then, the forward rate must be weakly exogenous
(αf = 0). If that condition holds, efficient estimates are obtained, as shown by Johansen,
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from:
∆St = b0∆Ft + αs(St−1 − β1Ft−1 − β0) +
k−1∑
i=1
bi∆St−i +
k−1∑
i=1
ci∆Ft−i + t (4.20)
The parameters in equation (4.20) are related to those of the spot equation of (4.18)
in the following way: b0 = σsfσ−1ff , bi = bsi − σsfσ−1ff bfi, and ci = csi − σsfσ−1ff cfi (where
σij are the components of the variance covariance matrix of (st, ft). As argued by Moore
(1994), if the errors in the two equations in (4.18) are uncorrelated, so that σsf = 0, then
(4.20) is identical to the spot equation of (4.18).
The author then re-writes (4.20) as in (4.21), to better illustrate the number of re-
strictions imposed when using the traditional testing vehicle for unbiasedness, presented
in equation (4.17):
∆St = −αsβ0 − αs(Ft−1 − St−1) + b0∆Ft + αs(1− β1)Ft−1 +
+
k−1∑
i=1
bi∆St−i +
k−1∑
i=1
ci∆Ft−i + t (4.21)
Only if b0 = 0, β1 = 1, bi = 0 and ci = 0, estimating (4.17) would be analogous to
estimating (4.21). This leads Moore (1994) to conclude that only if:
(1) spot and forward rates are cointegrated,
(2) the forward rate is weakly exogenous, that is to say, the error correction term in
the forward equation is zero, implying that the derivative market is driving the
underlying market,
(3) the long run condition of unbiasedness holds (i.e. β1 = 1),
(4) the cross-equation covariances are zero and
(5) the lag order of the error correction mechanism is exactly equal to one,
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then, the traditional testing method of unbiasedness would be valid.
Because these conditions are of empirical nature, we tested each of them using our
dataset for the whole period under consideration, using the Johansen procedure. This
allows us to test for long and short run unbiasedness in the foreign exchange market
in Uruguay, and to assess the validity of testing unbiasedness using a single equation
approach, in the traditional way. Results of this analysis are discussed in Section 4.5.3.
Then, in Section 4.5.4 we discuss the results obtained when using the traditional testing
vehicle, and comment on the compatibility of both approaches.
4.5.3 The Validity of the Traditional Testing Vehicle
The validity of the traditional approach relies on five conditions outlined above. We
consider each of them in turn, and use a system estimation approach to test for long and
short run unbiasedness.
Firstly, we choose the lag structure for the vector autoregression represented by equa-
tion (4.18). This choice was motivated on tests of serial correlation on the residuals. The
null hypothesis of serially uncorrelated residuals cannot be rejected when a generous struc-
ture of 12 lags is chosen. Different information criteria point in the same direction in terms
of the lag order (see Tables D.9 and D.8 in the Appendix). This provides the first piece
of evidence casting doubt on the validity of the traditional approach to test unbiasedness
of expectations in the Uruguayan foreign exchange market.
Secondly, we test for long run unbiasedness. This implies, to begin with, testing for
cointegration between the ex-post spot exchange rate and the expected exchange rate. We
find evidence of one cointegrating relationship between these two series, and this finding
is robust to the choice of the lag structure. In fact, for any lag order between one and
twelve, the null hypothesis of the number of cointegrating vectors being no greater than
zero is rejected, while the null of the number of cointegrating vectors being no greater than
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one cannot be rejected (see Table D.7 in the Appendix). Further to this, we examine the
estimated cointegrating vector. The second part of the long run unbiasedness hypothesis
is that β1 = 1 and β0 = 0. For any lag-length in the interval [1, 12], the hypothesis is
rejected. However, β1 is, from an economic point of view, very close to unity (see Table
D.11 in the Appendix). This suggests a substantial kernel of truth for the uncovered
interest parity condition for the case of Uruguay.
Thirdly, we test for weak exogeneity of the expected exchange rate. If the expected
exchange rate is weakly exogenous, that would imply that there is no significant rectifica-
tion of any displacement from long-run equilibrium via changes in the expected exchange
rate. We then tested the hypothesis of the error correction adjustment parameter in the
equation corresponding to the expected exchange rate, αf = 0. Here again, we test the
hypothesis using lag orders in the interval [1, 12] and systematically reject it. In line with
previous research done for different currency pairs, such as Moore (1994), and MacDonald
and Moore (2001), we cannot reject the null of αs = 0.29 Conceptually, these results sug-
gest that expectations are not driving the exchange rate movements. Instead, this would
be consistent with a world in which agents have some sort of information about what
is going to happen with the exchange rate, and form expectations accordingly. For the
case of Uruguay over the period considered, this is intuitively appealing, as the market
is relatively thin, and the main actor was the Central Bank, whose systematic interven-
tions were largely pre-announced. Methodologically, the rejection of weak exogeneity of
the expected exchange rate implies that efficiency losses are incurred when using a single
equation approach to test unbiasedness of expectations.30
To conclude, evidence suggests, firstly, a strong rejection of short-run unbiasedness
— or short run validity of the uncovered interest parity, as defined by Moore (1994).
29We can only reject it when the lag order of the VAR is 1, case in which serial correlation is severe.
30The condition of the cross-equation uncorrelated errors is also violated.
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Secondly, although long-run unbiasedness is also rejected, βˆ1 is from an economic point of
view, quite close to unity. Thirdly, that caution should be placed in the interpretation of
results emerging from using the traditional testing vehicle for unbiasedness.
4.5.4 The Traditional Testing Vehicle: Results
The results from the analysis of Section 4.5.3 suggest that equation (4.17) is mis-specified.
We found it pertinent, however, to proceed and estimate it given that this approach is so
widely used in the literature. Frankel, for example, considers the single equation procedure
to be a parsimonious way of testing a simple hypothesis.31 Of course, caution should be
placed when interpreting the results.
When estimating (4.17) we find that during the period 1980m02 − 2010m3 there has
been a statistically significant bias in the expectations contained in the interest rate differ-
entials, as γˆ1 < 1 (Column 1 in Table D.5). Given the important extrapolative component
in expectations that was found in Section 4.4, this bias is not surprising. What is re-
markable is that the bias is lower than the general finding in the literature for developed
countries’ currencies (γˆ1 = 0, and even negative).32 Our results are in line with the argu-
ment of Frankel and Poonawala (2010) that the bias for emerging economies is lower than
that for advanced economies, as currencies in the former group have more easily identi-
fiable trends of depreciation than those in the latter group. Also, Gilmore and Hayashi
(2008) report γˆ1 in the range of 0.5− 1.5 for Argentinean, Chilean and Brazilian currency
markets, and Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) also find lower forward premium biases for
emerging economies and argue that the bias is positively correlated with GDP per capita
and negatively with average inflation and inflation volatility.
We then investigated whether these findings are stable across the sub-periods defined
31This was expressed by Jeffrey Frankel in a personal communication, dated on Nov. 7th, 2010.
32For a survey of the original literature, see Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996).
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in Section 4.4. Column 2 reports results for the Pre-TZ regime (1980−1992). Surprisingly,
the results imply that expectations move in the opposite direction to actual spot rates.
However, a closer look at the scatter plot for this sub-period (top-right panel of Figure 4.4)
suggests that the finding is driven by the large depreciation of the peso in 1982. We exclude
the extreme event of 1982, and re-estimate equation (4.17) for the Pre-TZ period starting
in 1983 (Column 3). The rationale for this adjustment is as follows: our sample period
starts with a drastic exchange rate movement. It is likely that the internalization of this
drastic event has happened earlier, out of our sample, which induces a small-sample bias.
This can be thought of as the other side of the coin of the ‘peso problem’. Conceptually,
the peso problem refers to a perennial premium on the market interest rate associated
with a currency that is pegged to the dollar (or any other). 33 The discount is due to a
small probability attached to a big fall in the value of the pegged currency. A bias due
to the small-sample used arises if interest rate differentials contain information on this
’small probability of a big change’ expectation, while this big change is realized out of
sample. Our small sample includes the jump but not the whole of the gradual expectation
adjustment that is likely to have taken place before the actual depreciation. After adjusting
the sub-period to start in 1983, (Pre−TZ∗), we find a strong co-movement of expectations
and spot rates, although the bias in the prediction of the interest rate differential is still
statistically significant. Results for the TZ period point to the same direction (Column 4).
The period Post-TZ, characterized by a floating exchange rate regime, reveals a different
pattern: no significant co-movement is found between expectations and spot rates.34 These
results raise a number of issues.
33It is claimed to be first observed by Milton Friedman in the context of the Mexican Peso interest rate
in the 1970s.
34We also estimated equation (4.17) using the Newey-West procedure. Newey-West results are in line
with those reported here, and the γ1 coefficient is always highly significant, with the exception of the one
estimated for Post-TZ. It is worth mentioning that because using Newey-West the standard errors are
larger, now the 95% confidence interval estimates for γ1, for the whole period, and the sub-periods Pre-TZ
and TZ contain 1. This implies that the null of unbiasedness cannot be rejected.
189
First, the bias of the interest rate differential as a predictor of exchange rate movements
is smaller when looking at the whole sample period, than when looking at a set of sub-
periods, separately. This is likely to be related to the ‘peso problem’. As argued by Flood
and Rose (1996), a sufficiently large sample, with a representative number of actual drastic
depreciation will attenuate this bias.35
Second, the fact that the bias seems to be larger in the Post-TZ than in the Pre-TZ
period offers some evidence that the drivers of these results are not related to unidentified
time-varying risk premia, but instead are associated with expectational failures. This is
because if the risk premium is associated with exchange rate volatility, then, given the
record of exchange rate volatility one would expect the risk premium to have been (a)
higher, and (b) more volatile during Pre-TZ than Post-TZ. However, the bias is found to
be smaller during Pre-TZ than during Post-TZ.
Third, the poor performance of the interest rate differential over the Post-TZ period
could be attributed to the fact that with a regime in which there are no announcements
from the Central Bank, and in the context of low inflation, predicting exchange rate
movements becomes more difficult than during Pre-TZ and TZ. It is worth mentioning
that this period is characterised by non-systematic interventions of the Central Bank in
the foreign exchange market, and erratic messages from both its board of directors and the
government, in terms of exchange rate policy. This introduces uncertainty with respect
to the underlying model determining the exchange rate and makes it more complex to
predict. One could argue that, of the three sub-periods considered, this one is the one
in which the resemblance to a developed currency market is the highest, and so is the
finding: the interest rate differential does not predict depreciation at all. It fits the
‘forward premium puzzle’.36 This is in line with previous findings. For example Flood and
35Of course, there is no guarantee that the 15 drastic movements that we have in our sample are enough
to make our sample ‘large’.
36This is further evidence that is in line with Frankel and Poonawala (2010). They argue that the bias
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Taylor (1996), Huisman et al. (1998), Lothian and Wu (2005) and Huisman and Mahieu
(2006) find that the larger the interest rate differentials are, the better their predictive
power. As argued by (MacDonald, 2007, p. 387), in contexts of low inflation, interest
rates reflect liquidity effects, while in environments of high inflation, they will reflect
Fisher effects. So, the regression of depreciation on interest rate differentials will show a
correctly signed association for the high inflation environment, but a wrongly signed one
for the low inflation environment.
An additional explanation related to the ‘peso problem’ can be found through a close
examination of the scatter of ex-post depreciation and the expectations contained in the
interest rate differential, reported in the bottom-right panel of Figure 4.4. Expectations
have been predominantly biased upwards. While the interest rate differentials have been
systematically positive, actual depreciation alternated between positive (30 periods) and
negative (56 periods). Given the history of exchange rate movements in Uruguay, it seems
reasonable to attribute a portion of that bias to a perennial discount in the peso, as agents
have the perception of a small probability of a large peso depreciation.37
Table 4.3: Ex-Post Depreciation on Interest Rate Differentials Regressions
(1) All Period (2) Pre-TZ (3) Pre-TZ* (4) TZ (5) Post-TZ
D.V. Actual Dep. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Expected Dep. 0.748*** (0.008) -0.132*** (0.032) 0.723*** (0.032) 0.634*** (0.032) 0.011 (0.285)
Constant 0.004*** (0.001) 0.286*** (0.008) 0.081*** (0.008) 0.019*** (0.003) -0.026*** (0.010)
ARCH
L.arch 2.675*** (0.065) 1.892*** (0.168) 1.596*** (0.266) 1.194*** (0.241) 0.713 (0.446)
Constant 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
Observations 357 156 120 120 81
AIC -971.122 -292.497 -359.173 -525.847 -213.692
BIC -955.611 -280.298 -348.023 -514.697 -204.114
Arch LM Test 254.2 116.6 65.9 74.9 62.9
ADF on Residuals -6.672 -4.504 -4.726 -3.041 -3.601
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, CV for ADF on Res with 2 non-stationary vars. 3.78 at 1%, 3.25, at 5%, 2.98 at 10%
Standard errors in parentheses. C.V. for the Arch LM Test: 3.84.
is larger for developed countries’ currencies, and reach this finding by exploiting their panel structure. An
analogy can be drawn here. Exploiting the time series structure of our data, we find the bias to be largest
when the market most resembles one of a developed economy.
37For all periods, the null of no ARCH effects in the residuals is overwhelmingly rejected by the data for
all specifications.
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4.6 Conclusions
This chapter adds to the literature on exchange rate expectation generating mechanisms
and the uncovered interest parity testing. The empirical departures from the uncovered
interest parity are well-known in the literature, which has mostly focused on developed
economies. These departures, in turn, have brought about research on the drivers of
expectation generating mechanisms but tend to have ignored that these mechanisms may
change over time.
This chapter draws upon the Uruguayan case over the period 1980-2010. The Ur-
uguayan case is interesting because during the period it exhibited two distinctive features
of emerging economies: a movement from high to low inflation levels, and changes in ex-
change rate policies. Both features are likely to have a direct bearing on exchange rate
expectations formation, and on the correlation between exchange rate changes and the
interest rate differentials.
First, this chapter explores how much weight agents placed on the past behaviour of
exchange rates to form expectations, and what determines that weight. Our contribu-
tion is motivated from the conjecture that economic conditions related to exchange rate
determination and the degree of inertia in the economy changed significantly during the
period. In line with this, we reveal that the extrapolative component associated with ex-
pectations changes over time. The identified evolution of the extrapolative component in
expectation formation, jointly with our finding that agents internalize in their expectations
policy announcements and external events that may affect exchange rate fundamentals,
points to some degree of rationality and smooth adaptation to different environments.
We also find, using alternative testing frameworks, that there have been statistically
significant departures from the uncovered interest parity over the period. Overall, the
prediction bias for the case of Uruguay is significantly lower than that found for developed
economies. However, the result is not homogeneous across periods. During Pre-TZ and
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TZ periods, the prediction of the interest rate differential performs quite well, during the
period characterized by a relatively freely floating exchange rate regime — or at least,
lack of announcements about target values for the exchange rate — and low inflation, the
interest rate differential has no predictive power over the exchange rate movements.
In light of our findings on the drivers of expectations mechanisms, we can claim that as
long as what it takes to predict well is rather simple — i.e. look backwards, follow policy
announcements, the interest rate differential performs well. However, once the exchange
rate determination model becomes intricate, or at least unfamiliar — regimes in which
the Central Bank does not pre-announce a target for the exchange rate have not been
frequent in Uruguay— agents fail in their attempt to accurately predict exchange rate
depreciations. The ‘forward premium puzzle’ does not seem so puzzling in this case.
Although the focus of this chapter is on the Uruguayan economy and this might raise
some doubts on the external validity of the results, it offers some interesting insights on
the process of adaptation of expectation generating mechanisms, and its implications on
agents’ forecasting ability across different environments.
However, a few caveats are in order. First, we use interest rate differentials as an
indirect measure of expectations. Within those differentials there is a risk-premium. We
have argued above why these results are not likely to be driven by the risk premium,
though strictly, we would need to use survey data on exchange rate expectations, which
unfortunately are not available for Uruguay over the period of analysis. Second, we have
not found a way of simultaneously treating the ARCH effects and the non-invertible moving
average process in the residuals. The ad-hoc approach used attempted to do so, although
this has not proved to be entirely satisfactory. On the one hand, we obtain ARCH estimates
exceeding unity in some cases, which violates the stationarity condition for the conditional
variance. This is suggesting that the processes are not stable in how they absorb shocks to
volatility. On the other hand, there is still some evidence of serial correlation, which led us
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to re-estimate all models using the Newey-West correction procedures. The results found
are in line with those obtained using ARCH models (Newey-West estimates of the key
coefficients estimated here are reported in the Appendix). Finally, it is worth noting that
both ARCH models and Newey-West procedures rely on asymptotic properties, while our
sample size is relatively modest. For these reasons, the reported estimates of the standard
errors should be interpreted with some caution.
In light of these caveats, and given the availability of survey data on expectations for
the period 2005-2010, in the next chapter we investigate the consistency of these results
with those obtained using survey data.
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Chapter 5
Exchange Rate Expectations in
the Southern Cone
“It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future”1
5.1 Introduction
The analysis of Chapter 4 used interest rate differentials as a proxy for depreciation ex-
pectations to test for expectation formation mechanisms and unbiasedness of the interest
rate differentials as a predictor of the ex-post depreciation rates. However, as argued in
that chapter, the interest rate differentials not only contain information about depreci-
ation expectations, but also a risk premium required by the holders of the risky asset.
This latter confounding factor prevented us from disentangling (in the face of rejections
of the unbiasedness hypothesis), the extent to which this is attributable to expectational
failures, or to the presence of a risk premium that varies over time.
In this chapter, we use unexploited survey data on foreign exchange rate expectations
1This quote is attributed to a baseball-playing philosopher, Yogi Berra. A quick internet search reveals
a similar quote “Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future” by Niels Bohr, a Danish physicist.
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for the Uruguayan Peso/US dollar rate available for the last five years of the post target
zone period (Post TZ), to examine how much of the “puzzle” found in the previous chapter
can be explained by expectational failures. Broadly speaking, expectational failures refer
to situations in which agents’ expectations do not coincide with the mathematical ex-
pectation of the variable. Expectational failures could be attributed to irrationality, slow
learning processes, or peso problems (defined in the previous chapter). We investigate ex-
pectation formation mechanisms, examine whether expectations are unbiased predictors
of ex-post exchange rate changes, and measure the accuracy of expectations.
The motivation for this chapter is twofold. Firstly, using interest rate differentials for
the Uruguayan case, we have rejected the hypothesis of unbiasedness more strongly when
looking at the Post TZ period that goes from 2003 until 2010. This period is atypical since
exchange rates were allowed to float relatively freely, and because CPI inflation records
were low by historical standards. Probably, looking back at the past fifty years, the period
Post TZ is the one in which the foreign exchange market most resembles that of a small
open, developed economy. At the same time, survey data on exchange rate expectations
for the Uruguayan Peso/Dollar exchange rate have been made available by the Central
Bank of Uruguay since June 2005, and, to the best of our knowledge, these data have
been unexploited to date. Survey data on expectations are extremely useful, allowing
us to understand to what extent our version of the “forward premium puzzle” found
above is attributable to expectational failures, in a period in which participants in the
foreign exchange market were learning to adapt to the lack of Central Bank announcements
or commitments to particular exchange rate values.2 Secondly, given that the region
was undergoing a similar adaption process to a new foreign exchange regime (also the
Argentinean Peso and the Brazilian Real were floated, although to different extents, around
2In fact, given that we do not use forward premia in Chapter 4, but interest rate differentials — as
forward markets were inexistent for much of the period, strictly, what we find is not a “forward premium”
but an “interest rate differential” puzzle.
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the beginning of the 2000s), and that the three countries have exhibited relatively low
levels of inflation since then, we incorporate these markets in the analysis and test for
expectational failures in the three markets to see if patterns could be extracted.
The first part of the chapter concentrates on the Uruguayan survey data. Firstly, we
test for extrapolative, adaptive and hybrid expectation formation mechanisms, with incon-
clusive results. Although there is some evidence of extrapolative and adaptive mechanisms
when investigated in isolation, this vanishes when a hybrid mechanism is allowed.
Secondly, we test for expectational failures. Unbiasedness of exchange rate forecasts is
rejected at the three horizons considered (one, six and twelve months), although forecasts
perform well at predicting the direction of the exchange rate movement over a one-month
horizon. Error orthogonality is tested and results suggest that at short time-horizons,
orthogonality cannot be rejected.
Thirdly, we calculate the root mean squared error of alternative forecast rules to assess
their accuracy. We compare the survey expectations, the interest rate differentials, and
a simple rule of predicting depreciation rates using the mean depreciation of the period.
We find that survey expectations, although biased, are more accurate than other forecast
rules.
Finally, we incorporate survey data for the Argentinean Peso/Dollar and the Brazilian
Real/Dollar markets into the analysis. We test for expectational failures in the three
markets. We find that unbiasedness of expectations cannot be rejected only for the Ar-
gentinean Peso/Dollar market, where the Argentinean Central Bank intervention is sub-
stantial and rather systematic. One explanation for this result is that systematic central
bank interventions make the forecast exercise simpler.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents a decompos-
ition of the forward premium puzzle into a portion explained by expectational failures and
a portion explained by a time-varying risk premium. Section 5.3 describes the Uruguayan
197
survey data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5.4 tests for extrapolative,
adaptive and hybrid expectation formation mechanisms. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 focus on
analysing expectational failures. In Section 5.5, the hypothesis of unbiasedness and error
orthogonality are tested, while in Section 5.6 a measure of accuracy is calculated for al-
ternative forecasting rules. In Section 5.7 we incorporate survey data for Argentina and
Brazil and test for unbiasedness of expectations in the three foreign exchange markets.
Section 5.8 concludes.
5.2 A Decomposition of the Puzzle
The forward premium puzzle refers to the generalized finding in the literature that the
forward premium is a biased predictor of the change in the future spot exchange rate.
This means that in the regression:
∆St+k = β0 + β1(ft − St) + vt+k (5.1)
the null hypothesis β1 = 1, and with non-overlapping data, E(vt+k) = 0, is generally
rejected. The possible sources of the rejection of this null hypothesis have been extensively
discussed in the literature. Here we follow the exposition of MacDonald (2007).
This hypothesis consists of two legs: a non-time varying risk premium (or alternatively,
risk-neutral agents) and no expectational failures.3 Violations of either of the two would
imply a rejection of the null. But identifying a reason for the rejection is elusive if one
only has data on the forward premium, as it conflates expectations and risk.
Fama (1984) showed how the rejection of that null hypothesis could be explained by
the presence of a time-varying premium required by the holder of the risky asset, or some
3Often, the null is expressed as the joint hypothesis of β0 = 0 and β1 = 1. That would imply no risk
premium, or risk-neutrality.
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sort of expectational failure (such as irrationality, or slow learning processes, or small
sample biases), or, of course, a combination of both. We examine these in turn.
5.2.1 Conditional on Rational Expectations
To see how a time-varying risk premium would imply β 6= 1, consider Fama (1984)’s
‘complementary regression’, that relates the risk-premium contained in the forward rate,
consistent with rational expectations to the forward premium, as described by (5.2):4
ft − St+k = γ + α(ft − st) + vt+k (5.2)
The forward premium can be expressed as the sum of depreciation expectations and a
risk premium required by the holder of the risky asset: (ft−St) = ∆Set+k+rpt. Assume no
expectational failures, such that the mathematical expectation of the future spot coincides
with the agents’ expectation: EtSt+k = Set+k, and that the difference between the actual
and the expected outcome for the exchange rate is a random term: St+k = EtSt+k +ut+k.
A careful examination of the probability limit of βˆ1 helps understanding under which
conditions the estimate of β = 1:
plim(βˆ1) = β1 =
Cov((ft − St),∆St+k)
V ar(ft − St) (5.3)
Substituting ft for λ+ St+k in (5.3), and expanding the denominator yields:
plim(βˆ1) = β1 =
Cov(λ,ESt+k − St) + V ar(ESt+k − St)
V ar(λ) + V ar(ESt+k − St) + 2Cov(λ,ESt+k − St) (5.4)
4The risk premium consistent with agents not making systematic forecast errors (the ‘rational expect-
ations risk premium’) can be written as λt = ft − St+k
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In turn, plim(α) can be expressed as:
plim(α) =
Cov(λ+ ESt+k − St, λ)
V ar(λ+ ESt+k − St)
=
V ar(λ) + Cov(ESt+k − St, λ)
V ar(λ) + V ar(ESt+k − St) + 2Cov(λ,ESt+k − St) (5.5)
Notice that β1 = 1 − α. Conditional on rational expectations, the forward rate will be
an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate as long as α = 0. Thus, testing
the null of β1 = 1 implies, as argued above, testing no expectational failures (so that
ESt+k = Set+k = St+k) jointly with a constant risk premium (which would imply the
numerator of (5.5) to be zero).
5.2.2 Conditional on a Time-Invariant Risk Premium
Alternatively, one could condition on a time-invariant risk premium, and see how expect-
ational failures also imply β1 6= 1.
One case of an expectational failure is what is known as the ‘peso problem’. Agents
form expectations using the correct distribution of the exchange rate and expect, for
instance, a large depreciation of S, but the expected change does not occur in the sample
that is analyzed. That would imply, given the finite sample considered, ESt+k > St+k−St.
Note that in this case agents are still assumed to form expectations rationally.
Then, β1 = 1 − α − αFS , where αFS is the finite sample bias, which tends to zero as
the sample size tends to infinity (given that we have conditioned on a time-invariant risk
premium, α = 0). This can be written as:
αFS =
ˆCov(ft − St, ESt+k − St+k)
ˆV ar(ft − St)
(5.6)
If, as in the example above, ESt+k − St > St+k − St and correspondingly, ft − St is
high, then, αFS will be positive, and βˆ < 1.
200
Analogously, a bias will be introduced due to irrational expectations— when the mar-
ket expectations differ from the mathematical expectation, even in large samples — or
because of slow learning processes after policy changes.
The availability of survey data on expectations is helpful as it allows us to unravel the
forward premium bias, and understand to what extent the bias is due to expectational
failures or to the presence of time-varying risk premium. This is what we attempt to do
in what follows, using the available survey data on exchange rate expectations for the
Uruguayan Peso/Dollar rate.
5.3 The Survey Data
The survey data on expectations were supplied by the Central Bank of Uruguay (BCU).
The BCU has compiled systematic monthly series for one-month and twelve-month forecast
horizons since June 2005, as well as unsystematic monthly series for different forecast
horizons (two, three, six, eighteen months, et cetera). The exchange rate surveyed is the
bilateral US dollar exchange rate against the Uruguayan Peso.
The group of surveyed agents has increased over the period, although not all of them
actually responded (on average, the number of responses is around seventeen). The BCU
aggregates the data, providing mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum
indicators. They do not disclose the micro data. To match this data, we use inter-bank
spot rates for the last working day of each month (Interest rate differentials are differences
in the monthly average rate for a fixed-maturity deposit in pesos and for a fixed-maturity
deposit in dollars in the private banking sector).
There are two sources of periodicity mismatch in this analysis. Firstly, even if the
forms are sent to the analysts at the beginning of the period, the precise date of the
response is not revealed. Therefore, it is not possible to know precisely the true horizon
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of the forecast. Here we assume that the forecast is made at the beginning of the month.
Secondly, because interest rate differentials are calculated from monthly average interest
rates and not of those at the end of the month, another source of mismatch is introduced.
These are inevitable, given data availability constraints. However, they are likely to affect
mainly the analysis for the one-month horizon, and have less impact for longer forecast
horizons.
Data availability constrains us to assume that the mean survey response is a valid
proxy for a single expectation, homogeneously held by investors.
Figure 5.1 plots the evolution of the spot exchange rate and its forecast (made one
month, six months and twelve months before) for the period from June 2005 to July 2010.
Visual inspection suggests that while the one-month-ahead prediction moves closely with
the actual rate, there are substantial differences between the forecast made six and twelve
months ahead the real outcome.
Figure 5.1: Exchange Rate and Expectations
Figure 5.2 displays the distribution of forecast errors, calculated as (St − Se,t−kt )/St,
where St is the spot exchange rate at period t, and S
e,t−k
t is the expectation, formed k
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periods before, for the exchange rate at period t. The left panel shows all forecast horizons
grouped, the middle panel shows the one-month ahead forecast errors, and the right panel
shows the twelve-month ahead forecast errors. Two interesting observations can be made
from the graphs. Firstly, and in line with Figure 5.1, these histograms show the forecast
error concentrated around zero for the one-month ahead predictions, while these are more
evenly distributed for the twelve-month ahead prediction. Secondly, when looking at all
forecast horizons, the distribution of the forecast error is negatively skewed. Appreciations
seem to take agents by surprise more than depreciations. This is not surprising if one
assumes a slow learning process after policy changes. The period considered is relatively
atypical from a historical perspective: freely floating exchange rates have been in place,
consumer price inflation has been historically low, and nominal appreciations of the peso
have been more frequent than depreciations.
Figure 5.2: Distribution of Forecast Errors
Table 5.1 reports the number of observations on expectations we have for each forecast
horizon considered (measured in months), along with some statistics that inform us on
the heterogeneity of expectations at every time horizon. As already mentioned, systematic
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data on expectations is only available for one-month and twelve-month ahead forecasts for
the period of analysis (June 2005-July 2010). Other forecast horizons are only occasionally
surveyed. At a given horizon, and for a given period, the difference between the mean
of expectations formed by different analysts is very small. The spread of distribution of
expectations increases as agents have to forecast values for longer horizons. For example,
increasing the forecast horizon by one month, increases the standard deviation of the
forecasts, measured in pesos, by 0.037, on average (or by 6.8% percent).
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics on Expectation Heterogeneity
Horizon (Med-Mean)/Med (Max-Min)/Med Ave Std Dev Obs.
1 0.000 0.028 0.168 62
2 0.000 0.034 0.210 13
3 0.000 0.042 0.286 12
4 -0.003 0.088 0.506 5
5 -0.002 0.047 0.342 6
6 0.000 0.087 0.504 35
7 -0.004 0.089 0.532 6
8 -0.001 0.080 0.494 5
9 0.003 0.079 0.468 5
10 -0.002 0.106 0.576 5
11 0.003 0.118 0.694 5
12 -0.001 0.101 0.625 62
13 -0.002 0.133 0.743 4
14 0.006 0.129 0.817 3
15 -0.007 0.174 1.030 3
16 0.005 0.165 0.990 3
17 -0.001 0.104 0.677 6
18 0.001 0.132 0.824 46
19 -0.001 0.182 0.990 4
20 0.003 0.173 0.923 4
21 -0.005 0.139 0.835 4
22 0.000 0.169 1.003 4
23 0.003 0.145 0.925 4
24 0.004 0.170 1.058 4
Notes: (Med-Mean)/Med is the difference between the median and the mean as a prop. of the median
median. (Max-Min)/Med is the difference between maximum and minimum as a prop. of the median.
5.3.1 Interest rate differentials and survey expectational data on ex-
change rates.
In the preceding analysis of Chapter 4 we have used the data contained in the interest
rate differentials for a six-month horizon as a proxy for depreciation expectations. We now
examine the correlation between interest rate differentials and depreciation expectations
extracted from the survey data available for the period June 2005 - July 2010. The cor-
relation matrix for three forecast horizons (one-month, six-month, twelve-month) between
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actual depreciation, expected depreciation and interest rate differentials is reported in
Table 5.2. For the six-month horizon considered in the preceding chapter, the correla-
tion between the interest differential and the depreciation expectations for a matching
period, constructed from the survey data compiled by the BCU is 0.445, and statistically
significant at 5%. The correlation falls below 20% when looking at twelve month time
horizons, while there seems to be no association between the information contained in the
one-month interest differential and the expectation data.
Table 5.2: Correlations between Interest Differentials and Survey Expectation Data
Int Differential Actual Deprec.
One-Month Horizon: June 2005-July 2010
Actual Deprec. -0.044
p-value (0.735)
Exp Deprec. -0.015 0.829
p-value (0.908) (0.000)
Six-Month Horizon: June 2005-July 2010
Actual Deprec. -0.133
p-value (0.483)
Exp Deprec. 0.445 -0.223
p-value (0.014) (0.236)
Twelve-Month Horizon: June 2005-July 2010
Actual Deprec. -0.015
p-value (0.917)
Exp Deprec. 0.192 0.043
p-value (0.178) (0.762)
Note: p-values in parentheses
5.4 Expectation Generating Mechanism
Here we use expectational data for the period June 2005-July2010 to test for extrapol-
ative and adaptive expectations at forecast horizons of one, six and twelve months. The
literature provides evidence of a twist in the expectation formation mechanism as the
forecast horizon lengthens. At short horizons (one month and less), expectations tend to
exhibit bandwagon effects, while at longer horizons, expectations tend to be stabilizing.
For example, recent depreciations are expected to be followed by appreciations. This type
of result is found, for example, in Frankel and Froot (1987), MacDonald and Torrance
(1988), Frankel and Froot (1990), Cavaglia et al. (1993) and Chinn and Frankel (1994).
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Table E.2 in Appendix E summarizes the main contributions to the literature.
To understand the mechanism used for expectation formation, we estimate the follow-
ing three equations, (5.7), (5.8), (5.9), to test for extrapolative, adaptive and a combina-
tion of extrapolative and adaptive expectations respectively, over horizons of one, six and
twelve months.
∆set+k = β0 + β1∆st + t+k (5.7)
∆set+k = γ0 + γ1ForeErrort + υt+k (5.8)
∆set+k = α0 + β
′
1∆st + γ
′
1ForeErrort + ηt+k (5.9)
If β1 ≥ 0, then expectations display “bandwagon” effects, and are destabilizing, while
if β1 < 0, then they are said to be stabilizing. On the other hand, if γ1 ≥ 0, agents adjust
their expectations upwards after they observe that they have under predicted, and the
converse is true for γ1 ≤ 0.
Results are reported in Table 5.3, for time horizons of one, six and twelve months.5 The
top part of the table displays the results of estimating (5.7). These suggest that, for all
horizons, the extrapolative component in expectations (the coefficient β1 in equation (5.7))
is statistically significant, but relatively small. This is in line with the results reported in
Chapter 4, when interest rate differentials were used as a proxy for expectations.
The middle portion of the table displays the results of estimating (5.8). Our results
suggest the presence of an adaptive component in expectations. Given that the forecast
5The same methodological considerations discussed in Chapter 4 regarding the moving average compon-
ent and the ARCH effects in the error apply here. We test for serial correlation (using the Breusch-Godfrey
test) and ARCH effects (using a Lagrange Multiplier test) and report the statistics and critical values in
the table. We reject the null of no serial correlation for the models estimated for the twelve month horizon,
so we report results of estimating them with OLS and with GMM, with standard errors corrected using
the Newey and West (1987) adjustment. We do not reject the null of no ARCH effects in all models.
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error is defined as the difference between the actual and the expected rate (relative to the
actual), the positive coefficient suggest destabilizing expectations, in that, for example, an
unanticipated appreciation of the currency indicates the expectation of a further appreci-
ation over the next period. Similar findings have been reported by, for example, Frankel
and Froot (1987), MacDonald and Torrance (1988), and Cavaglia et al. (1993).6
The estimated adaptive component loses statistical significance for the twelve-month
horizon, once the adjustment for serial correlation is made to the variance-covariance
matrix.
The bottom portion of the table shows the result when a hybrid model is estimated (as
in (5.9)), in which expectations are allowed to have both an extrapolative and an adaptive
component. In this case, the estimates for β
′
1 and γ
′
1 are poorly determined at all horizons.
This is likely to be explained by the high collinearity between lagged depreciation and the
lagged forecast error (the variables display a correlation coefficient of 0.899) .7
5.5 Testing for Expectational Failures
In Chapter 4 we found that the interest rate differentials had no predictive power on the
behaviour of exchange rate depreciation during the Post-TZ period. As argued above,
the availability of survey data on expectations allows us to identify the extent to which
that lack of predictive power is associated with expectational failures. By expectational
failure we mean situations in which agents’ expectations do not match the mathematical
6A reminder on the terminology used in this thesis is in order. Strictly speaking, if agents form
expectations adapting to the past forecast error, as described in equation (5.8), their expectations about
future depreciations are going to be formed on the basis of past information, and therefore, these agents are
“backward-looking”. However, here we use “backward-looking” to refer to the situation in which agents
use an autoregressive forecast model. That is, they look backwards, but only at the past evolution of the
variable to be forecasted.
7We have estimated a model allowing for regressive expectations, by including the measure of the
distance between the actual exchange rate and the “equilibrium” value needed to preserve a constant real
exchange rate, as defined in Chapter 4, but we find no evidence of agents forming regressive expectations,
neither when considering that mechanism separately, nor when allowing for a hybrid mechanism. For these
reasons, and for brevity of exposition, we did not report the estimation output of these models.
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Table 5.3: Expectation Formation
(1) 1-M OLS (2) 6-M OLS (3) 12-M OLS (4) 12-M GMM
D.V. ∆Se. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Extrapolative
Lagged ∆S 0.13** (0.06) 0.15*** (0.04) 0.11*** (0.04) 0.11* (0.07)
Constant 0.00 (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.01)
AIC -344.00 -120.55 -195.77 -195.77
BIC -339.78 -117.96 -191.94 -191.94
ARCH LM Test 0.004 0.172 1.546
BGodfrey 0.231 0.005 26.397
ADF on Residuals -4.269 -2.812 -1.837 -1.837
Adaptive
L.Forecast Error 0.19* (0.10) 0.17*** (0.04) 0.09** (0.03) 0.09 (0.07)
Constant 0.00 (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
AIC -342.93 -123.50 -194.36 -194.36
BIC -338.71 -120.91 -190.53 -190.53
ARCH LM Test 0.031 0.757 1.519
BGodfrey 0.603 0.135 27.141
ADF on Residuals -3.865 -3.32 -1.735 -1.735
Hybrid
Lagged ∆S 0.14 (0.14) -0.10 (0.15) 0.21 (0.16) 0.21 (0.24)
L.Forecast Error -0.01 (0.22) 0.27* (0.15) -0.08 (0.13) -0.08 (0.23)
Constant 0.00 (0.00) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03 (0.02)
AIC -342.00 -122.07 -194.15 -194.15
BIC -335.67 -118.18 -188.41 -188.41
ARCH LM Test 0.006 1.516 2.222
BGodfrey 1.228 0.125 26.130
ADF on Residuals -4.286 -3.464 -1.906 -1.906
Observations 61 27 50 50
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
ARCH LM and BGodfrey ∼ χ21. Critical Values at 5% significance for χ21=3.84
expectation of the relevant variable. One reason for expectational failure is due to irra-
tionality. However, expectational failures will also arise if agents display slow learning
processes, or, if there are peso-problems as discussed above. We first test for the un-
biasedness of the expectational data, and second, test whether analysts efficiently use all
available information.
5.5.1 Unbiasedness Tests
Here we use survey data to test for systematic forecast errors for exchange rate depreci-
ation. We estimate equation (5.10) and test for no expectational failures by testing the
joint hypothesis of α = 0 and β = 1:
∆st+k = α+ β∆set+k + t+k (5.10)
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where ∆st+k is the actual depreciation rate in the period t, t + k, ∆set+k is the expected
depreciation in t, for the period t, t+ k, and t+k is an error term, with a moving average
component of order k − 1.
Results are reported in Table 5.4. Equation (5.10) is estimated using ARCH models
and GMM as we find evidence of ARCH effects, and for the horizons of six and twelve
months, of serial correlation.8 The message conveyed by Figures 5.1 and 5.2 is confirmed
by the estimation results. Only when predicting one-month ahead do agents get the right
sign of the exchange rate movement, although they systematically overestimate its size.
Regardless of the estimation strategy (ARCH model in Column 1, GMM in Column 2),
the null hypothesis of unbiasedness (α = 0, β = 1) is overwhelmingly rejected by the
data, suggesting that forecast errors are systematic. For longer horizons (six-month in
Columns 3 and 4 for ARCH and GMM respectively, and twelve-month in columns 5 and
6 for ARCH and GMM respectively) the results are suggestive of significant expectational
failures, as agents do not even get the sign of the exchange rate movement right, and the
models are poorly determined (residuals exhibit unit roots).
This helps explaining the finding of Chapter 4. During the Post-TZ period, when the
Central Bank has no target for the exchange rate, and this is largely determined by market
forces, six-month-horizon interest rate differentials may not perform well at predicting
exchange rate movements due to to expectational failures. It is worth mentioning that the
period for which the survey data is available exhibits some swings in the exchange rate
that follow an international trend, due to the sharp depreciation of the dollar, followed by
a substantial appreciation during 2008. This period, atypical by international standards,
may have particularly affected the predictive capacity of agents. Lothian and Wu (2005)
argue, for example, that many of the expectational failures reported by the literature for
8The null of no serial correlation is upheld only for the one-month horizon model. This is reasonable,
as in this case there is no problem of overlapping of observations, as the frequency of the data matches
that of the expectation horizon.
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the period of the 1980s are related to the atypical behaviour of the dollar in that period,
and may then be attributable to a bias due to small samples. Their approach to tackle the
small sample bias, is to look at two-hundred years of data, which is, unfortunately, beyond
our possibilities due to data constraints. Another reason behind the lack of prediction
ability of agents, as argued in Chapter 4, may be related to the erratic messages given by
the Central Bank and the government in terms of the “desired” value for the exchange
rate over the period of consideration. Even if not systematic, the Central Bank often
intervened during the period, although the authorities kept claiming the prevailing was a
freely floating regime. This could have generated uncertainty with respect to the model
underlying the determination of the exchange rate, thus affecting the agents’ prediction
ability.
Table 5.4: Unbiasedness
Dep.Var. ∆S 1-M-ARCH 1-M-GMM 6-M-ARCH 6-M-GMM 12-M-ARCH 12-M-GMM
∆Se 1.68*** 1.68*** 0.71 -0.02 -0.65*** -1.42**
(0.13) (0.21) (0.70) (0.80) (0.24) (0.69)
Constant -0.00** -0.00 -0.05** -0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
ARCH
L.arch 0.75** 0.64 1.35**
(0.30) (0.43) (0.63)
L.garch 0.26*
(0.14)
Constant 0.00** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 62 62 30 30 51 51
AIC -349.94 -328.37 -47.34 -38.04 -108.66 -75.36
BIC -339.31 -324.12 -41.73 -35.24 -100.93 -71.50
ARCH LM 7.926 11.722 19.346
BGodfrey 2.871 22.927 38.518
Wald:α = 0, β = 1 69.38 21.7 6.27 2.53 167.12 53.86
ADF on Res. -4.812 -4.812 -1.980 -1.750 -1.928 -1.746
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.ARCH LM and BGodfrey ∼ χ21. Critical Values at 5%
significance for χ21=3.84. Wald on Unbiasedeness ∼ χ22. Critical Values at 5% significance: 5.99
5.5.2 Orthogonality Tests
A second test on expectational failures is concerned with answering if forecasters are
efficiently using all available information. If that is the case, any variable containing
relevant information regarding the formation of expectations of exchange rate depreciation,
regressed against the ex-post forecast error should be orthogonal to that forecast error.
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Otherwise, the forecaster could use that information to improve their prediction.
We estimate equations (5.11) and (5.12), using the lagged forecast error and the interest
rate differentials as elements of the relevant information set respectively, and test whether
α1 and α2 are jointly equal to zero (and analogously for α
′
1 and α
′
2).
(st+k − set+k)/st+k = α1 + α2(st − set )/st + t+k (5.11)
(st+k − set+k)/st+k = α
′
1 + α
′
2(i− i∗)t+kt + t+k (5.12)
Table 5.5: Error Orthogonality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1M ARCH 1M GMM 6M ARCH 6M GMM 12M ARCH 12M GMM
Using Lagged Forecast Error
Lagged F.Err 0.27 0.24 -0.20** -0.20 -1.56*** -1.20***
(0.19) (0.23) (0.08) (0.13) (0.06) (0.18)
Constant -0.00 -0.00 -0.03** -0.04 -0.15*** -0.14***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
ARCH
L.arch 0.21 1.00 1.41*
(0.21) (0.72) (0.75)
Constant 0.00*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 61 61 22 22 39 39
ARCH LM 6.996 16.399 32.314
BGodfrey 0.098 25.761 43.681
Wald: α1 = α2 = 0 6.09 4.29 20.63 6.34 823.23 48.65
AIC -312.93 -310.45 -31.54 -24.74 -111.13 -87.79
BIC -304.49 -306.23 -27.18 -22.56 -104.48 -84.46
Using Interest Rate Differentials
i− i∗ -2.19*** -0.63 -5.10* -7.61* -4.12*** -2.52
(0.53) (1.13) (2.80) (4.23) (0.60) (3.79)
Constant -0.00** -0.00 0.02 0.09 0.10*** 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.08) (0.02) (0.13)
ARCH
L.arch 1.21*** 0.65 1.31**
(0.35) (0.62) (0.57)
Constant 0.00*** 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 62 62 30 30 51 51
ARCH LM 9.278 11.893 36.458
BGodfrey 3.709 19.887 36.458
Wald: α
′
1 = α
′
2 = 0 50.34 1.24 17.63 5.41 199.93 3.39
AIC -323.58 -313.29 -48.35 -44.70 -87.03 -47.99
BIC -315.07 -309.03 -42.75 -41.89 -79.31 -44.12
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.ARCH LM and BGodfrey ∼ χ21. Critical Values at 5%
significance for χ21=3.84. Wald on Orthogonality ∼ χ22. Critical Values at 5% significance: 5.99
Results are reported in Table 5.5. When using the lagged forecast error as explanatory
variable of the forecast error (top of Table 5.5) , results seem to suggest that at short
horizons, the null of orthogonality is upheld by the data, but as the horizon lengthens,
we reject it. This suggests that analysts use past forecast error information efficiently for
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one-month forecast horizons, but not for the longer horizons of six and twelve months.
When using the interest rate differentials as an explanatory variable of the forecast
error (bottom of Table 5.5), the results are puzzling. Orthogonality seems to be rejected
at all horizons when looking at the estimates obtained using ARCH models. However,
results are very different when using GMM. A reason that could explain this puzzle is
related to the short sample size.9
Nevertheless, the results of estimating (5.11) seem to be in line with the literature. For
example, Cavaglia et al. (1993), Cavaglia et al. (1994), Sobiechowski (1996) and Verschoor
and Wolff (2001) tend to find that rejection of orthogonality is found as the forecast horizon
considered lengthens.
5.6 Accuracy
Results in the previous section suggest that agents correctly predict the direction of ex-
change rate changes in the context of Uruguay, in the period 2005-2010, only over short
time-horizons. In a seminal contribution, Meese and Rogoff (1983) show that most meth-
ods of exchange rate determination (standard monetary models, time series models, lagged
forward rates, et cetera) cannot perform better than a simple random walk characteriza-
tion, using data for the dollar/mark, dollar/pound, dollar/yen and trade weighted dollar
exchange rates. A question that arises, is whether the survey forecast can do better. As-
sessing the accuracy of forecast is very important, as these forecasts are generally used to
guide economic decisions.
Here, we use a simple statistical measure of accuracy, given by the root mean squared
error (RMSE), calculated as in equation (5.13) to compare the accuracy of alternative
9In large samples, the point estimates of the coefficients that obtained when using ARCH should not
differ from the point estimates when using GMM.
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forecasting methods over a one-month horizon, for the period of analysis.10 These are
the interest rate differential, the analyst expectations, and a simple rule that predicts
depreciation to be equal to the average over the period. The RMSE is just an average
measure of the forecast error, over a certain time period.
RMSE =
√√√√√ n∑t=1(∆se,t−kt −∆st)2
n
(5.13)
We calculate the RMSE using the expectations data, taking six period rolling win-
dows and plotting it together with the evolution of the spot exchange rate in Figure 5.3.
The RMSE peaks right after the swings in the exchange rate caused by the worldwide
appreciation of the dollar.
Figure 5.3: Root Mean Squared Error
Then we calculate the RMSE for the other two forecast methods and report the mean
10MacDonald and Marsh (1994) and MacDonald and Marsh (1996), using micro data on expectations,
determine the RMSE for 30 individual forecasters, the country averages, and total cross-sectional mean, and
compare them with the RMSE for the forward rate and forecast based on a random-walk hypothesis. They
find that only for two individual forecasters, the RMSE of their prediction is lower than that calculated
for the prediction emerging from a random-walk hypothesis.
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Table 5.6: Accuracy of Alternative Prediction Methods
Interest Diff. Expectation Survey Mean
RMSE 0.024 0.014 0.024
SD(RMSE) 0.016 0.010 0.017
and standard deviation over the period in Table 5.6. Results show that agents are better
off following analysts’ expectations than looking at interest rate differentials, or predicting
depreciation to be equal to the mean, as the average forecast error of analysts’ expecta-
tions is about one percentage point below that of the other methods. While analysts err
on the depreciation rate, on average, by about 1.4 percentage points, using the alternative
methods would imply a 2.4 percentage point error. It should be noted that these conclu-
sions are drawn conditional on the assumption that the mean of the analysts’ expectations
is, as already argued above, a good proxy for a single, homogeneous expectation held by
the representative market participant. If this is not the case, all these results are saying
is that using the average of all analysts’ predictions is more accurate than using other
forecast rules.
5.7 Unbiasedness Tests for the Southern Cone
In a recent contribution, Frankel and Poonawala (2010) present evidence suggesting that
expectations in developing countries are less biased than in developed countries. The
authors conjecture that as relatively high inflation has been pervasive in this group of
economies, exchange rate trends are more easily identifiable, hence the ability to predict is
better. Here we exploit available survey data on exchange rate expectations for Argentina
and Brazil in addition to Uruguay, and explore the unbiasedness hypothesis for these three
Southern Cone countries. Looking at the performance of forecasts for these three foreign
exchange markets is interesting as they share some characteristics. Price inflation records
in the last decade have been low by historical standards. In fact, for the period 2005-
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2009, the annual variation of the CPI has been below 10% in almost all cases, for the
three countries (See Table E.1).11 In addition, it is only recently that the Central Banks
(CBs) stopped announcing a target for the future exchange rate value, in a movement
towards floating regimes (Argentina in 2002, Brazil in 1999, Uruguay in 2002). De jure,
freely floating regimes are in place in the three countries. Whether the regimes are freely
floating de facto is less clear (as already discussed for the case of Uruguay). Probably, the
three foreign exchange markets are consistent with managed floating schemes, although
the degree of intervention of Central Banks varies substantially across countries.
How much do Central Banks Intervene in these Countries? In an attempt to
understand if countries that de jure have freely floating exchange rate regimes, would de
facto fall in the same category, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) construct a number of indicat-
ors that allow to measure the degree of CBs’ intervention in foreign exchange markets. In
essence, what they do is to investigate the frequency distribution of changes in a nominal
exchange rate depreciation, rates of change of foreign exchange reserves, rates of change
of the monetary base, et cetera. When the regime is actually one in which the CB inter-
venes to a high extent, the authors expect to find minimal changes in depreciation rates,
and substantial changes in the rates of change of foreign exchange reserves and of the
monetary base, and the converse, of course, when the regime is a truly freely floating one.
Their benchmark for comparison is that of the USA, where, according to the authors, the
exchange rate regime is closest to a freely floating one.
Using Calvo and Reinhart (2000)’s indicators, Pires de Souza (2006) concludes, after
a systematic study that examines the foreign exchange markets in Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay, over the post-crisis period until 2006, that while in Brazil and Uruguay the
11The exception is Argentina in 2006, when CPI inflation was at 10.9%. It is worth mentioning that
for the case of Argentina, there seems to be a consensus on the downward bias of the official estimate
for inflation. Private analysts have reported own calculations on CPI inflation that are well above those
reported by the INDEC (National Statistics Office).
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regimes were closer to a freely floating one, the Argentinean one was closer to a peg “in
disguise” (p. 207). The author argues that while in the former two countries CBs intervene
to avoid “excessive” volatility, in Argentina, intervention has two goals: firstly to reduce
the burden of the debt, and secondly, to keep a “competitive exchange rate” (p. 208).
The analysis of Pires de Souza (2006) does not cover much of the period under analysis
in this chapter (2005-2010). To gain an understanding of the heterogeneous behaviour of
CBs in the different markets under consideration we calculated Calvo and Reinhart (2000)
indicators for this period, for each of the three countries. Of course, these measures are
imperfect indicators of the degree of CB’s intervention. If, for example, the economies are
subject to idiosyncratic shocks, exchange rate, reserves and monetary base variability will
differ independently of any policy decision of a CB. During the period considered, one of
the largest shock that could have affected foreign exchange markets in these economies
has been a positive terms of trade shock, arising from systematic increases in world food
prices. Given the production structure of the economies, this shock is likely to have been
common to the three.12 For these reasons, we consider this indicators to be an acceptable
measure of intervention. However, the interpretation of the indicators reported here should
be done with caution, acknowledging its limitations to accurately assess the differences in
the degree of CB intervention across countries.
Table 5.7 reports frequency with which depreciation rates, rates of change of foreign
exchange reserves of the Central Bank, and rates of change of the monetary base fall
outside: (a) a band given by 1 percentage point amplitude, and (b) a band given by
2.5 percentage points amplitude. The striking result in the table corresponds to the
substantial differences in terms of the frequency distributions for nominal exchange rate
depreciations. While in Argentina only 24% of the monthly changes in the variable fell
12Another important, and common shock to the three economies is the swings in the international value
of the dollar during the period under consideration.
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outside the interval (-1%, +1%) and 8% fell outside the interval (-2.5%, +2.5%), in Brazil
and Uruguay monthly depreciation rates larger than 1% in absolute value tended to be the
rule rather than the exception. These results are in line with what Pires de Souza (2006)
finds for the preceding period (2000-2005). Brazil and Uruguay’s variations in depreciation
rates are more in line with a freely floating regime, whereas Argentina’s variations are more
in line with peg “in disguise”. The indicators that refer to the frequency distribution of the
rates of change of CB’s reserves and that of the Monetary Base do not suggest substantial
differences. One could conclude, thus, that even though intervention is present in the three
markets — hence the substantial variation in reserves for the three cases — in Argentina
it is associated with much less exchange rate flexibility.
Table 5.7: Adaptation of Calvo and Reinhart (2000)’s Fear of Floating Indicators
Argentina Brazil Uruguay
1pp Band 2.5pp Band 1pp Band 2.5pp Band 1pp Band 2.5pp Band
Dep. NER 0.24 0.08 0.77 0.45 0.56 0.21
Change in Reserves 0.76 0.55 0.83 0.53 0.88 0.61
Change in Monetary Base 0.85 0.52 0.73 0.44 0.85 0.71
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of data from IMF IFS. The period considered is Jan 2005-July 2010. Dep. NER stands for
Nominal Exchange Rate depreciation. 1pp and 2.5pp stand for 1 and 2.5 percentage points of amplitude bands.
5.7.1 OLS by country or System Estimation?
To test for unbiasedness of expectations for the three countries, we estimate a modified
version of equation (5.10), as in (5.14).
∆si,t+k = αi + βi∆sei,t+k + i,t+k (5.14)
where the subindex i indicates the country considered (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay).
One could estimate separate equations for each country using OLS, the best linear unbiased
estimator under no serial correlation and homoscedasticity, and under the assumption of
errors being orthogonal to expected depreciation.
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However, gains in precision due to a larger sample size could be achieved if we stack
the data together and estimate a system as in: ∆s1∆s2
∆s3
 =
 ∆se1 0 00 ∆se2 0
0 0 ∆se3
  β1β2
β3
+
 12
3

= Xβ + .(5.15)
where ∆si is an n × 1 vector containing depreciation rates for the i-th country over n
periods, ∆sei is a matrix of dimensions n × 2, containing a first column of ones, and a
second column of expected depreciation rates for the i-th country over n periods, and βi
is a 2× 1 vector of parameters (α, β), and i is an n× 1 vector of errors.
Estimating equation (5.15) using OLS will yield inefficient estimates even under the
assumption of E(i
′
i) = σ
2 × I. That is to say, serially uncorrelated, and homoscedastic
errors within the ith equation. The reason is that error contemporaneous correlations
across equations are likely to be non-zero, i.e.: E(i
′
j) 6= 0. Since the three exchange rates
considered are defined with respect to the US dollar, any unanticipated shock affecting
the international value of the dollar, for example, will appear in the error term, thus
generating cross sectional dependence. The literature typically deals with this problem
by using seemingly unrelated regression techniques (SURE), due to Zellner (1962). The
SURE estimator is a generalized least squares (GLS) estimator, in which the weighting
matrix, Ω is defined as the Kronecker product of the error covariance matrix of the system
of equation (5.15), Σ, and an identity matrix, I.13
The parameters contained in Σ are unknown and need to be estimated using the sample
covariances of the estimated residuals, so the estimator to be used is feasible GLS (FGLS).
The FGLS is a two-step approach, consisting in estimating each of the three equations
separately by OLS, and then using the residuals to estimate the components of Σ. As a
consequence, inferences on the model’s estimates are only asymptotically valid.14
13The GLS estimator of β is given by βˆ = [X ′Ω−1X]−1X ′Ω−1y.
14For a detailed exposition of SURE techniques, see (Greene, 2002, Chp. 14).
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Notice that if the contemporaneous correlations across equations are actually zero,
then the SURE estimator reduces to the application of OLS to each equation separately.
Given the structure of our data, the choice of whether to estimate separate equations
for each country or use seemingly unrelated regression techniques and estimate the system
as in equation (5.15) is not obvious. This is because the datasets for the three countries
only overlap over a period of 30 monthly observations. For Brazil, data are available since
January 2002, until July 2010, for Uruguay between June 2005 and July 2010; and for
Argentina from November 2004 until July 2010, with several gaps over the period. Using
SURE would imply throwing away the information corresponding to the non-overlapping
part of the data (almost three years for Brazil). For this reason we estimate the system of
seemingly unrelated regressions, as in equation (5.15), and test the unbiasedness hypothesis
on the overlapping 30 periods with available data for the three countries. Then, we
estimate equation (5.14) separately for each country and test the unbiasedness hypothesis.
This allows us to exploit all the information available for Brazil. Given that data used
are monthly and expectations are formed over horizons of one month, we assume serially
uncorrelated errors.15
Scatter plots of the data on actual and expected depreciation for each of the countries
considered along with a 45-degree line are displayed in Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. Results
of estimating (5.15) for Uruguay and Brazil only, and then for Uruguay, Brazil and Ar-
gentina are reported in Columns 1 & 2 of Table 5.8, along with the unbiasedness tests
and some diagnostic statistics. Results of estimating (5.14) separately for every country
are reported in Table 5.9.16 Both estimation strategies provide comparable results. For
Brazil and Uruguay, where Central Banks intervene in the foreign exchange market in an
15Data on foreign exchange expectations for Argentina were obtained from the Central Bank of Argentina
(BCRA). Data for Brazil were obtained from the Central Bank of Brazil. Daily interbank exchange rates
both for Argentina and Brazil were obtained from OANDA.
16For Uruguay, results were reported above, in Table 5.4.
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unsystematic way, and do not commit explicitly or implicitly to any exchange rate value,
the unbiasedness hypothesis is rejected by the data at 5% significance (although in the
latter country results suggest that agents do get the sign of the exchange rate movement
right). For Argentina, where the BCRA intervenes actively and systematically to keep a
“competitive” exchange rate, unbiasedness of expectations cannot be rejected, even at 10%
significance. A possible explanation for these results is that the systematic intervention
of the BCRA and implicit commitment to keep a competitive exchange rate may simplify
the forecast process. This explanation is also consistent with our findings of Chapter 4
when looking at the Uruguayan case over 1980-2010. As long as what it takes to predict
well is simple, agents perform well. If instead the exchange rate determination model is
intricate or unfamiliar, agents fail at predicting.17
Figure 5.4: Scatter of Expected and Actual Depreciation Rates: Argentina
17Both for Argentina and Brazil, the hypothesis of no ARCH effects in the error terms is upheld by the
data. The null of independence of errors across equations, tested using the Breusch-Pagan test of cross
sectional independence (B-P Indep.) is clearly rejected, confirming that SURE techniques were necessary
to treat the cross sectional dependence.
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Figure 5.5: Scatter of Expected and Actual Depreciation Rates: Brazil
Figure 5.6: Scatter of Expected and Actual Depreciation Rates: Uruguay
5.8 Conclusions
This chapter has used unexploited survey data on expectations for the Uruguayan Peso/US
Dollar exchange rate over the period June 2005-July 2010 to investigate expectation form-
ation mechanisms, unbiasedness and accuracy of survey expectations as predictors of ex-
post exchange rate movements. It then incorporated survey data for the Argentinean and
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Table 5.8: Unbiasedness Tests For Mercosur Countries - SURE
(1) 1-M Uru-Bra (2) 1-M Uru-Bra-Arg
Dep.Var. ∆S. Coef. S.E. Diag. Coef. S.E. Diag.
Uruguay
∆Se 1.55*** (0.14) RMSE: 0.017 1.57*** (0.18) RMSE: 0.022
Constant -0.00 (0.00) R2= 0.7038 -0.00 (0.00) F Unbias= 5.24
Brazil
∆Se 0.09 (0.29) RMSE: 0.048 -0.16 (0.44) RMSE: 0.055
Constant -0.00 (0.01) R2=-0.0036 -0.01 (0.01) F Unbias= 3.46
Argentina
∆Se 1.26*** (0.24) RMSE: 0.015
Constant 0.00 (0.00) F Unbias.= 1.37
Observations 54 30
AIC -474.05 -423.75
BIC -466.09 -415.34
B-P Indep 9.999 21.999
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗(p < 0.10), ∗ ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗ ∗ ∗(p < 0.01), B-P Indep is the Breusch Pagan
test of cross-sectional independence. B − P ∼ χ2j (j=number of countries). CV at 5% forχ22 = 5.99, forχ23 = 7.81
F Unbiased. is an F test for α = 0&β = 1, F ∼ F(2, 84). CV at 5% = 3.1, at 10% = 2.34.
Table 5.9: Unbiasedness Tests For Mercosur Countries - OLS
Brazil Argentina
Dep.Var. ∆S. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
∆Se -0.03 (0.18) 1.20*** (0.28)
Constant -0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)
Observations 93 33
ARCH LM 2.930 0.097
F Unbias. 16.10 1.5
AIC -273.73 -181.52
BIC -268.67 -178.53
Std. errors in parentheses, ∗(p < 0.10), ∗ ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗ ∗ ∗(p < 0.01).
ARCH LM ∼ χ21. CV at 5% = 3.84. F Unbias is a test on α = 0 & β = 1.
CV for Brazil F (2, 91) = 3.09. For Arg. F (2, 31) = 3.3
Brazilian foreign exchange rate markets and tested for unbiasedness of expectations in the
three markets.
The first part of the chapter focuses on the Uruguayan market. Firstly, we tested for
extrapolative, adaptive and hybrid expectation formation mechanisms, with inconclusive
results. Although some evidence of extrapolative and adaptive mechanisms was found
when investigated in isolation, this vanished when a hybrid mechanism was allowed.
Secondly, we tested for expectational failures. Unbiasedness of exchange rate forecasts
was rejected at all forecast horizons considered, although short-horizon forecasts perform
better, as at least, they predict the direction of the exchange rate movement correctly. In
line with previous results reported in the literature, when error orthogonality was tested
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results suggest that non-rejections only happen at short forecast horizons.
The evidence presented here on significant expectational failures does not necessarily
imply irrationality, but instead may reflect slow learning processes or peso problems. This
is because the period under consideration is both atypical in terms of the prevalent ex-
change rate regime in Uruguay (relatively freely floating) and in terms of the evolution of
the international value of the US Dollar, which has exhibited important swings.
Thirdly, we calculated the root mean squared error of three forecast rules to assess their
accuracy: we compared survey expectations, interest rate differentials, and a simple rule
consisting in predicting depreciation rates using the mean depreciation of the period. We
found that survey expectations, although biased, were more accurate than other forecast
rules.
In the second part of this chapter, we incorporated survey data for the Argentinean
Peso/Dollar and the Brazilian Real/Dollar markets into the analysis. Given that the
Uruguayan Peso, the Argentinean Peso and the Brazilian real were floated (although to
different extents), around the beginning of the 2000s, and that the three countries have
exhibited relatively low levels of inflation since then, it seemed interesting to test for
expectational failures in the three markets and see if some pattern could be extracted. For
the Argentinean Peso/Dollar market, where the Argentinean Central Bank intervention is
substantial and rather systematic, we found that unbiasedness of expectations cannot be
rejected. Instead, unbiasedness is clearly rejected for the Brazilian market. The pattern
that emerged from these results hinted that systematic central bank intervention, even
if it does not involve a public announcement or a commitment to a particular exchange
rate value, may simplify the forecast exercise for the participants in the foreign exchange
market. This seems to be in line with our finding in the previous chapter. As long as what
it takes to predict well is rather simple, agents perform well, but once the exchange rate
determination model becomes intricate or unfamiliar, agents fail to predict.
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Lastly, one implication of these results is that the systematic forecast errors observed
in Brazil and Uruguay suggest a substantial level of uncertainty with respect to exchange
rate movements.
Future research in this area could systematically explore the extent to which central
bank interventions in foreign exchange markets imply lower deviations from the unbiased-
ness hypothesis.
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Conclusions
Fundamentally, this thesis is about exchange rate uncertainty and its impact on manufac-
turing output in Southern Cone economies. It begins with the premise that production
takes time, and so, every output decision can be seen as a risky investment decision.
In this thesis we analytically show that the output response to exchange rate un-
certainty depends on a number of firm characteristics, including risk preferences, trade
orientation, currency mismatches in balance sheets, profitability, and perceptions about
soft budget constraints. Furthermore, we argue that it also depends on characteristics
of uncertainty itself. High uncertainty levels, typically perceived in these economies im-
mediately before or after the collapses of fixed exchange rate regimes, tend to affect firm
behaviour disproportionately more than low uncertainty levels.
Given the analytical ambiguities, we use a panel spanning 28 manufacturing sectors
in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay over the years 1970-2002 and empirically investigate
the impact of REER uncertainty on output by estimating a supply function in which
the output-price simultaneity was tackled using alternative sets of instruments. The on
average negative effect of uncertainty on output that we identified when controlling for
relevant supply determinants masks a number of specificities. We find non-linearities in
the uncertainty-output relationship. There is a threshold above which uncertainty affects
output negatively, but below which the effect may even be positive. Furthermore, we find
that output in those sectors that are more export oriented seem to be less vulnerable to
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REER uncertainty. This is in line with the prediction of our model. It is possible that the
more exposed to international trade a sector is, the more its assets are linked to exchange
rate variations, and so, the lower the currency mismatch that firms in that sector face.
However, those sectors that display a higher export exposure to other Mercosur countries
seem to be more affected by REER. This finding is likely to be explained by the fact that
exposure to uncertainty is larger in these sectors, and not necessarily because they are more
sensitive to uncertainty. An alternative — or perhaps a complementary — explanation for
this result is related to differences in the types of goods that are traded within Mercosur
and with the Rest of the World. Differentiated goods are predominantly traded within
the bloc. This is because for these types of flows, proximity, historical and cultural links
are key. These characteristics make it relatively more difficult to reorientate trade flows of
differentiated goods. It is thus likely that those producers trading these type of good, that
happen to trade them mainly within the bloc, will be more cautious during episodes of
exchange rate uncertainty. In addition, we find that higher labour productivity decreases
the negative impact of REER uncertainty on output. Labour productivity is likely to
be associated with profitability. Higher profitability grants firms with a “buffer stock”
of liquidity that may make firms immune to more depreciated exchange rate outcomes.
Hence, sectors in which firms are more profitable may be less vulnerable to uncertainty.
The aforementioned effects are identified using different measures of REER uncertainty
that are based on the history of errors of three alternative autoregressive forecast models,
that differ in their degree of sophistication. The autoregressive nature of the models
was a choice driven by data constraints. Data for an ‘assumption-free’ measure of real
exchange rate uncertainty would require, for example, the availability of data on forecasts
for nominal exchange rates and relevant prices, with which to calculate the variance of
a forecast error on the basis of a true mechanism — whichever it is — for forecasting,
instead of an assumed one. These data were unavailable for the three countries over the
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period of analysis.
This constraint motivates the second part of the thesis, in which we carefully examine
the behaviour of exchange rate expectations. Our hypothesis is that an autoregressive
forecast model is a reasonable approximation of the true model in the context of firms
operating in Southern Cone economies during the period of analysis, implying that agents
attach a substantial importance to recent exchange rate trends to form expectations about
future outcomes. The empirical analysis on expectations focuses on nominal exchange
rates. The shift from the real to nominal exchange rates is motivated, here again, by data
constraints. Expectation proxies or direct expectational data are available for the latter
variable but not for the former, and although there is no guarantee that agents use the
same mechanisms to forecast nominal and real exchange rates it seems likely that some
lessons could be learned.
The fourth chapter of this thesis uses data contained in interest rate differentials as
a proxy for exchange rate depreciation expectations, and looks at the period 1980-2010
for Uruguay. It examines the econometric evidence for the presence of an extrapolative
component in expectations, and allows for the internalization of changes in the economic
environment, and other expectation formation mechanisms. The evidence suggests that
although the extrapolative component in expectations has evolved (in an inverted-U shape
pattern) over time, it has been significant both from an economic, and from a statistical
point of view. This provides to some extent comforting evidence that an autoregress-
ive forecast model is a reasonable approximation. Nevertheless, our results suggest that
the expectation formation mechanism is actually more complex, as agents tend to in-
ternalize Central Bank announcements and changes in the economic environment, and
display also adaptive, and regressive expectation mechanisms. In addition to this, using
alternative testing frameworks we find that the prediction bias for the case of Uruguay
is significantly lower than that found for developed economies. However, the result is
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not homogeneous across periods. During Pre-TZ and TZ periods, the prediction of the
interest rate differential performs quite well. Instead, during the period characterized by a
freely floating exchange rate regime and low inflation, the interest rate differential has no
predictive power over the exchange rate movements. Although the focus of this chapter is
on the Uruguayan economy and this might raise some doubts on the external validity of
the results, it offers some interesting insights on the process of adaptation of expectation
generating mechanisms, and its implications on agents’ forecasting ability across different
environments.
The fifth chapter uses unexploited survey expectational data on exchange rate changes
for Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. Given that the Uruguayan Peso, the Argentinean Peso
and the Brazilian real were floated (although to different extents), around the beginning
of the 2000s, and that the three countries have exhibited relatively low levels of inflation
since then, we test for expectational failures in the three markets and investigate if pat-
terns can be extracted. For the Argentinean Peso/Dollar market, where the Argentinean
Central Bank intervention is substantial and rather systematic, we find that unbiased-
ness of expectations cannot be rejected. Instead, unbiasedness is clearly rejected for the
Brazilian market, and although less strongly, it is also rejected for the Uruguayan market.
The pattern that emerges from these results hints that systematic Central Bank interven-
tion, even if it does not involve a public announcement or a commitment to a particular
exchange rate value, may simplify the forecast exercise for the participants in the foreign
exchange market. The results from the last two chapters seem to suggest that as long as
what it takes to predict well is rather simple, agents perform well, but once the exchange
rate determination model becomes intricate or unfamiliar, agents fail to predict.
Two policy implications emerge from this analysis. Firstly, given the finding of threshold
effects, suggesting that it is high REER uncertainty that exerts a negative effect on out-
put changes, it seems that the strategy of adopting fixed exchange rate regimes, or some
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sort of hard pegs to the dollar in an attempt to reduce uncertainty may be counterpro-
ductive. This is because experience has shown that these regimes tend to come to an
end collapsing, and generate extremely high uncertainty. This is confirmed when one ex-
amines the performance of expectations. Even if agents display intelligent expectations,
and to some extent internalize changes in the economic environment that may affect fun-
damentals, they have been systematically “surprised” by large exchange rate movements
triggered by the collapses of fixed regimes that can be identified in our sample, for the
case of Uruguay. Because agents also extrapolate recent trends when forming expecta-
tions, they under-predict large exchange rate movements, but once they have occurred
they tend to over-predict them. The large forecast errors during these periods introduce
high uncertainty.
Instead, it is possible that the REER uncertainty associated with regimes that allow
more flexibility of nominal exchange rates may be within the benign range that we identify
in this thesis. In addition, if a portion of the effects of REER uncertainty on output are
explained by the high degree of dollarization of the economies under analysis, then more
flexible exchange rate arrangements may induce firms to internalise the risk of borrowing
in foreign currency, and contribute to a reversal of dollarization, which may in turn reduce
the vulnerability of output to REER uncertainty.
Notice that, as argued above, our results suggest that some Central Bank intervention
in the foreign exchange market, with a clear rationale — like keeping a “competitive
exchange rate” — may make the forecast exercise simpler for agents, thus eliminating
some of the uncertainty attached to expectations. Two clarifications need to be made
in this respect. First, the episodes of highest uncertainty in these economies have been
generated by collapses of regimes that involved substantial Central Bank intervention.
That type of intervention did not reduce uncertainty and made forecasting simple, but
on the contrary, as it was unsustainable and perceived to be so by agents, it actually
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increased uncertainty. Second, even if some type of intervention does reduce uncertainty
by enhancing predictability, our results suggest that, if the economy is within the benign
range of uncertainty values, reductions do not necessarily increase output.
The second implication is related to trade policy. If REER uncertainty affects the out-
put of manufacturing sectors negatively, and if those sectors trading predominantly with
other Mercosur countries are particularly affected, because of their substantially higher
volatility records, then policies that contribute to the diversification of export markets
are likely to be beneficial. One example is to promote negotiations of free trade agree-
ments with other trading blocs or countries. Another, is to strengthen the international
networks that each country has already established in the form of their foreign service
offices. Given that in the context of trade in differentiated manufactures, the connections
between sellers and buyers are made through search processes that are costly, and given
that these costs tend to increase, the further away the potential buyer is from the seller,
the role that foreign service offices have in partnering with the private sector to contribute
to the diversification of export markets may be substantial.
As argued in the text, happily, some of the policies implemented since 2003 in Southern
Cone economies have been in line with the recommendations that emerge from this study.
Since 2003, the three countries have moved —although to different extents of intervention
— to relatively freely floating exchange rate regimes. In addition, there have been several
policy initiatives for the diversification of export destinations. Examples of these are the
increase in free trade agreements (or negotiations to that end) that the bloc has imple-
mented with other countries or regions, and the increasing role played by the Secretariats
of Foreign Affairs in these countries in promoting exports of goods and services.
Finally, the analyses conducted in this thesis present some limitations that, although
discussed in the text, are reiterated here to restate the motivations that have led to
particular methodological choices despite their shortcomings, and, in particular, to provide
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some suggestions for future research.
In the first chapter, the simple production model presented assumes that exchange
rates are exogenous to the production decision of the firm. This may seem restrictive,
however, the choice has been made because in these economies exchange rates are mainly
affected by capital flows, and are unlikely to be driven by output decisions of individual
manufacturing firms.
In the second chapter a similar concern arises around the assumed exogeneity for the
REER. The potential endogeneity of REER is not fully addressed because of the lack of
suitable instruments. However, we examine which are the sectors with the highest con-
tributions to total exports (and thus, that explain the highest inflows of foreign exchange
in the economy), exclude them from the sample, and find no substantial changes in the
results. In addition to this, the identification of the uncertainty effect on output relies
on being able to control for the output effects of currency and banking crises that tend
to occur concomitantly with high REER uncertainty. This makes the identification of
a ‘pure’ uncertainty effect difficult. To tackle this problem, we control for these effects
using the Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) indicator of crises. We take comfort in the fact
that this variable is systematically well determined, yielding a reasonably sized estimated
coefficient, which is discussed at length in the text. Finally, in this chapter we cannot
identify whether the average negative effect of uncertainty is related to risk aversion, or
to some other factors, such as agents contracting dollar debt and facing bankruptcy costs.
We have no measure of risk aversion, or data on balance-sheet currency mismatches. We
try to control for the latter with the trade orientation of the sector, but this is clearly an
imperfect indicator. Here we are constrained once again by data availability. Industrial
surveys with firm-level data on a number of firm characteristics that may affect output
decisions and the vulnerability of output to changes in REER uncertainty would have al-
lowed us to shed more light on the research questions posed in this thesis. Unfortunately,
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very stringent regulations in terms of data confidentiality prevailing in the National Stat-
istics Offices of some of these countries imply that although taxpayers finance firm-level
data collection, no outsider to these offices can use them.
In the fourth chapter we use interest rate differentials as an indirect measure of expect-
ations. Even if, given the characteristics of Uruguay, there are no differences in transaction
costs associated with holding dollar or peso assets, within those differentials there is a risk-
premium. We have argued above why these results are not likely to be driven by the risk
premium, though strictly, we would need to use survey data on exchange rate expecta-
tions, which unfortunately are not available for Uruguay over the whole of the period of
analysis. In the next chapter we actually use survey expectational data for the period in
which these are available. Second, we have not found a way of simultaneously treating the
ARCH effects and the non-invertible moving average process in the residuals. The ad-hoc
approach used attempted to do so, although this has not proved to be entirely satisfact-
ory. On the one hand, we obtain ARCH estimates exceeding unity in some cases, which
violates the stationarity condition for the conditional variance. This is suggesting that the
processes are not stable in how they absorb shocks to volatility. On the other hand, there
is still some evidence of serial correlation, which led us to re-estimate all models using
the Newey-West correction procedures. The results found are in line with those obtained
using ARCH models. Finally, it is worth noting that both ARCH models and Newey-West
procedures rely on asymptotic properties, while our sample size is relatively modest. For
these reasons, the reported estimates of the standard errors should be interpreted with
some caution.
In the fifth chapter we use average survey expectational data. Although these data
constitute an improvement over interest rate differentials to explore expectation formation
mechanisms, the fact that they are averages prevent us from asking a number of interest-
ing questions. For example, given that we find evidence of several expectation formation
232
mechanisms at work (both in this and in the previous chapter), it would be interesting
to explore whether this is determined by agents’ heterogeneity, or by the presence of a
representative agent in the market that uses several rules at the same time. Disaggreg-
ated, micro data on expectations would allow us to shed light on this issue. Here again,
the stringent confidentiality regulations of the Central Bank of Uruguay prevent us from
attempting to answer them.
Finally, a general limitation of this thesis relates to the fact that the cases analysed
are rather idiosyncratic, and results may just be valid for Southern Cone economies. How-
ever, it should be remembered that the most salient particularities of the Southern Cone
economies refer to a highly uncertain economic environment, a high degree of liability
dollarization, and the lack of hedging instruments for most of the period. These charac-
teristics are, by no means, specific to Southern Cone economies, and they can be found
elsewhere in the developing world.
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Appendix A
Indifference curves as loci of constant expected utility of wealth.
It is necessary to explain the indifference curves that are considered in this analysis.
We have argued that if A1 or A2 held, then, the expected utility maximization could be
reduced to the mean and variance space. Still, the slope and curvature of the indifference
curves need to be explained. Here, we will assume that A2 holds.
Suppose that the probability distribution of Π can be described by a two-parameter
density function fΠ(Π;µΠ, σΠ). Then, the expected value of utility is:
E[U(Π)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
U(Π)fΠ(Π;µΠ, σΠ)dΠ (A.1)
Let z =
Π− µΠ
σΠ
.
Then P (Z ≤ z) = P (Π− µΠ
σΠ
≤ z) = P (Π ≤ σΠz + µΠ)Fz(z) = FΠ(σΠz + µΠ)
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So, taking derivatives, we find the density function for z:
fz(z) = fΠ(σΠz + µΠ)× σΠ
And recalling that dΠ = σΠdz, and that Π = σΠz+µΠ then, we can re-express equation
A.1 as:
E[U(Π)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
U(σΠz + µΠ)fΠ(Π;µΠ, σΠ)σΠdz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
U(σΠz + µΠ)fz(z)dz (A.2)
An indifference curve is a locus of points (µΠ, σΠ) along which expected utility is
constant. We may find the slope of such a locus by differentiating equation (A.2) with
respect to σΠ, and solving for dµΠ/dσΠ:
0 =
∫ ∞
−∞
U ′(µΠ + σΠz)
(
dµΠ
dσΠ
+ z
)
f(z; 0, 1)dz (A.3)
dµΠ
dσΠ
= −
∫∞
−∞ zU
′(Π)f(z; 0, 1)dz∫∞
−∞ U
′(Π)f(z; 0, 1)dz
(A.4)
The denominator of equation A.4 is always positive, as U ′(Π) > 0, for all values of
Π. Then, if the agent is risk-averse the numerator is negative. The mean of z is zero.
The numerator weights z by marginal utilities. Because U ′′, all the weights on negative z
exceed all the weights on positive z. Therefore the integral is negative, which makes the
expression in equation A.4 positive. For a risk-averse agent, the slope of the indifference
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curve between risk and expected profits is positive, given the negative sign preceding the
quotient.
To explore the curvature of the indifference loci, take (µΠ, σΠ) and (µ′Π, σ
′
Π). Assume
they are in the same indifference curve, so that the expected utility derived from the two
points is the same: i.e.: V (µΠ, σΠ) = V (µ′Π, σ
′
Π). Will ((µΠ + µ
′
Π)/2), (σΠ + σ
′
Π)/2) be on
the same locus, on a higher or on a lower one?
If marginal utility is declining in Π, Jensen’s inequality tells us that for every z:
1
2
U(µΠ + σΠz) +
1
2
U(µ′Π + σ
′
Πz) < U(
µΠ + µ′Π
2
+
σΠ + σ′Π
2
z)
And so,
V (
µΠ + µ′Π
2
,
σΠ + σ′Π
2
) > V (µΠ, σΠ) (A.5)
or greater than V (µ′Π, σ
′
Π) - as we assumed that (µΠ, σΠ) and (µ
′
Π, σ
′
Π) are on the same
indifference curve.
The point ((µΠ + µ′Π)/2, (σΠ + σ
′
Π)/2) lies on a line between (µΠ, σΠ) and (µ
′
Π, σ
′
Π)
but belongs to a higher indifference curve than the other two points. This shows that a
risk-averter’s indifference curve is convex provided A2 holds and U ′′ < 0.
The same type of argument shows that risk-lover’s indifference curve is concave.
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Appendix B
Series of growth rates of the relative price and growth rates of output are calculated on
the basis of data obtained from the PADI dataset, complied by ECLAC. The indicator
of relative prices results from the variation of the quotient between the deflator of value
added and a general production price index. The former is sector, country and year specific
while the latter is country, year specific. Hence, the growth rate of relative prices varies
along time and across sector and country. Figure B.1 shows the distribution of the series
of growth of output (top) and relative prices (bottom) over the whole dataset (left) and
excluding atypical observations (right). There are a number of atypical observations that
exhibit extremely large values for these variables.
Figure B.1: Distribution of the Price and Output Changes with and without Outliers
Table B.1 reports summary statistics for the two series. The mean relative price growth
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Variable Mean Std Dev Max Min Skewness Kurtosis
Growth of Rel Prices 0.0318 0.4854 16.970 -1.0000 25.156 804.427
Growth of Rel Prices (No Out.) 0.0203 0.2392 4.578 -1.0000 5.8238 91.907
Growth of Output 0.0724 0.9812 47.383 -1.0000 41.936 2016.576
Growth of Output (No Out.) 0.0486 0.3356 1.9853 -1.0000 2.387 12.372
Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Price and Output Changes with and without Outliers
is positive as well as output growth. The series are right-skewed, suggesting that large
price increases are more common than large price decreases, and their kurtosis departs
substantially from normality. The fat tails indicate the frequency of extreme outcomes,
even when outliers have been excluded.
Figure B.2: Distribution of the Growth Rate of the REER
Country Mean Std. Dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
Argentina 0.007 0.150 -0.343 2.205 8.894 114.0
Brazil 0.002 0.038 -0.113 0.247 1.964 13.83
Uruguay 0.001 0.068 -0.241 0.874 9.217 117.1
Table B.2: Summary Statistics for the Growth Rate of the REER
Distribution over time and by country of the BCDI Crises Index.
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Figure B.3: Distribution of the BCDI Index
Table B.3: Ratios of Means of Volat-GARCH across Periods
Argentina 1970 1980 1990
1980 0.950
1990 1.447** 1.524***
2000 1.479** 1.558** 1.021
Brazil 1970 1980 1990
1980 0.461***
1990 0.467*** 1.014
2000 0.271*** 0.589*** 0.581***
Uruguay 1970 1980 1990
1980 0.992
1990 1.644*** 1.658***
2000 1.457** 1.470*** 0.885
Notes: ‘***’ indicates differences are significant at 1%,
‘**’ significant differences at 5% and ‘*’ significant diff. at 10%
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Appendix C
Table C.1: International Comparison of Instability of Selected Economic Indicators
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. C.V. Obs.
Real GDP Growth
Argentina 2.494 5.421 -10.894 10.579 3.62 40
Brazil 4.133 3.951 -4.234 13.948 0.995 40
Uruguay 2.542 4.816 -11.032 11.82 2.699 40
Australia 3.261 1.717 -0.888 6.735 0.552 40
Canada 2.933 2.155 -2.859 6.964 0.654 40
New Zealand 2.703 2.548 -3.284 8.471 1.002 40
United Kingdom 2.211 2.197 -4.92 7.196 0.843 40
CPI Inflation
Argentina 2.458 6.068 -0.012 30.793 2.218 39
Brazil 4.032 7.498 0.032 29.477 1.559 29
Uruguay 0.443 0.315 0.044 1.125 0.565 39
Australia 0.06 0.041 0.003 0.151 0.622 39
Canada 0.046 0.034 0.002 0.125 0.669 39
New Zealand 0.07 0.056 0.003 0.171 0.723 39
United Kingdom 0.066 0.055 -0.006 0.242 0.768 39
Depreciation of the NER
Argentina 4.63 20.741 -0.063 130.109 4.054 39
Brazil 0.401 0.656 -0.242 2.694 1.219 27
Uruguay 0.412 0.463 -0.18 1.923 0.902 39
Australia 0.023 0.113 -0.214 0.362 2.835 39
Canada 0.016 0.087 -0.13 0.208 2.868 39
New Zealand 0.028 0.105 -0.184 0.304 2.444 39
United Kingdom 0.026 0.098 -0.117 0.339 3.385 39
Notes: Annual data obtained from IMF IFS database expressed in percentage changes
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Table C.3: Replication of Table 2.5 with HAC standard errors
Dep. Var.: (1) (2)
Growth Ind Output Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Growth of Rel Prices 0.26* (0.14) 0.29** (0.14)
REER Growth 0.87*** (0.03) 0.86*** (0.03)
REER Uncert RollVar 65.13*** (21.66)
Sq REER Uncert Roll Var -26589.69*** (6219.99)
REER Skewness 0.03** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
REER Kurtosis -0.02** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01)
BCDI -0.04*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01)
REER Misalignment 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Dummy Floating -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Dummy Interm -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
lv1290 50.12*** (17.38)
hv1290 -23.13** (10.25)
Observations 2563 2563
Time Dummies X X
Sector-Country FE X X
Hansen Overid Test 1.320 2.255
K&P Statistic 6.243 5.242
C Statistic 8.502 8.895
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table C.4: Replication of Table 2.6 with HAC standard errors
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth Ind Output Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Growth of Rel Prices 0.19 (0.13) 0.27* (0.15) 0.26* (0.15) 0.13 (0.17)
REER Growth 0.88*** (0.03) 0.87*** (0.03) 0.87*** (0.03) 0.89*** (0.04)
REER Uncert RollVar -33.86*** (10.71) -31.94*** (11.11) -33.05*** (11.44) 23.40 (21.43)
REER Skewness 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
REER Kurtosis -0.01** (0.01) -0.01** (0.01) -0.01* (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
BCDI -0.04*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.03** (0.01)
REER Misalignment 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Dummy Floating -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)
Dummy Interm -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)
Uncert*Lagged Exp/Out 16.13*** (4.37)
L.Exp/Out 0.00 (0.00)
Uncert*5-y Ave Exp/Out 7.63** (3.85)
5-y Ave Exp/Out -0.01*** (0.01)
Uncert*10-y Ave Exp/Out 7.75** (3.92)
10-y Ave Exp/Out -0.01*** (0.00)
Uncert*Q1 Exp/Out -68.15*** (24.03)
Uncert*Q2 Exp/Out -42.13* (23.35)
Uncert*Q3 Exp/Out -45.81 (28.24)
Q1 Exp/Out 0.04 (0.03)
Q2 Exp/Out 0.02 (0.03)
Q3 Exp/Out 0.03 (0.02)
Observations 2563 2563 2563 1992
Time Dummies X X X X
Sector-Country FE X X X X
Hansen Overid Test 0.727 1.279 1.126 1.041
K&P Statistic 6.527 5.717 6.006 9.451
C Statistic 6.385 8.263 8.081 1.676
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The Hansen Overid and the C tests are
distributed χ21, the K&P statistic is distributed χ
2
2.
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Table C.5: Replication of Table 2.7 with HAC standard errors
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth Ind Output Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Growth of Rel Prices -0.01 (0.12) 0.12 (0.14) 0.37 (0.28) 0.10 (0.14) -0.03 (0.18)
REER Growth 0.98*** (0.03) 0.93*** (0.04) 0.93*** (0.05) 0.94*** (0.04) 0.95*** (0.04)
REER Uncert RollVar -33.85** (15.96) -50.50*** (12.96) -6.61 (16.63) 41.82 (25.86) -40.14** (17.00)
REER Skewness 0.02** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
REER Kurtosis -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
BCDI -0.06*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.08*** (0.02) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.03** (0.01)
REER Misalignment 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Dummy Floating 0.00 (0.03) -0.00 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03)
Dummy Interm -0.01 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02) 0.06* (0.04) -0.00 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Uncert*L.Prod 150.87*** (49.88)
Labour Productivity 0.01*** (0.00)
Uncert*L.Prod 3.92** (1.89)
Average L.Prod 0.00 (0.00)
Uncert*1st Qtile.LP -54.53* (30.05)
Uncert*2nd Qtile.LP -42.17* (25.07)
Uncert*3rd Qtile.LP 26.29 (23.24)
Qtiles LP -0.01 (0.01)
Uncert*Dist Frontier -94.87*** (32.06)
Dist to Frontier -0.18*** (0.05)
Uncert*1st Qtile. Dist 27.46 (19.70)
Uncert*2nd Qtile. Dist 25.31 (17.88)
Uncert*3rd Qtile. Dist 15.81 (16.84)
Qtiles Dist Frontier 0.00 (0.01)
Observations 2235 2514 1931 2570 2048
Time Dummies X X X X X
Sector-Country FE X X X X X
Hansen Overid Test 0.244 0.303 3.277 0.035 1.359
K&P Statistic 6.468 7.340 4.765 7.034 8.874
C Statistic 4.581 3.530 3.776 4.163 0.123
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
257
T
ab
le
C
.6
:
R
ep
lic
at
io
n
of
T
ab
le
2.
2
ex
cl
ud
in
g
Se
ct
or
31
1
D
ep
.
V
ar
.:
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
G
ro
w
th
In
d
O
ut
pu
t
C
oe
f.
S.
E
.
C
oe
f.
S.
E
.
C
oe
f.
S.
E
.
C
oe
f.
S.
E
.
C
oe
f.
S.
E
.
C
oe
f.
S.
E
.
C
oe
f.
S.
E
.
G
ro
w
th
of
R
el
P
ri
ce
s
0.
26
*
(0
.1
4)
0.
15
(0
.1
2)
0.
30
**
(0
.1
3)
0.
29
**
(0
.1
4)
0.
18
(0
.1
3)
0.
31
**
(0
.1
5)
0.
20
(0
.1
4)
R
E
E
R
G
ro
w
th
0.
88
**
*
(0
.0
3)
0.
89
**
*
(0
.0
3)
0.
89
**
*
(0
.0
4)
0.
87
**
*
(0
.0
4)
0.
88
**
*
(0
.0
3)
0.
88
**
*
(0
.0
4)
0.
88
**
*
(0
.0
3)
R
E
E
R
U
nc
er
t
G
A
R
C
H
-1
8.
42
(1
8.
55
)
-2
.6
7
(2
0.
69
)
-5
.8
5
(2
0.
14
)
B
C
D
I
-0
.0
5*
**
(0
.0
1)
-0
.0
4*
**
(0
.0
1)
-0
.0
5*
**
(0
.0
1)
-0
.0
6*
**
(0
.0
1)
-0
.0
5*
**
(0
.0
1)
-0
.0
6*
**
(0
.0
1)
-0
.0
5*
**
(0
.0
1)
D
um
m
y
F
lo
at
in
g
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
2)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
2)
-0
.0
0
(0
.0
2)
0.
00
(0
.0
2)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
2)
-0
.0
0
(0
.0
2)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
2)
D
um
m
y
In
te
rm
-0
.0
0
(0
.0
2)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
2)
0.
00
(0
.0
2)
-0
.0
0
(0
.0
2)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
2)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
2)
-0
.0
1
(0
.0
2)
R
E
E
R
U
nc
er
t
R
ol
lV
ar
-2
8.
44
**
*
(8
.6
0)
-2
1.
74
**
(9
.7
5)
-2
1.
17
**
(1
0.
21
)
V
ar
ia
nc
e
R
E
E
R
-0
.2
6
(0
.1
9)
R
E
E
R
Sk
ew
ne
ss
0.
03
**
*
(0
.0
1)
0.
03
**
(0
.0
1)
0.
03
**
(0
.0
1)
0.
03
**
(0
.0
1)
R
E
E
R
K
ur
to
si
s
-0
.0
2*
*
(0
.0
1)
-0
.0
1*
*
(0
.0
1)
-0
.0
2*
*
(0
.0
1)
-0
.0
1*
(0
.0
1)
R
E
E
R
M
is
al
ig
nm
en
t
0.
01
(0
.0
1)
0.
01
(0
.0
1)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
24
71
24
71
24
71
24
71
24
71
24
71
24
71
T
im
e
D
u
m
m
ie
s
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
S
ec
to
r-
C
ou
n
tr
y
F
E
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
lu
st
er
ed
S
E
C
&
S
C
&
S
C
&
S
C
&
S
C
&
S
C
&
S
C
&
S
H
an
se
n
O
ve
ri
d
T
es
t
1.
17
3
0.
36
7
1.
35
4
2.
34
5
0.
50
1
1.
44
4
0.
61
5
K
&
P
S
ta
ti
st
ic
4.
44
2
6.
50
3
4.
12
7
3.
95
7
5.
56
4
4.
07
4
6.
12
0
C
S
ta
ti
st
ic
5.
46
3
3.
01
9
5.
65
0
6.
25
5
3.
67
2
6.
63
2
4.
08
1
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
*
p
<
0
.1
0
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
.
T
h
e
H
a
n
se
n
O
v
er
id
a
n
d
th
e
C
te
st
s
a
re
d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
χ
2 1
,
th
e
K
&
P
st
a
ti
st
ic
is
d
is
tr
ib
u
te
d
χ
2 2
.
258
Appendix D
Table D.1: Descriptive Statistics on Main Variables
All Period
Depreciation Expected Depreciation CPI Inflation
Mean 15.5% 14.6% 16.4%
Std. Dev. 22.0% 11.1% 13.6%
95th Perc.. 44.7% 33.7% 38.9%
Pre-TZ
Mean 27.9% 24.1% 28.5%
Std. Dev. 24.3% 6.9% 11.1%
95th Perc. 53.6% 35.8% 50.5%
TZ
Mean 11.7% 9.2% 10.1%
Std. Dev. 14.3% 5.2% 8.0%
95th Perc. 52.7% 16.7% 23.6%
Post-TZ
Mean -1.8% 5.1% 4.7%
Std. Dev. 8.4% 9.7% 3.7%
95th Perc.. 17.3% 25.1% 17.1%
Tranquil Periods
Mean 12.2% 14.7% 16.9%
Std. Dev. 13.1% 11.3% 13.7%
95th Perc. 36.4% 33.8% 39.1%
During Jumps
Mean 92.3% 12.7% 8.8%
Std. Dev. 38.6% 8.0% 10.0%
95th Perc. 150.3% 23.4% 32.1%
After Jumps
Mean 13.2% 30.8% 24.1%
Std. Dev. 8.5% 9.1% 7.9%
95th Perc. 26.8% 53.5% 36.7%
Notes: Variables are measured over a 6-month period.
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Table D.2: Unit Root Tests on Main Variables
Actual Depreciation
Period Trend Lags Test Stat CV 1% CV 5% CV 10%
All No 1 -5.418 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All No 3 -5.555 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All No 6 -2.968 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All No 12 -2.463 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All Yes 1 -6.54 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
All Yes 3 -6.95 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
All Yes 6 -4.278 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
Pre TZ Yes 3 -4.788 -4.023 -3.443 -3.143
Pre TZ Yes 6 -2.854 -4.024 -3.443 -3.143
Pre TZ Yes 12 -2.736 -4.026 -3.444 -3.144
TZ Yes 1 -2.706 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 3 1.046 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 6 0.281 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 12 1.716 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
Post TZ Yes 1 -3.279 -4.071 -3.464 -3.158
Post TZ Yes 3 -2.85 -4.071 -3.464 -3.158
Post TZ Yes 6 -2.215 -4.071 -3.464 -3.158
Post TZ Yes 12 -2.034 -4.071 -3.464 -3.158
Interest Rate Differential
Period Trend Lags Test Stat CV 1% CV 5% CV 10%
All No 1 -1.641 -3.451 -2.876 -2.57
All No 3 -1.686 -3.451 -2.876 -2.57
All No 6 -1.711 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All No 12 -1.523 -3.452 -2.876 -2.57
All Yes 1 -2.724 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
All Yes 3 -2.828 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
All Yes 6 -2.91 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
All Yes 12 -2.912 -3.986 -3.426 -3.13
Pre TZ Yes 1 -1.431 -4.022 -3.443 -3.143
Pre TZ Yes 3 -1.581 -4.023 -3.443 -3.143
Pre TZ Yes 6 -0.877 -4.024 -3.443 -3.143
Pre TZ Yes 12 -0.892 -4.026 -3.444 -3.144
TZ Yes 1 3.782 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 3 3.456 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 6 2.765 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
TZ Yes 12 2.773 -4.035 -3.448 -3.148
Post TZ Yes 1 -2.08 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155
Post TZ Yes 3 -2.168 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155
Post TZ Yes 6 -2.425 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155
Post TZ Yes 12 -2.522 -4.058 -3.458 -3.155
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results Displayed Above. CV stands for Critical Value
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Table D.3: Newey-West: Expectation Generating Mechanism Regressions
Dep.Var: i− i∗ (1) Extrap (2) MILERA (3) ADL Extrap
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Lagged Dep 0.704*** (0.030) 0.454*** (0.040) 0.102*** (0.020)
Lagged Jump 0.257*** (0.046) 0.201*** (0.037) -0.005 (0.021)
Inter Lagged Jump*Dep -0.620*** (0.057) -0.367*** (0.057) -0.019 (0.031)
Trend Tablita 0.001** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000)
Slope TZ to come 0.028 (0.019) 0.008 (0.014) -0.004 (0.006)
Mexican Debt Crisis 0.002 (0.034) 0.013 (0.029) -0.003 (0.020)
Tablita Argentina -0.021 (0.028) 0.006 (0.023) -0.059*** (0.015)
Austral Collapse 0.043 (0.028) 0.009 (0.020) 0.000 (0.010)
Cruzado Collapse 0.032 (0.027) -0.003 (0.019) 0.010 (0.009)
Cruzeiro Depreciation 0.053 (0.039) -0.005 (0.030) 0.006 (0.019)
Forward Contracts BROU -0.005 (0.022) -0.003 (0.016) -0.010 (0.007)
Forward Contracts BCU -0.012 (0.031) -0.020 (0.023) -0.022* (0.013)
Hyper in Argentina 0.041** (0.020) 0.021 (0.014) 0.013** (0.006)
Collor -0.036 (0.037) -0.012 (0.031) 0.003 (0.020)
1st SlopeTZ 0.012 (0.012) 0.021** (0.010) 0.002 (0.003)
2nd SlopeTZ -0.031* (0.019) 0.011 (0.014) -0.007 (0.005)
3rd SlopeTZ -0.039** (0.020) 0.006 (0.015) -0.007 (0.006)
4th SlopeTZ -0.022 (0.017) 0.006 (0.012) -0.005 (0.005)
Tequila 0.011 (0.038) 0.023 (0.030) 0.013 (0.019)
Real -0.022 (0.017) 0.015 (0.013) -0.000 (0.005)
Argentina -0.009 (0.029) 0.036* (0.021) 0.015 (0.009)
Var in Forex Reserves 0.028* (0.016) 0.016 (0.014) -0.007 (0.009)
Lagged ∆ CPI 0.249*** (0.043)
L. Fore Error 0.130*** (0.043)
L. Diseq E -0.122*** (0.027)
L. Actual Dev 0.060*** (0.018)
L2. Actual Dev -0.038*** (0.013)
L.Expected Depreciation 0.712*** (0.053)
L2.Expected Depreciation 0.314*** (0.067)
L3.Expected Depreciation -0.424*** (0.065)
L4.Expected Depreciation 0.161** (0.066)
L5.Expected Depreciation 0.233*** (0.063)
L6.Expected Depreciation -0.164*** (0.049)
Constant 0.050*** (0.007) 0.031*** (0.006) 0.006*** (0.002)
Observations 351 345 351
AIC -1218.887 -1357.233 -1720.353
BIC -1091.481 -1218.866 -1585.226
ADF on Res -6.275 -7.773 -13.025
Standard errors in parentheses. CV for ADF on Res with 2 non-stationary vars. 3.78 at 1%, 3.25, at 5%, 2.98 at 10%
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table D.4: Newey-West Time-Varying Extrapolating Factor Regressions
Dep.Var: i− i∗ (1) Pre TZ (2) TZ (3) Post-TZ (4) Whole Per. TV
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Lagged Dep 0.426*** (0.061) 0.253*** (0.053) 0.137*** (0.041) -2.134*** (0.326)
Lagged Jump 0.178*** (0.044) 0.133*** (0.036)
Inter Lagged Jump*Dep -0.459*** (0.081) -0.280*** (0.056)
Lagged ∆ CPI 0.211*** (0.039) 0.220*** (0.053) 0.436*** (0.110) 0.107** (0.043)
L. Fore Error 0.103 (0.085) 0.041 (0.089) 0.081** (0.033) 0.043 (0.039)
L. Diseq E -0.097 (0.067) -0.037 (0.023) 0.003 (0.015) -0.122*** (0.024)
Slope TZ to come 0.003 (0.011) -0.006 (0.012)
Tablita Argentina 0.105** (0.044) 0.033 (0.021)
Austral Collapse 0.009 (0.015) 0.029 (0.018)
Cruzado Collapse -0.010 (0.014) 0.015 (0.017)
Cruzeiro Depreciation -0.015 (0.020) -0.013 (0.026)
Hyper in Argentina 0.013 (0.010) 0.006 (0.012)
Collor 0.008 (0.022) -0.030 (0.026)
Var in Forex Reserves -0.028** (0.014) -0.018 (0.012) 0.015 (0.016) 0.030** (0.012)
1st SlopeTZ 0.041*** (0.009) 0.016* (0.009)
2nd SlopeTZ 0.018** (0.007) -0.005 (0.013)
3rd SlopeTZ 0.000 (0.006) -0.004 (0.013)
4th SlopeTZ -0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.011)
Tequila 0.008 (0.008) 0.017 (0.026)
Real -0.002 (0.003) 0.011 (0.011)
Argentina 0.032*** (0.006) 0.028 (0.018)
T.V. Extrapol 0.014*** (0.002)
T.V. Extrapol Sq. -0.000*** (0.000)
Trend Tablita 0.004*** (0.001)
Mexican Debt Crisis 0.014 (0.025)
Forward Contracts BROU 0.021 (0.014)
Forward Contracts BCU -0.005 (0.020)
Constant 0.063*** (0.019) 0.038*** (0.010) -0.003 (0.004) 0.035*** (0.005)
Observations 119 113 81 345
AIC -539.131 -760.972 -501.504 -1456.860
BIC -469.653 -698.242 -463.193 -1310.805
ADF on Res -4.956 -4.229 -3.969 -7.707
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure D.1: Coefficients of Adaptive and Regressive Components - Rolling Regressions
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Table D.7: Trace Test for Cointegration Rank
Lags VECM Max Rank Parms LL Trace Stat Crit. Val.
1 0 2 -695.230 70.288 15.41
1 5 -660.387 0.600 3.76
2 0 6 -596.810 86.031 15.41
1 9 -554.259 0.929 3.76
3 0 10 -582.578 88.932 15.41
1 13 -538.377 0.531 3.76
4 0 14 -571.298 98.650 15.41
1 17 -522.299 0.653 3.76
5 0 18 -553.729 156.965 15.41
1 21 -475.517 0.541 3.76
6 0 22 -486.736 102.931 15.41
1 25 -435.586 0.631 3.76
7 0 26 -357.183 36.983 15.41
1 29 -339.183 0.984 3.76
8 0 30 -293.360 68.535 15.41
1 33 -259.721 1.257 3.76
9 0 34 -262.241 38.650 15.41
1 37 -243.558 1.285 3.76
10 0 38 -255.553 51.058 15.41
1 41 -230.593 1.138 3.76
11 0 42 -251.784 50.062 15.41
1 45 -227.256 1.007 3.76
12 0 46 -232.636 53.187 15.41
1 49 -206.392 0.699 3.76
Table D.8: Information Criteria for Determination of Lag Order
Lags LL LR df P-Value FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 -2024.57 433.758 11.748 11.757 11.771
1 -650.429 2748.3 4 0.000 0.154 3.805 3.832 3.872
2 -547.997 204.86 4 0.000 0.087 3.235 3.279 3.346
3 -533.26 29.474 4 0.000 0.082 3.173 3.235 3.328
4 -518.003 30.514 4 0.000 0.077 3.107 3.187 3.308
5 -472.683 90.64 4 0.000 0.060 2.868 2.965 3.113
6 -433.741 77.884 4 0.000 0.049 2.665 2.781 2.955
7 -338.787 189.91 4 0.000 0.029 2.138 2.271 2.472
8 -260.073 157.43 4 0.000 0.019 1.705 1.856 2.084
9 -243.79 32.567 4 0.000 0.018 1.634 1.802 2.057
10 -230.681 26.218 4 0.000 0.017 1.581 1.767 2.049
11 -227.09 7.1828 4 0.127 0.017 1.583 1.787 2.096
12 -206.043 42.095 4 0.000 0.015 1.484 1.706 2.041
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Table D.9: Serial Correlation Criteria for Determination of Lag Order
Lags VECM Lags in Test Chi2 DofF P-Value
1 1 30.465 4 0.000
2 39.370 4 0.000
3 37.625 4 0.000
4 102.124 4 0.000
5 35.234 4 0.000
2 1 30.147 4 0.000
2 19.091 4 0.001
3 63.395 4 0.000
4 107.869 4 0.000
5 15.979 4 0.003
3 1 30.400 4 0.000
2 39.331 4 0.000
3 37.638 4 0.000
4 102.043 4 0.000
5 35.260 4 0.000
4 1 89.437 4 0
2 20.619 4 0.0004
3 52.458 4 0.000
4 133.492 4 0.000
5 20.521 4 0.0004
5 1 75.836 4 0.000
2 177.733 4 0.000
3 130.787 4 0.000
4 33.967 4 0.000
5 63.294 4 0.000
6 1 183.944 4 0.000
2 261.372 4 0.000
3 84.496 4 0.000
4 15.404 4 0.004
5 32.493 4 0.000
7 1 150.680 4 0.000
2 7.206 4 0.125
3 31.019 4 0.000
4 30.407 4 0.000
5 66.865 4 0.000
8 1 31.097 4 0.000
2 46.080 4 0.000
3 10.355 4 0.035
4 6.382 4 0.172
5 23.969 4 0.000
9 1 24.844 4 0.000
2 17.122 4 0.002
3 9.032 4 0.060
4 10.190 4 0.037
5 26.617 4 0.000
10 1 6.874 4 0.143
2 16.972 4 0.002
3 13.662 4 0.008
4 11.764 4 0.019
5 7.297 4 0.121
11 1 39.197 4 0.000
2 7.851 4 0.097
3 14.444 4 0.006
4 19.421 4 0.001
5 7.222 4 0.125
12 1 15.264 4 0.004
2 5.401 4 0.249
3 6.798 4 0.147
4 6.463 4 0.167
5 2.188 4 0.701
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Table D.10: Weak Exogeneity Tests
Lags Equation Coefficient S.E. t-stat P-Value Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 Forward Eq -0.162 0.021 -7.77 0 -0.202 -0.121
Spot Eq. -0.049 0.012 -4.08 0 -0.073 -0.026
2 Forward Eq -0.193 0.020 -9.74 0 -0.232 -0.154
Spot Eq. -0.002 0.012 -0.17 0.864 -0.025 0.021
3 Forward Eq -0.220 0.022 -9.92 0 -0.263 -0.176
Spot Eq. -0.0003 0.013 -0.02 0.983 -0.025 0.025
4 Forward Eq -0.254 0.024 -10.5 0 -0.301 -0.207
Spot Eq. -0.001 0.015 -0.07 0.947 -0.029 0.028
5 Forward Eq -0.342 0.025 -13.49 0 -0.392 -0.292
Spot Eq. 0.033 0.016 2.06 0.04 0.002 0.065
6 Forward Eq -0.292 0.029 -10.23 0 -0.348 -0.236
Spot Eq. 0.046 0.020 2.26 0.024 0.006 0.086
7 Forward Eq -0.142 0.025 -5.62 0 -0.191 -0.092
Spot Eq. 0.034 0.024 1.46 0.145 -0.012 0.081
8 Forward Eq -0.163 0.021 -7.64 0 -0.205 -0.121
Spot Eq. 0.042 0.024 1.74 0.082 -0.005 0.090
9 Forward Eq -0.129 0.023 -5.59 0 -0.174 -0.083
Spot Eq. 0.027 0.027 0.98 0.328 -0.027 0.080
10 Forward Eq -0.163 0.024 -6.92 0 -0.209 -0.117
Spot Eq. 0.001 0.028 0.04 0.97 -0.054 0.056
11 Forward Eq -0.167 0.025 -6.58 0 -0.217 -0.118
Spot Eq. 0.026 0.030 0.87 0.384 -0.033 0.086
12 Forward Eq -0.181 0.026 -6.96 0 -0.232 -0.130
Spot Eq. 0.017 0.033 0.52 0.6 -0.047 0.081
Table D.11: Cointegration Coefficient
Lags in VECM Coeff. S.E. t-stat P-Value Upper Bound Lower Bound
1 0.944 0.021 45.100 0.000 0.985 0.903
2 0.947 0.017 55.310 0.000 0.981 0.914
3 0.946 0.015 63.330 0.000 0.975 0.917
4 0.943 0.012 75.650 0.000 0.968 0.919
5 0.944 0.008 114.120 0.000 0.961 0.928
6 0.948 0.009 110.140 0.000 0.965 0.931
7 0.956 0.013 71.180 0.000 0.982 0.930
8 0.965 0.009 102.170 0.000 0.984 0.947
9 0.962 0.012 81.460 0.000 0.985 0.939
10 0.964 0.010 98.970 0.000 0.983 0.945
11 0.963 0.009 104.360 0.000 0.981 0.945
12 0.959 0.008 115.580 0.000 0.975 0.943
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Appendix E
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Argentina 9.64 10.90 8.83 8.58 6.27
Brazil 6.87 4.18 3.64 5.66 4.89
Uruguay 4.70 6.40 8.11 7.86 7.10
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. Figures are in percentage changes.
Table E.1: CPI Inflation Rate
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